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Preface 
This document describes the concept definition, studies, and analysis results generated by the 
Space Shuttle Program (SSP), International Space Station (ISS) Program (ISSP), and Mission 
Operations Directorate for implementing Dual Docked Operations (DDO) during mated 
Orbiter/ISS missions. This work was performed over a number of years. Due to the ever 
increasing visiting vehicle traffic to and from the ISS, it became apparent to both the ISSP and 
the SSP that there would arise occasions where conflicts between a visiting vehicle docking 
and/or undocking could overlap with a planned Space Shuttle launch and/or during docked 
operations. This potential conflict provided the genesis for evaluating risk mitigations to gain 
maximum flexibility for managing potential visiting vehicle traffic to and from the ISS and to 
maximize launch and landing opportunities for all visiting vehicles. 
This document reflects the hard work and dedication of individuals representing the SSP, ISSP, 
and their contractor community. This team has contributed to the Agency’s understanding of 
DDO and are greatly appreciated. The teams and their leads who contributed to this effort are as 
follows: 
SSP Flight Operations and Integration Office - Joel Sills 
SSP Orbiter Project Office (OPO) - Malise Fletcher 
SSP Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Office - Sally Davis 
ISS Vehicle Integrated Performance, Environments, and Resources (VIPER) - W. Spetch and E. 
Menkin 
ISS Environments - Courtney Steagall 
ISS S&MA Office - Nathan Vassberg 
ISS S&MA Risk Office - Mike Lutomski 
Johnson Space Center (JSC) S&MA - Brian Rochon 
JSC Proximity Operations Environments - Quyen Jones 
The overarching goal of this effort was to assess the viability and readiness of the SSP to protect 
for DDO on any given mission. Discussion and results presented herein represent a generic 
assessment of the SSP and ISSP integrated safety and technical evaluations of DDO, realizing 
that mission-specific analysis and operational impacts are future work. 
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1.0 Executive Summary 
1.1 Introduction 
Due to the ever increasing visiting vehicle traffic to and from the International Space Station 
(ISS), it became apparent to both the ISS Program (ISSP) and the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) 
that there would arise occasions where conflicts between a visiting vehicle docking and/or 
undocking could overlap with a planned SSP launch and/or during docked operations. This 
potential conflict provided the genesis for evaluating risk mitigations to gain maximum 
flexibility for managing potential visiting vehicle traffic to and from the ISS and to maximize 
launch and landing opportunities for all visiting vehicles. This document chronicles the concept 
definition studies and analysis results generated by both the SSP and the ISSP for Dual Docked 
Operations (DDO) involving the Orbiter and Russian vehicles (RVs) (i.e., Soyuz or Progress). 
The studies, analyses, and results presented summarize the work conducted over a 22-month 
timeframe from October 2008 through August 2010 by a cadre of SSP, ISSP, and, Mission 
Operations Directorate (MOD) teams.  
To manage this wide-ranging issue, the program teams decided to approach this study in a piece-
wise manner, focusing on the greatest portion of the visiting vehicle traffic and their potential 
overlap with Space Shuttle missions. For the purposes of this document, both the ISSP and the 
SSP defined DDO as the capability to perform a RV docking or undocking during a mated SSP 
mission to ISS. H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV), Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), and 
commercial resupply vehicles were not considered.  
The overarching goal of this effort was to assess the viability and readiness of the SSP to protect 
for DDO on any given mission. Discussion and results presented represent a generic assessment 
of the SSP and ISSP integrated safety and technical evaluations of DDO, realizing that mission-
specific analysis and operational impacts are future work. 
1.2 Requirements and Ground Rules 
From the outset, a set of requirements and ground rules were established to set the framework for 
the study. The ISSP and SSP teams jointly agreed that DDO shall occur only at the following ISS 
Ports (see Figure 1-1):   
1. Service Module (SM) Aft for docking and undocking 
2. Docking Compartment One (DC-1) Nadir for docking and undocking  
3. Functional Cargo Block (FGB) Nadir for undocking only 
4. Multi-Purpose Research Module One (MRM1) 
5. MRM2 Zenith for docking and undocking  
RV docking or undocking is prohibited while a cargo element is on the Shuttle Remote 
Manipulator System (SRMS). RV docking or undocking during extravehicular activity (EVA), 
robotics, or during Orbiter dock/undock day is prohibited.  
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During RV dockings, the ISS shall be under Russian Segment (RS) control, and the Orbiter 
system shall remain passive. For undocking, two options shall be considered for mated stack 
control:   
1. Undocking shall be performed with ISS mated stack under RS control only. 
2. Undocking shall be performed with mated stack under Orbiter Vernier reaction control 
system (VRCS) jet control only. There shall be no consideration given to mixed RS and 
Orbiter control due to the complexity associated with the ISS solar array plan for either 
set of jets.  
For docking of the Soyuz, DDO shall occur only during indirect Soyuz crew rotations. 
Therefore, there will be no more than 13 crew members onboard the ISS at a single time. RV 
undock/dock shall occur only over Russian ground track and during crew awake periods. 
 
 
Figure 1-1.  Representation of joint docked SSP/ISS mission configuration. 
1.3 Thruster Contamination and Particle Fluence 
To assess the viability of performing DDO, the ISSP delivered plume particle fluence and 
contamination deposition based on RV proximity operations to the SSP for evaluation. These 
environments will cause thruster plume contamination and erosion/pitting to Orbiter surfaces. 
The contamination is due to the deposition of unburned or partially burned propellant droplet 
material, while the erosion/pitting is mechanical damage due to high velocity impacts of 
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unburned propellant droplets. Initial contaminant deposit includes unburned unsymmetrical 
dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO), monomethyl hydrazine (MMH)-
nitrates, N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), and non-volatile residue (NVR), which includes 
impurities in the propellant.  
Particle fluence and contamination results were provided by ISSP for the following Orbiter 
surfaces:  crew cabin windows, Orbiter boom sensor system (OBSS) sensors, cameras on 
payload bay (PLB) bulkheads, keel, and SRMS, payload bay door (PLBD) thermal control 
system (TCS) radiators, and general PLB surfaces.  
Environments include particle fluence results for MRM2-based RV proximity operations to 
allow consideration of plume impingement on Orbiter wing reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) due 
to an MRM2 event. For each RS docking port, the ISS Space Environments team simulated six 
approaches, one separation, and one Soyuz thruster test per the available data. These scenarios 
were developed using as-flown data. No translation or attitude dispersions were modeled. In all 
simulations, the RV centerline was coaxial throughout with the docking port centerline and with 
the vehicle maintaining a constant attitude. This technique was used because sufficient 
information for accurate modeling of translation or attitude dispersions is not available from RV 
flight simulations.  
An additional analysis case involving a more conservative RV approach trajectory and attitude 
was provided by the ISS Space Environments team for assessment. RV approach proximity 
operations to the MRM2 docking port was selected for an alternative analysis case. The vehicle 
approach trajectory and attitude were selected to maximize particle fluence/contamination results 
for the front Orbiter windows (see Figure 1-2).  
For this more conservative case, nominal RV lateral misalignment was limited to a 10° cone 
along the approach vector. The 10° cone is a specification value for the approaching vehicle. The 
4° RV pitch results in higher particle fluence/contamination levels to the front Orbiter windows. 
The 4° pitch was selected to place the thrusters closest to the windows within the limits of the 
nominal approach. Results for this case indicate that particle fluence to front windows for the 
more conservative RV approach trajectory and attitude was higher than predictions in the 
original study by a factor of ~2.2, and contamination levels to front windows for the more 
conservative RV approach trajectory and attitude were higher than predictions in the original 
study by a factor of ~2.1. 
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Figure 1-2.  Approach trajectory and attitude for alternative approach analysis case. 
A RV abort scenario for vehicle proximity operations to the MRM2 docking port was assessed 
and environments were provided to SSP personnel. The abort scenario was synthesized from 
nominal approach jet firing data. The RV proximity operations to the MRM2 docking port was 
selected for the abort scenario. The scenario involves an approach and backout, both of which 
were modeled using available jet firing data for nominal RV approach proximity operations. The 
range offset was applied such that the last lateral engine thruster firing occurs at the minimum 
range for Orbiter window exposure (see Figure 1-3).  
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Figure 1-3.  RV trajectory and attitude assumptions for the abort scenario. 
Table 1-1 summarizes the particle fluence for the Orbiter windows, considered the most sensitive 
vehicle surface when exposed to the particle fluence.  In addition, separate particle fluence 
results were generated from the abort scenario case for 1 to 5 microns (μm), 6 to 10 μm, and 11 
to 12 μm diameter particle groups to support planned SSP ground hypervelocity impact tests as 
shown in Figure 1-4. 
Table 1-1.  Analysis case summary for orbiter windows. 
Nominal Approach
Alternative/Bounded 
Nominal Approach
Abort Scenario - 
Approach
Abort Scenario -
 Back-out
Abort 
Total
Approach Cone Half-Angle
degrees
0 10 10 15 -
Russian Vehicle Pitch Angle
degrees
0 4* 4* 15** -
Offset Applied 
(to fix last firing at range = 5 ft)
N N Y Y -
Particle Fluence to Fwd-Stbd 
Fuselage Window (Front)
particles/cm
2
2279 5006 6580 30754 37335
Particle Fluence to Fwd-Port 
Fuselage Window (Front)
particles/cm
2
2274 5047 6501 30678 37179
Reference Section 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.3 5.2.3
*Pitch angle held at 4 degrees to maximize particle fluence to Orbiter front windows.
**Pitch angle of up to 15 degrees.  Pitch angles less than 15° selected as needed to maximize particle fluence to Orbiter front windows.  
6 
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Figure 1-4.  Particle fluence by diameter to the Orbiter forward-starboard front window for the 
RV abort scenario. 
1.4 Proximity Operations Environments 
The ISS Loads and Dynamics Team (LDT) provided RV proximity operation loads when 
approaching the SM aft port, DC-1 nadir port, FGB nadir port, and MRM2 zenith port. These 
loads are based on post-flight reconstructions of RV approach trajectories to the ISS. A Monte 
Carlo analysis of the data was used to develop the models. For the analysis, the plume flowfield 
uncertainty factor was set to its maximum value for all jet firings to ensure conservatism in the 
model. For off-nominal plume pressure cases, a dual jet plume amplification factor of 1.634 was 
implemented. The 1.634 amplification factor addresses superposition of two-jets and provides 
additional conservatism.  
RV undocking force time histories were generated for the RVs using dynamic analyses that are 
based on the stiffness characteristics of the Probe and Cone mechanism’s plunger system. The 
undocking forces are calculated from a simple mass-spring system that consists of four plungers, 
located symmetrically about the interface, activated after the hooks and latches are released. It 
was assumed that the mass of the ISS was sufficiently larger than the undocking vehicle to 
justify using only a one mass system with a grounded spring. No other external forces are 
included in the model. 
1.5 Approach and Separation Trajectory Assessments 
Approach and separation clearances to ISS, as well as abort trajectories, were assessed during 
this study. Separation and docking analyses are required to confirm compliance with on-orbit 
Interface Control Document (ICD) requirements defined in Appendix S of NSTS-21000-IDD-
ISS paragraph S.4.2.3.5.3. From over 500 cases that were run, only 12 of the worst cases were 
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selected for detailed vehicle clearance analysis. Cases include both RV failed motion control 
system and nominal separation scenarios. The FGB-nadir port was ruled out for DDO due to 
Orbiter tail impingement within the 45 half-angle Kurs antenna signal cone. For the same 
reason, the MRM1 at the FGB-nadir point was ruled out for DDO. This signal interference keeps 
the approaching vehicle from communicating with the ISS. The FGB-nadir port separation for 
DDO provides a close clearance between a RV on the DC1 port.  
The NASA safety community and the Russians conducted extensive reviews of these 
trajectories. The two-fault tolerant guidelines were applied to RVs, with the implicit 
understanding that NASA would never receive complete documentation.  
However, over the course of detailed technical discussions concerning the architecture and 
docking operations, to include flight histories, agreement was achieved. In cases where the 
vehicles were not two-fault tolerant, nonconformance reports (NCRs) were written by the 
Russians, and the risks were accepted by the SSP and ISSP using the rationale of flight history to 
explain these situations. 
1.5.1 Orbiter Assessment Results 
The Orbiter Project Office (OPO) reviewed all ISSP-provided induced environments and 
performed assessments of all their subsystems. Regarding particle impingement, the threat posed 
to the RCC hardware is taken seriously, and inspections for surface damage will be included as 
appropriate to ensure the “Late Mission” micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) inspection 
is performed in accordance with operational flight rules. However, no damage to RCC is 
predicted, even if the late inspection constraint cannot be met.  
For the thermal protection system (TPS), post-flight MMOD inspections demonstrate that 
damage to tiles/blankets/felt reusable surface insulation (FRSI) from light fast particles is 
generally less severe than the damage of light fast particles to the RCC. Since the detailed Soyuz 
docking evaluation has determined there is no issue for RCC, no issue would be expected for 
tiles/blankets/FRSI. Therefore, there are no constraints for TPS.  
The closed circuit television (CCTV) system’s greatest vulnerability is in the camera lenses. The 
forward and aft bulkhead cameras and the SRMS Elbow camera must be pointed away from the 
plume flow to avoid direct contact by the plume particles. The SRMS wrist camera and the 
Orbiter RMS Sideview camera (RSC) should be protected from direct contact by the plume 
particles. If these constraints are not met, damage would result in degraded video pictures both 
by unwanted glints from pits on the wrist camera lens and/or blurring from the residue.  
Regarding SRMS/OBSS positioning, the OBSS receives particle impacts to some degree for all 
port locations. To mitigate this, the intensified television camera (ITVC)/laser dynamic range 
imager (LDRI) optics are not to be in the line of sight of the source of particle fluence. The 
OBSS constraint is to place it out of the line of sight of the plume. These positions have already 
been developed.  
Particle impingement on the Orbiter windows was analyzed, and the Windows Problem 
Resolution Team (PRT) assessment is that the pane strength test of laboratory-created specimens 
shows no adverse degradation to thermal pane strength as a result of the nominal and bounded 
nominal environments for DDO. A 3-sigma (σ) strength value of 6,212 pounds per square inch 
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(psi) stress is used, which exceeds the minimum entry/descent certification strength minimum 
value of 5,010 psi stress for thermal pane fused silica glass. 
The testing performed does not encompass the abort scenario environment, and the Windows 
PRT was not comfortable extrapolating their results to this environment. The testing performed 
was at the edge of the bounded nominal environment. The PRT used 5 μm particles of a certain 
fluence, and 10 μm particles of certain fluence. The strength of the glass was not sensitive to the 
two particle sizes nor the fluence prescribed for the nominal and bounded nominal cases. For the 
nominal and bounded cases, the strength of the glass was adequate for launch and landing; 
however, a determination on whether or not the strength of the glass was adequate for aborts 
cannot be made based on the data set in hand. During testing, the Windows PRT tried to insert as 
much potential scatter as possible with the available 17 specimens from 8 windows.  
Toxicity concerns for ground processing primarily center on the NDMA residue from the 
UDMH fuel oxidizer reaction products (UFORP). A secondary consideration is the nonvolatile 
salts that may accumulate in the PLB since these do no liberate in a vacuum environment. The 
UFORP components evaporate within 45 minutes from a surface at 25 °C. The nonvolatile 
particulate salts are eye and skin irritants per the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS), but use of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) will mitigate these concerns. Therefore, there are no 
constraints pertaining to toxicity. Forward work will involve sampling after the first DDO to 
include destructive testing of the TCS blanket cover to determine worst-case contamination 
quantity and composition. The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) industrial hygiene group has been 
engaged in this study, and no issues are foreseen. As an additional precaution, EVA is not 
allowed as per ground rules during a DDO, and the only exposure risk to the UFORP is in the 
area immediately around the engine bells of the SM. 
1.5.2 SSP Flight Operations and Integration (FO&I) Assessment Results 
All FO&I areas of responsibility assessed the viability for DDO. The Space Transportation 
System (STS)-130/20A mission was used as the pathfinder for this study. Existing certifications 
were applied generically where possible. All Joint Technical Working Groups (JTWGs) assessed 
the ISSP-provided environments for viability to perform DDO. Power/Avionics, Environmental 
Control and Life Support System (ECLSS), Power/Avionics, and Communication and Tracking 
(C&T), and electromagnetic effects panels completed generic assessments with no issues 
identified. The Thermal Control System (TCS), Vehicle Configuration (VC), Loads and 
Dynamics, and Flight Control and Structures panels require mission-specific analyses and 
documentation updates. 
Peak docking/undocking loads for both STS-130/20A and STS-131/19A demonstrated no limit 
load exceedances, with the peak load at 37 percent and 35 percent of the ICD limit loads, 
respectively. There were no constraints to DDO identified.  
Flight Control DDO results showed that Orbiter maintains control within attitude deadbands, and 
propellant usage was as expected, with all Shuttle Operations Data Book (SODB) constraints 
satisfied. The constraint was that DDO is certified using VRCS only, and only for undocking.  
The C&T Panel used the Soyuz/Progress System Data Book, the Space Shuttle Circuit Margin 
Data Book, and the EV7 radio frequency (RF) Data Base to ensure compatibility between RV 
and Orbiter communication systems. All ports were evaluated. Results indicated that the Orbiter 
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Ku-band requires restriction, either by mask or by placing the system in standby mode. There 
were no other constraints on either the Orbiter communication system or the Russian 
communication system, pending Russian concurrence. However, reflections from the RV could 
cause damage to Space Station Operations (SSO), the ISS Ku-band system, and the RV. 
The ISSP-provided Orbiter/ISS interface acceleration time histories for STS-131/19A were used 
to verify that RV docking/undocking loads and frequencies do not adversely affect the 
Orbiter/ISS interface and payloads. This configuration was selected to generate worst-case 
responses for STS-132/Unpressurized Logistics Flight (ULF) 4 and subs. The STS-134/ULF6 
manifest was selected based on payload frequency content. Resulting payload maximum 
(max)/minimum (min) load factors were compared to verification loads analysis (VLA) max/min 
load factors, and each DDO payload max/min was enveloped over all docking cases. All 
Orbiter/ISS interface loads were within ICD allowables. For the docking ports that were 
examined, there were no constraints for DDO for STS-132/ULF4 and subs. 
FO&I completed all required assessments to determine viability for performing DDO for all 
technical areas of responsibility. These assessments were based on formally delivered ISS 
environments documented in the ISS on-orbit ICDs. Work on STS-132/ ULF4 and subsequent 
missions are in progress. Assessments and evaluations for each flight where the possibility of 
DDO could occur are being incorporated into the Certificate of Flight Readiness (CoFR) process. 
The new environments will be vetted after the additional data are received. 
1.5.3 S&MA Assessments 
The integrated S&MA team members (ISSP, JSC, and SSP) met many times over the course of 
the DDO analysis period. Joint S&MA discussions and efforts included: reviewing the affected 
integrated hazard and risk baseline for docked operations; many hours of detailed background of 
the content development and rationale for the hazard reports; exchange of corporate knowledge; 
and identification of potential areas where engineering analysis might be needed to obtain a 
thorough review of the risk baseline. 
Recommendations from the SSP S&MA office include the following: 
1. Concurrence with the hazard analyses and risk characterization contained in the JSC 
S&MA analysis. 
2. No show stoppers were identified that preclude DDO, although there is a high level of 
uncertainty concerning the hazard analyses.  
3. If the ISSP requirements mandate DDO, then these risks should be carefully considered 
against the requirements mandating DDO and, if possible, the ISSP and SSP should 
reconsider scheduling and other constraints to avoid DDO. 
4. Any risk mitigation such as development of operational responses, however extensive, or 
further engineering analysis (including Russian-generated engineering analysis), should 
be pursued to reduce the potential risk that the current limited and high-level assessment 
presents.  
The ISS S&MA Office working in collaboration with the SSP Office agrees that no show 
stoppers have been identified that preclude DDO and if the ISSP requirements mandate DDO, 
that these risks be carefully considered against the requirements mandating DDO.  
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ISS S&MA evaluated hazards associated with visiting vehicles and incorporated their findings 
into their hazard reports and controls. For any risk mitigation on a specific mission where DDO 
is required, mission-specific development of operational responses however extensive, or further 
engineering analysis, including Russian-generated engineering analysis, should be pursued to 
further reduce the potential risks. 
JSC S&MA stated that the DDO assessment shows that this operational condition represents an 
increase in risk to the Orbiter. Docking/undocking aborts present a higher risk than normal, but 
quantifying the risk is difficult because of a lack of data, open causes, and undeveloped 
operational impacts. The primary hazards are collision, ISS structural overload, and Orbiter 
structural overload.  
The probability of an off-nominal scenario involving a RV dynamic operation remains high 
(about 1 in 20), although there is not a consensus in the S&MA community or an agreed-to 
methodology for computing the probability. However, because the joint ISS/Orbiter/Russian 
operational response to an off-nominal scenario is undeveloped, an off-nominal scenario may 
increase risk to the Orbiter.  
SSP Safety Panel chairs reviewed the approach to DDO safety assessment and have no additional 
concerns. 
1.6 Recommendations 
The SSP S&MA position is that no safety show stoppers have been identified that preclude 
DDO, although there is a high level of uncertainty concerning the hazard analyses. If ISSP 
requirements mandated performing DDO, the risks should be carefully considered against those 
requirements.  
The ISS S&MA position is to avoid DDO unless it must be performed. ISSP would look at 
mission-specific cases.  
It is important to note that the primary operational impacts are loss of activities for one docked 
day, sleep shift required, and complexity of operations with communications and docked Orbiter 
activities. These impacts would need assessing on an individual mission basis. 
The overriding consensus from these reviews is that DDO can be performed, but it should not be 
done unless required because of Agency priorities. For any scenario involving MRM1 docking 
and undocking, rigorous analysis and evaluation would be required by both the SSP and ISS 
communities, as this port was ground ruled out in all assessments performed to date due to 
limited clearance with the Orbiter vertical tail. Additionally, mission-specific risks and 
operational complexities will need to be assessed as part of the risk trade if a decision is made to 
protect DDO for a particular flight. 
2.0 DDO Operations 
The ISS is frequented by visiting vehicles, which ferry crew members and deliver ISS elements 
and supplies. These visiting vehicles include the Orbiter and RVs. Current ISS visiting vehicle 
launch constraints present a concern of the RV flights to ISS overlapping with Orbiter flights, an 
activity referred to as DDO. DDO is the capability to perform one RV docking or undocking 
during a mated Orbiter to the ISS mission, as shown in Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1.  Representation of joint docked RV/Orbiter/ISS mission configuration. 
2.1 Identified Impacts Evaluated in DDO Assessments 
The potential impacts resulting from DDO on Orbiter hardware, Orbiter government-furnished 
equipment (GFE), and ISS are identified below. This list is representative of the impacts assessed 
in the results presented herein, but is not limited to: 
a. ISS/RV Induced Environments:  
1. Docking and structural loads 
2. Thermal (mission specific) 
3. Thruster plume impingement loads, contamination, and erosion  
4. RF threats 
b. ISS docking port clearance (including Trajectory Analysis and Physical Clearance) 
c. RV Nominal and Abort Trajectories and/or corridors 
d. Orbiter Hardware, Software, and Operations 
e. Orbiter Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) while mated to ISS stack 
f. Orbiter Hardware, GFE 
g. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (CIL) of the Orbiter/ISS mated stack 
configuration 
h. Robotics Operations of OBSS and SRMS 
i. Flight-Specific Mission Operations Timeline, procedures, and training 
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3.0 Ground Rules and Assumptions 
For this joint assessment, a common set of ground rules and assumptions were established and 
refined as results were made available. These ground rules and assumptions were categorized 
into technical and schedule. 
3.1 Technical Ground Rules and Assumptions 
a. DDO shall occur at the following ISS Ports only 
1. SM Aft - docking and undocking 
2. DC-1 Nadir - docking and undocking 
3. FGB Nadir - undocking only 
4. MRM2 Zenith - docking and undocking 
5. MRM1 - This docking port is not specifically addressed in this study, but will be 
addressed post STS-132/ULF4, if necessary. 
b. RV docking or undocking is prohibited while a cargo element is on the SRMS.  
c. RV docking or undocking during EVA and/or docked robotics activities or during Orbiter 
dock/undock day is prohibited.  
d. During RV dockings, the ISS shall be under RS control, and the Orbiter system shall remain 
passive. 
e. For undocking, only two options shall be considered for mated stack control. 
1. Undocking shall be performed with ISS mated stack under RS control only. 
2. Undocking shall be performed with mated stack under Orbiter VRCS jet control only. 
f. There shall be no analysis or consideration for looking at VRCS jet fail case that leads to 
Alt-Primary Reaction Control System (PRCS) jet control for this case. 
g. There shall be no consideration given to mix Russian segment and Orbiter control due to the 
complexity associated with the ISS solar array plan for either set of jets. 
3.2 Schedule Ground Rules and Assumptions 
a. For Soyuz dockings, DDO shall only occur during indirect Soyuz crew rotations with no 
more than 13 total crew on board ISS during mated operations. 
b. RV undock/dock shall occur over Russian Ground track only. 
c. RV undock/dock shall occur during crew awake periods. 
d. RV relocation during Orbiter/ISS mated operations is not considered. 
e. Propellant shall be prioritized for planned Orbiter mated stack maneuvers to/from the 
dock/undocked attitude and budgeted as required. 
4.0 Environments 
RV proximity operations (i.e., docking and undocking) to ISS have never been performed with 
Orbiter present and raise a number of technical issues. In particular, the possibility of RV 
proximity operations to ISS with a docked Orbiter has raised concerns regarding thruster plume 
induced contamination and particle impacts/erosion to external Orbiter surfaces. Thruster plume 
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induced contamination and particle fluence/erosion are characterized by the ISS Space 
Environments team. 
4.1 Thruster Plume Effects and Modeling 
ISS surfaces as well as potential hazards to EVA as the Fuel/Oxidizer Reaction Products (FORP) 
contain toxic byproducts. Initial contaminant deposit includes unburned UDMH and NTO, 
MMH nitrates, NDMA, and NVR, which includes impurities in propellant. Initial contamination 
deposits are of interest in evaluations of potential toxicity levels. Permanent contaminant deposit 
that remains after evaporation of volatile material includes MMH-nitrates and NVR. Permanent 
contamination deposits are of interest in evaluations of surface optical property degradation. 
Data obtained during the plume impingement contamination (PIC) experiment on STS-74 
showed most volatile components evaporated within 45 minutes from a surface at 25° C [1]. 
External surfaces on the ISS can be mechanically damaged (eroded/pitted) when impacted by 
high velocity unburned liquid propellant drops present in bipropellant thruster plumes. Optical 
surfaces and surfaces with thin coatings, such as windows and camera lenses, are of primary 
concern. Thruster plume induced contamination and erosion/pitting have been observed on SSP 
flight experiments. The Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment (SPIFEX) on STS-64 and 
the PIC experiment both demonstrated pitting from plume particles, Figure 4-1. Surface pits 
from 1 to 24 μm in diameter were observed with scanning electron microscopy (SEM) [1, 2].  
 
Pit Diameters:  1-10μm 
 ~8μm 
Figure 4-1.  Thruster induced pits on SPIFEX aluminum witness  coupon (left) and PIC glass 
camera lens (right). 
The ISS Space Environments team bipropellant thruster plume model is a semi-empirical model 
that uses flight experiment and chamber test data for contamination characterization [3]. The 
model describes the number density and velocity distribution of unburned fuel droplets 
(particles) in a thruster plume with respect to particle size and angle from plume centerline. The 
thruster plume particle sizes and respective velocities are based on a model chronicled in 
reference [4]; however, the droplet flux model was revised in 2008 by the ISS Space 
Environments team to reduce excess conservatism and improve correlation with flight 
experiment and ground test data [5]. The revised plume model specifies unburned propellant 
droplets with diameters between 1 and 12 μm and limiting velocities ranging from 2.5 to 3 km/s, 
as summarized in Table 4-1. The normalized plume particle/droplet distribution by angle off of 
the plume centerline is shown in Figure 4-2. 
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Table 4-1.  Particle sizes and velocities in ISS bipropellant  thruster plumes based on the 2008 
droplet flux model. 
Particle Size Limiting Particle Kinetic Energy*
(mm) Velocity (km/s) (J)
1 3.05 3.53E-09
5 2.9 3.99E-07
10 2.65 2.67E-06  
*Kinetic energy calculated for a NTO particle; density = 1.45g/cc 
Normalized Droplet Fluence versus Off-Centerline Angle for Various Droplet Sizes
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Figure 4-2.  Normalized droplet fluence versus angle off-centerline  for various droplet sizes. 
The particle distribution is coded inside the NASAN-3 contamination computer model. NASAN-
3 is an integrated computer model, utilizing NASTRAN™ geometric models, view factor 
calculations, and transport routines to analyze induced contamination on an ISS configuration, 
with results available in tabular or graphical formats. The thruster plume particle distribution was 
adapted for each ISS engine type depending on thrust, propellant mass flow rate, and nozzle 
length [4, 6]. Using NASAN-3, RV thruster firings can be simulated to calculate contamination 
and particle fluence to Orbiter surfaces. 
4.2 RV Proximity Operations 
The RV traffic to ISS involves multiple ISS docking ports, as shown in Figure 4-3. The FGB 
nadir, DC-1 nadir, SM aft, and the MRM2 zenith docking ports were all considered for DDO 
studies. RV thruster firing activities that could result in plume impingement to docked Orbiter 
surfaces include approach/docking proximity operations and undocking/separation proximity 
operations. Soyuz thruster tests, which typically occur a few days prior to vehicle undocking, 
could result in plume impingement to the Orbiter. Thruster plume induced contamination and 
particle fluence to Orbiter external surfaces due to ISS reboost/attitude control thruster firings 
(from the SM or mated Progress vehicles) is negligible. Figure 4-4 shows some example 
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hemispherical views from RV thrusters that may plume Orbiter surfaces during ISS proximity 
operations. 
Note:  ISS Solar Arrays and ATCS Radiators 
removed for viewing of Russian Segment
Mini Research Module 2 
(MRM2) Zenith
Functional [Cargo] Block 
(FGB) Nadir
Service Module (SM) Aft
Docking Compartment 1
(DC1) Nadir
 
Figure 4-3.  RV docking ports (Stage 5R Configuration,  November 2009). 
  
a) RV braking thruster at range of 20 meters 
(m) from FGB nadir docking port. 
b) RV side-firing thruster at range of 10 m 
from MRM2 zenith docking port. 
Figure 4-4.  Example hemispherical views from Russian vehicle thrusters during ISS proximity 
operations. 
Available jet firing data for RV proximity operations is limited. The ISS Space Environments 
team utilizes post-flight jet firing histories provided by Rocket and Space Corporation-Energia 
(RSC-E) for analyses involving RV approaches to ISS. The relevant post-flight data set includes 
six nominal approach cases with vehicle range and thruster firing records (2S, 3S, 8S Soyuz 
missions and 14P, 15P, 16P Progress missions). For RV separations, RSC-E provided a generic 
timeline of RV braking thruster firings (side-firing/lateral thrusters not characterized). The range 
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and thruster firing timelines for the six approach cases and generic separation case are mapped to 
each of the four RS docking ports (accounting for docking port orientation as defined in SSP 
30129 [7]) for analysis purposes. 
Sufficient information for accurate modeling of translation or attitude dispersions during 
approach and separation proximity operations is not available. With the exception of MRM2 
separations, for which RSC-E supplied specific trajectory information, the ISS Space 
Environments team typically assumes the RVs remain straight, level, and aligned with the 
docking port during simulations. RSC-E has concurred with this practice. No jet firing data are 
available for off-nominal or contingency scenarios (e.g., abort, thruster failure). 
Soyuz thruster tests are performed manually by the crew inside the vehicle. The crew utilizes the 
hand controllers to fire the thrusters and monitors the command response on the Soyuz displays. 
The crew procedure is to deflect the hand controllers for 1 second in each direction. If the crew 
does not see the appropriate response on their display in a given axis, they will then repeat the 
test in that axis [8]. To simulate a Soyuz thruster test, the ISS Space Environments team assumes 
each Soyuz thruster is fired for 2 seconds total (1 second for the baseline test and 1 second for 
the potential repeat test). 
4.3 Orbiter Sensitive Surfaces 
The SSP identified the Orbiter sensitive surfaces of concern for thruster plume contamination 
and particle impact damage. These surfaces, shown in Figure 4-5, include: 
1. Crew cabin windows 
2. OBSS sensors 
3. Cameras on PLB bulkheads, keel, and SRMS 
4. PLBD TCS radiators 
5. General PLB surfaces (bottom, sides, and bulkheads) 
6. RCC located on the Orbiter wing leading edge (WLE) 
The ISS Space Environments team conducted an analysis program to characterize plume 
contamination deposition and particle fluences to these Orbiter surfaces due to RV proximity 
operations and thruster tests. Plume contamination and particle fluence analysis results for listed 
items 1 to 5 are reported in Table 4-2 through Table 4-6. The ISS Space Environments team 
conducted an in-depth test and analysis program to assess integrated thruster plume particle 
impact damage to the Orbiter RCC. The details of this activity are reported in Section 4.7. 
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a) Space Shuttle Orbiter on-orbit. 
Bulkhead camera A
Bulkhead camera B
Bulkhead camera C
Bulkhead camera DKeel camera (STS-131)
Keel camera (STS-132)
SRMS Elbow camera
SRMS LEE  (wrist) camera
Payload bay windows
Fuselage windows
OBSS sensors
TCS radiators
 
b) Space Shuttle Orbiter NASTRAN™ model. 
Figure 4-5.  Orbiter surfaces of concern for thruster plume induced contamination and particle 
impact damage. 
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4.4 Thruster Plume Particle Fluence and Contamination to Orbiter Sensitive Surfaces 
ISS Space Environments team conducted analyses to characterize RV thruster pluming of Orbiter 
windows, cameras, OBSS, TCS radiators, and PLB surfaces during DDO. Analysis products 
included 
1. Particle fluence results for evaluating potential erosion; 
2. Initial contaminant deposit results for toxicity evaluations; 
3. Final contaminant deposit results for surface optical property degradation evaluations. 
Thruster plume induced erosion calculations are specific to the impacted material. The Space 
Environments team lacks sufficient data on Orbiter surfaces/materials to support this type of 
analysis. Therefore, particle fluence results (i.e., total number of particles per square centimeter 
per event) were provided instead so that Orbiter could evaluate impact damage to their materials. 
The particle fluences were calculated for particle diameter bins of 1-5, 6-10, and 11-12 µm. 
These sizes were selected to support planned SSP ground hypervelocity impact testing (i.e., 5 
and 10 µm diameters are common projectile sizes for hypervelocity impact testing).  
Calculations of thruster induced contamination addressed both initial and final contaminant 
deposit. The initial deposit, including unburned UDMH and NTO, MMH-nitrates, NDMA, and 
NVR, was provided to support Orbiter evaluation of toxicology issues. The final or permanent 
contaminant deposit, including MMH-nitrates, NDMA, and NVR, was provided to support 
Orbiter evaluation of surface optical property degradation.  
Particle fluence and contamination analysis results for nominal RV proximity operations are 
reported in Tables 4-2 through 4-6. An alternative analysis case for nominal RV approach 
proximity operations is presented in Section 4.5. This alternative case was selected to produce 
more conservative results for the Orbiter windows specifically. Thruster induced particle fluence 
results for a synthetic abort scenario, which was tailored to maximize pluming to the Orbiter 
windows, are reported in Section 4.6. The ISS and Orbiter direction conventions used to report 
the analysis results are shown in Figure 4-6. 
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Orb. Zenith, ISS Aft
Orb. and ISS Starboard
Orb. Aft, ISS Nadir
 
Figure 4-6.  ISS and Orbiter direction conventions. 
The OPO must determine acceptability of RV thruster pluming of Orbiter external surfaces. The 
thruster plume particle fluence and contamination analysis results reported herein were delivered 
to the OPO for evaluation of potential impacts to Orbiter hardware. [9, 10, 11] 
4.4.1 Nominal RV Proximity Operations 
Thruster induced particle fluence and contamination deposition for nominal RV proximity 
operations were analyzed using available RV jet firing data as described in Section 4.2. For 
nominal proximity operations, the ISS Space Environments team assumed the RVs remain 
straight, level, and aligned with the docking port for all simulations except for RV separations 
from the MRM2 docking port. RSC-E supplied specific trajectory information for this case. For 
the purposes of this analysis, RV proximity operations consist of three events:  approach, thruster 
test (Soyuz only), and separation. 
Example results for approach are shown in the color contours in Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8. 
Figure 4-7 shows the predicted fluence of particles with 1 to 5 µm diameters for the 8S approach 
jet firing history applied to each docking port. Figure 4-8 shows the predicted initial and final 
contamination deposition for the same jet firing history applied to the FGB nadir docking port.  
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Particles/cm2
 
a) Results for approach to FGB nadir (view of ISS with Orbiter mated). 
Particles/cm2
    
b) Results for 
approach to FGB 
nadir (view of 
Orbiter only). 
c) Results for 
approach to DC-1 
nadir. 
d) Results for 
approach to SM aft. 
e) Results for approach 
to MRM2 zenith. 
Figure 4-7.  Example particle fluence results for RV approach (1 to 5 µm particles; 8S-based jet 
firing history). 
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g/cm2
  
a) Initial plume contamination results.  b) Final/permanent plume contamination 
results. 
Figure 4-8.  Example plume contamination results for Russian vehicle approach to FGB nadir 
(8S-based jet firing history). 
Tabular results for each of the Orbiter sensitive surfaces (i.e., windows, OBSS sensors, cameras, 
TCS radiators, and PLB) are provided in Table 4-2 through Table 4-6. The tabular results include 
particle fluence, initial contamination, and final (i.e., permanent) contamination to the applicable 
surface for RV proximity operations to each of the four docking ports (i.e., FGB Nadir, DC-1 
Nadir, SM Aft, and MRM2 Zenith). The particle fluence results are further broken out by particle 
diameter bins (i.e., 1 to 5 µm, 6 to 10 µm, and 11to 12 µm). 
For RV approach proximity operations, all six nominal approach cases were analyzed (i.e., post-
flight cases 2S, 3S, 8S Soyuz missions, and 14P, 15P, 16P Progress missions). For conservatism, 
the maximum plume particle fluence/contamination result from all six approach cases is reported 
in the tabular results. It should be noted that the maximum result was determined uniquely for 
each sensitive surface and docking port combination. For example, the 8S Soyuz jet firing 
history produced the maximum particle fluence to Orbiter front windows for RV approach to the 
MRM2 docking port. This is demonstrated by Figure 4-9, which shows the cumulative particle 
fluence to the Orbiter front windows versus range for all six jet firing histories. 
It should be noted that the smallest particles constitute the vast majority in the fluence results. 
For example, for the 8S approach jet firing history applied to the MRM2 docking port, the 1 to 2 
µm diameter particles constitute over 92 percent of the particle fluence to the Orbiter front 
windows. Additional information is provided in Figure 4-10, which shows the cumulative 
particle fluence versus range for various particle sizes. This could be an important consideration 
when interpreting hypervelocity impact test results, since 5 µm is the smallest projectile diameter 
typically used for this kind of testing. 
The tabular results in Table 4-2 through Table 4-6 include a single event max corresponding to 
the maximum fluence/contamination value out of all individual proximity operations events (i.e., 
RV approach, Soyuz thruster test, and RV separation). The tabular results include the total for all 
three events (i.e., results for approach, Soyuz thruster test, and separation combined). In checks 
of results, the separation and Soyuz thruster test results were usually minor compared to the 
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approach results. However, given the limited available data, applying the single event max 
values for evaluating any individual proximity operations event (i.e., RV approach, Soyuz 
thruster test, or RV separation) is recommended for conservatism.  
 
Figure 4-9.  Cumulative particle fluence vs. range for RV approach to the MRM2 docking port. 
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Figure 4-10.  Cumulative particle fluence vs. range by particle size for RV approach to the 
MRM2 docking port. 
Table 4-2.  Tabular Results for Orbiter Windows. 
FGB Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter Windows
Window Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 9 9 0 0 0 0 9 9
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 9 9 0 0 0 0 9 9
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
DC1 Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter Windows
Window Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 10 10 0 0 0 0 10 10
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
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SM Aft Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter Windows
Window Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 20 20 0 0 0 0 20 20
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
MRM2 Zenith Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter Windows
Window Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1238 1238 5 5 0 0 1243 1243
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 1703 1703 8 8 0 0 1712 1712
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 2264 2264 14 14 0 0 2279 2279
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 485 485 0 0 0 0 485 485
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 1240 1240 5 5 0 0 1245 1245
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 1735 1735 9 9 0 0 1743 1743
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 2259 2259 14 14 0 0 2274 2274
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 487 487 0 0 0 0 487 487
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
Initial Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for Orbiter Windows
Window Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1.1E-10 1.1E-10 4.5E-11 4.5E-11 2.6E-16 2.6E-16 3.5E-08 3.5E-08
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 8.4E-16 8.4E-16 4.6E-15 4.6E-15 4.8E-08 4.8E-08
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 6.3E-08 6.3E-08
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 6.6E-10 6.6E-10 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 2.2E-08 2.2E-08
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 3.9E-10 3.9E-10 7.9E-11 7.9E-11 5.0E-10 5.0E-10 3.6E-08 3.6E-08
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 2.3E-13 2.3E-13 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 4.9E-08 4.9E-08
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 6.4E-08 6.4E-08
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 4.8E-10 4.8E-10 3.7E-13 3.7E-13 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 2.2E-08 2.2E-08
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      1.4E-11 1.4E-11 9.3E-11 9.3E-11 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
 
Permanent Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for Orbiter Windows
Window Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 6.1E-12 6.1E-12 2.5E-12 2.5E-12 1.4E-17 1.4E-17 1.9E-09 1.9E-09
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 4.7E-17 4.7E-17 2.5E-16 2.5E-16 2.6E-09 2.6E-09
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 3.5E-09 3.5E-09
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 3.6E-11 3.6E-11 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.2E-09 1.2E-09
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 2.1E-11 2.1E-11 4.4E-12 4.4E-12 2.8E-11 2.8E-11 2.0E-09 2.0E-09
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.3E-14 1.3E-14 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 2.7E-09 2.7E-09
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 3.5E-09 3.5E-09
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 2.6E-11 2.6E-11 2.0E-14 2.0E-14 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.2E-09 1.2E-09
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      8.0E-13 8.0E-13 5.2E-12 5.2E-12 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
*Approach, Soyuz Thruster Test, and Separation results combined
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
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Table 4-3.  Tabular Results for Orbiter Boom Sensor System. 
FGB Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for OBSS
Sensor Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
IDC Orb port/ISS port 11 11 0 0 0 0 11 11
IDC Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDC Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDC Orb zenith/ISS aft 99 99 0 0 0 0 100 100
IDC Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb port/ISS port        5 5 0 0 0 0 6 6
LCS Orb aft/ISS nadir        31 31 0 0 0 0 31 31
LCS Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb forward/ISS zenith         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb zenith/ISS aft      70 70 0 0 0 0 70 70
LCS Orb nadir/ISS forward        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb port/ISS port                 4 4 0 0 0 0 4 4
LDRI-ITVC Orb aft/ISS nadir                 96 96 0 0 0 0 96 96
LDRI-ITVC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb zenith/ISS aft                56 56 1 1 0 0 56 56
LDRI-ITVC Orb nadir/ISS forward             0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
DC1 Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for OBSS
Sensor Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
IDC Orb port/ISS port 2120 2205 116 118 18 18 2255 2342
IDC Orb aft/ISS nadir 324 324 23 23 4 4 351 351
IDC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDC Orb forward/ISS zenith 1980 2200 38 43 4 5 2022 2248
IDC Orb zenith/ISS aft 32775 34060 1820 1845 288 289 34882 36193
IDC Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb port/ISS port        2177 2257 119 121 19 19 2315 2396
LCS Orb aft/ISS nadir        3160 3160 94 94 12 12 3266 3266
LCS Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb forward/ISS zenith         259 259 20 20 3 3 282 282
LCS Orb zenith/ISS aft      33633 34828 1867 1887 294 295 35793 37010
LCS Orb nadir/ISS forward        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb port/ISS port                 2257 2321 123 124 19 19 2400 2464
LDRI-ITVC Orb aft/ISS nadir                 3089 3089 93 93 12 12 3194 3194
LDRI-ITVC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb forward/ISS zenith 1776 1976 39 42 6 6 1822 2024
LDRI-ITVC Orb zenith/ISS aft                35627 36614 1971 1983 307 308 37904 38904
LDRI-ITVC Orb nadir/ISS forward             0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
SM Aft Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for OBSS
Sensor Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
IDC Orb port/ISS port 69 121 1 1 0 0 70 122
IDC Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDC Orb forward/ISS zenith 317 481 2 4 0 0 320 484
IDC Orb zenith/ISS aft 2008 3046 16 23 0 1 2024 3069
IDC Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb port/ISS port        69 121 1 1 0 0 69 122
LCS Orb aft/ISS nadir        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb forward/ISS zenith         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb zenith/ISS aft      2002 3033 16 23 0 1 2018 3056
LCS Orb nadir/ISS forward        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb port/ISS port                 67 117 1 1 0 0 68 118
LDRI-ITVC Orb aft/ISS nadir                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb forward/ISS zenith 335 575 3 4 0 0 338 579
LDRI-ITVC Orb zenith/ISS aft                1991 2992 16 23 0 1 2008 3016
LDRI-ITVC Orb nadir/ISS forward             0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
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MRM2 Zenith Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for OBSS
Sensor Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
IDC Orb port/ISS port 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDC Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDC Orb forward/ISS zenith 13 13 0 0 0 0 13 13
IDC Orb zenith/ISS aft 5 5 0 0 0 0 5 5
IDC Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb port/ISS port        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb aft/ISS nadir        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb forward/ISS zenith         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LCS Orb zenith/ISS aft      5 5 0 0 0 0 5 5
LCS Orb nadir/ISS forward        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb port/ISS port                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb aft/ISS nadir                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDRI-ITVC Orb forward/ISS zenith 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2
LDRI-ITVC Orb zenith/ISS aft                7 7 0 0 0 0 7 7
LDRI-ITVC Orb nadir/ISS forward             0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
Initial Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for OBSS
Sensor Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
IDC Orb port/ISS port 4.8E-10 4.9E-10 7.1E-08 7.3E-08 1.7E-09 3.0E-09 1.1E-11 1.1E-11
IDC Orb aft/ISS nadir 4.0E-11 4.0E-11 1.1E-08 1.1E-08 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
IDC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
IDC Orb forward/ISS zenith 2.3E-10 2.6E-10 5.0E-08 5.6E-08 8.0E-09 1.2E-08 5.9E-10 6.7E-10
IDC Orb zenith/ISS aft 5.8E-09 5.9E-09 1.1E-06 1.1E-06 5.1E-08 7.7E-08 3.3E-10 3.5E-10
IDC Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LCS Orb port/ISS port        3.3E-10 3.3E-10 7.3E-08 7.5E-08 1.7E-09 3.0E-09 1.1E-11 1.1E-11
LCS Orb aft/ISS nadir        2.2E-09 2.2E-09 9.1E-08 9.1E-08 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LCS Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LCS Orb forward/ISS zenith         2.5E-11 2.5E-11 9.8E-09 9.8E-09 8.8E-12 1.1E-11 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LCS Orb zenith/ISS aft      5.0E-09 5.0E-09 1.1E-06 1.2E-06 5.0E-08 7.6E-08 3.3E-10 3.3E-10
LCS Orb nadir/ISS forward        0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LDRI-ITVC Orb port/ISS port                 2.5E-10 2.5E-10 7.5E-08 7.7E-08 1.7E-09 2.9E-09 4.6E-11 4.6E-11
LDRI-ITVC Orb aft/ISS nadir                 3.1E-09 3.1E-09 8.9E-08 8.9E-08 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LDRI-ITVC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LDRI-ITVC Orb forward/ISS zenith 2.0E-10 2.3E-10 4.3E-08 4.8E-08 8.5E-09 1.4E-08 4.8E-10 4.8E-10
LDRI-ITVC Orb zenith/ISS aft                3.9E-09 4.0E-09 1.2E-06 1.2E-06 5.0E-08 7.5E-08 8.5E-10 9.2E-10
LDRI-ITVC Orb nadir/ISS forward             0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
 
Permanent Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for OBSS
Sensor Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
IDC Orb port/ISS port 2.6E-11 2.7E-11 3.9E-09 4.0E-09 9.4E-11 1.6E-10 5.8E-13 5.8E-13
IDC Orb aft/ISS nadir 2.2E-12 2.2E-12 6.2E-10 6.2E-10 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
IDC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
IDC Orb forward/ISS zenith 1.3E-11 1.4E-11 2.8E-09 3.1E-09 4.4E-10 6.7E-10 3.2E-11 3.7E-11
IDC Orb zenith/ISS aft 3.2E-10 3.3E-10 6.1E-08 6.3E-08 2.8E-09 4.2E-09 1.8E-11 1.9E-11
IDC Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LCS Orb port/ISS port        1.8E-11 1.8E-11 4.0E-09 4.1E-09 9.3E-11 1.6E-10 5.8E-13 5.8E-13
LCS Orb aft/ISS nadir        1.2E-10 1.2E-10 5.0E-09 5.0E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LCS Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LCS Orb forward/ISS zenith         1.4E-12 1.4E-12 5.4E-10 5.4E-10 4.8E-13 6.0E-13 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LCS Orb zenith/ISS aft      2.7E-10 2.8E-10 6.2E-08 6.4E-08 2.8E-09 4.2E-09 1.8E-11 1.8E-11
LCS Orb nadir/ISS forward        0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LDRI-ITVC Orb port/ISS port                 1.4E-11 1.4E-11 4.2E-09 4.2E-09 9.2E-11 1.6E-10 2.5E-12 2.5E-12
LDRI-ITVC Orb aft/ISS nadir                 1.7E-10 1.7E-10 4.9E-09 4.9E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LDRI-ITVC Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
LDRI-ITVC Orb forward/ISS zenith 1.1E-11 1.3E-11 2.4E-09 2.7E-09 4.7E-10 8.0E-10 2.6E-11 2.6E-11
LDRI-ITVC Orb zenith/ISS aft                2.2E-10 2.2E-10 6.6E-08 6.7E-08 2.8E-09 4.2E-09 4.7E-11 5.1E-11
LDRI-ITVC Orb nadir/ISS forward             0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
*Approach, Soyuz Thruster Test, and Separation results combined
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
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Table 4-4.  Tabular Results for Orbiter Payload Bay and SRMS Cameras. 
FGB Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Bulkhead Cameras (A - D)
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
A Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Orb aft/ISS nadir   1929 1929 38 38 3 3 1970 1970
A Orb starboard/ISS starboard 19 19 0 0 0 0 20 20
A Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Orb zenith/ISS aft  662 663 10 10 1 1 673 674
A Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb aft/ISS nadir   112 112 0 0 0 0 113 113
B Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb forward/ISS zenith 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
B Orb zenith/ISS aft  7 7 0 0 0 0 7 7
B Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb aft/ISS nadir   147 147 2 2 0 0 150 150
C Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb zenith/ISS aft  16 16 0 0 0 0 16 16
C Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb port/ISS port   42 42 0 0 0 0 43 43
D Orb aft/ISS nadir   1301 1301 17 17 1 1 1319 1319
D Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb zenith/ISS aft  431 431 4 4 0 0 435 436
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
FGB Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Keel Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
STS-131 Orb port/ISS port    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-131 Orb aft/ISS nadir    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-131 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-131 Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-131 Orb zenith/ISS aft   1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
STS-131 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb port/ISS port    1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
STS-132 Orb aft/ISS nadir    60 60 0 0 0 0 60 60
STS-132 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb zenith/ISS aft   68 68 0 0 0 0 68 68
STS-132 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
FGB Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for SRMS Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb port/ISS port        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb aft/ISS nadir        33 33 0 0 0 0 33 33
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb forward/ISS zenith   1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb zenith/ISS aft       85 85 0 0 0 0 86 86
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb nadir/ISS forward    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb port/ISS port              0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb aft/ISS nadir              1757 1757 36 36 3 3 1796 1796
SRMS Elbow Orb starboard/ISS starboard    18 18 0 0 0 0 18 18
SRMS Elbow Orb forward/ISS zenith         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb zenith/ISS aft             618 619 10 10 1 1 629 630
SRMS Elbow Orb nadir/ISS forward          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
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DC1 Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Bulkhead Cameras (A - D)
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
A Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Orb aft/ISS nadir   85 85 0 0 0 0 85 85
A Orb starboard/ISS starboard 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2
A Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Orb zenith/ISS aft  99 99 0 0 0 0 99 99
A Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb aft/ISS nadir   446 446 24 24 3 3 473 473
B Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1889 1937 97 97 14 14 2000 2048
B Orb forward/ISS zenith 1719 1913 39 41 5 5 1762 1959
B Orb zenith/ISS aft  36739 37640 1777 1787 252 252 38768 39679
B Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb port/ISS port   1907 1956 110 110 17 17 2034 2083
C Orb aft/ISS nadir   757 757 44 44 8 8 808 808
C Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb forward/ISS zenith 1717 1910 44 47 7 7 1767 1964
C Orb zenith/ISS aft  37682 38582 2139 2149 337 337 40158 41068
C Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb port/ISS port   2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2
D Orb aft/ISS nadir   73 73 0 0 0 0 73 73
D Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb zenith/ISS aft  64 64 0 0 0 0 64 64
D Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
DC1 Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Keel Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
STS-131 Orb port/ISS port    42 46 2 2 0 0 44 49
STS-131 Orb aft/ISS nadir    2912 2912 78 78 10 10 2999 2999
STS-131 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 3 3 0 0 0 0 3 3
STS-131 Orb forward/ISS zenith 1701 1882 99 110 14 15 1814 2007
STS-131 Orb zenith/ISS aft   23952 26001 1279 1402 199 216 25430 27619
STS-131 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb port/ISS port    18 20 2 2 0 0 20 22
STS-132 Orb aft/ISS nadir    2010 2065 38 43 6 7 2054 2115
STS-132 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 33 36 3 3 1 1 36 40
STS-132 Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb zenith/ISS aft   23620 26160 2042 2262 380 420 26042 28842
STS-132 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
DC1 Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for SRMS Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb port/ISS port        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb aft/ISS nadir        3235 3235 91 91 10 10 3336 3336
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1897 1961 93 94 13 13 2003 2069
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb forward/ISS zenith   1950 2168 37 41 5 5 1992 2215
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb zenith/ISS aft       33482 34643 1624 1642 233 234 35339 36520
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb nadir/ISS forward    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb port/ISS port              0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb aft/ISS nadir              2062 2096 40 43 5 5 2106 2144
SRMS Elbow Orb starboard/ISS starboard    1163 1289 93 104 17 19 1273 1411
SRMS Elbow Orb forward/ISS zenith         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb zenith/ISS aft             27250 30194 2219 2460 402 446 29871 33099
SRMS Elbow Orb nadir/ISS forward          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
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SM Aft Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Bulkhead Cameras (A - D)
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
A Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Orb aft/ISS nadir   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Orb zenith/ISS aft  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb aft/ISS nadir   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb starboard/ISS starboard 39 70 1 1 0 0 40 72
B Orb forward/ISS zenith 547 1009 12 22 1 1 559 1032
B Orb zenith/ISS aft  3043 4908 64 104 4 6 3111 5018
B Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb port/ISS port   61 106 1 1 0 0 62 107
C Orb aft/ISS nadir   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb forward/ISS zenith 356 612 3 5 0 0 359 617
C Orb zenith/ISS aft  2054 3095 19 26 1 1 2073 3122
C Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb aft/ISS nadir   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb zenith/ISS aft  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
SM Aft Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Keel Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
STS-131 Orb port/ISS port    15 26 0 0 0 0 16 26
STS-131 Orb aft/ISS nadir    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-131 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 2
STS-131 Orb forward/ISS zenith 259 428 3 6 0 0 263 434
STS-131 Orb zenith/ISS aft   2140 3187 25 40 1 2 2166 3229
STS-131 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb port/ISS port    5 5 0 0 0 0 5 5
STS-132 Orb aft/ISS nadir    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
STS-132 Orb forward/ISS zenith 59 59 0 0 0 0 59 59
STS-132 Orb zenith/ISS aft   1082 1082 8 8 0 0 1090 1090
STS-132 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
SM Aft Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for SRMS Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb port/ISS port        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb aft/ISS nadir        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 42 78 1 2 0 0 43 80
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb forward/ISS zenith   531 995 12 22 1 1 543 1019
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb zenith/ISS aft       3112 5096 66 112 4 7 3182 5215
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb nadir/ISS forward    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb port/ISS port              0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb aft/ISS nadir              0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb starboard/ISS starboard    25 38 0 1 0 0 26 38
SRMS Elbow Orb forward/ISS zenith         242 379 4 6 0 0 246 385
SRMS Elbow Orb zenith/ISS aft             2719 3972 38 61 2 3 2759 4035
SRMS Elbow Orb nadir/ISS forward          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
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MRM2 Zenith Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Bulkhead Cameras (A - D)
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
A Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Orb aft/ISS nadir   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
A Orb forward/ISS zenith 5 5 0 0 0 0 5 5
A Orb zenith/ISS aft  88 88 0 0 0 0 88 88
A Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb aft/ISS nadir   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb zenith/ISS aft  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb aft/ISS nadir   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb zenith/ISS aft  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb port/ISS port   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb aft/ISS nadir   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb zenith/ISS aft  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
MRM2 Zenith Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Keel Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
STS-131 Orb port/ISS port    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-131 Orb aft/ISS nadir    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-131 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-131 Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-131 Orb zenith/ISS aft   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-131 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb port/ISS port    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb aft/ISS nadir    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
STS-132 Orb zenith/ISS aft   1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
STS-132 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
MRM2 Zenith Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for SRMS Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb port/ISS port        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb aft/ISS nadir        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb forward/ISS zenith   4 4 0 0 0 0 4 4
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb zenith/ISS aft       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb nadir/ISS forward    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb port/ISS port              0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb aft/ISS nadir              0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb starboard/ISS starboard    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRMS Elbow Orb forward/ISS zenith         38 38 0 0 0 0 38 38
SRMS Elbow Orb zenith/ISS aft             9 9 0 0 0 0 9 9
SRMS Elbow Orb nadir/ISS forward          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
31 
Initial Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Bulkhead Cameras (A - D)
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
A  Orb port/ISS port   0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
A  Orb aft/ISS nadir   5.1E-08 5.1E-08 4.6E-09 4.6E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
A  Orb starboard/ISS starboard 5.4E-10 5.6E-10 1.4E-10 1.4E-10 3.1E-17 3.1E-17 5.3E-11 5.3E-11
A  Orb forward/ISS zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.9E-10 1.9E-10
A  Orb zenith/ISS aft  1.8E-08 1.9E-08 5.8E-09 5.8E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 3.7E-09 3.7E-09
A  Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
B  Orb port/ISS port   0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
B  Orb aft/ISS nadir   2.8E-09 2.8E-09 1.4E-08 1.4E-08 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
B  Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1.2E-10 1.3E-10 6.0E-08 6.1E-08 1.0E-09 1.9E-09 6.6E-18 6.6E-18
B  Orb forward/ISS zenith 2.9E-10 3.3E-10 4.2E-08 4.6E-08 1.4E-08 2.6E-08 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
B  Orb zenith/ISS aft  2.8E-09 2.9E-09 1.1E-06 1.2E-06 7.9E-08 1.3E-07 7.3E-11 7.3E-11
B  Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
C  Orb port/ISS port   1.3E-10 1.4E-10 6.4E-08 6.6E-08 1.5E-09 2.6E-09 8.1E-12 8.1E-12
C  Orb aft/ISS nadir   3.7E-09 3.7E-09 2.6E-08 2.6E-08 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
C  Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
C  Orb forward/ISS zenith 1.7E-10 2.0E-10 4.2E-08 4.6E-08 9.0E-09 1.5E-08 1.7E-14 1.7E-14
C  Orb zenith/ISS aft  3.2E-09 3.3E-09 1.3E-06 1.3E-06 5.2E-08 7.8E-08 3.6E-11 3.6E-11
C  Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
D  Orb port/ISS port   1.2E-09 1.2E-09 1.3E-10 1.3E-10 7.4E-18 7.4E-18 1.1E-12 1.1E-12
D  Orb aft/ISS nadir   3.5E-08 3.6E-08 4.1E-09 4.1E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
D  Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
D  Orb forward/ISS zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 4.2E-17 4.2E-17 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
D  Orb zenith/ISS aft  1.2E-08 1.3E-08 3.5E-09 3.5E-09 3.5E-15 3.5E-15 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
D  Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
 
Initial Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Keel Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
STS-131 Orb port/ISS port    2.6E-11 2.8E-11 1.4E-09 1.5E-09 3.8E-10 6.4E-10 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-131 Orb aft/ISS nadir    2.3E-10 2.3E-10 8.1E-08 8.1E-08 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-131 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1.8E-11 1.8E-11 1.0E-10 1.1E-10 4.0E-11 5.7E-11 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-131 Orb forward/ISS zenith 7.8E-11 1.0E-10 5.5E-08 6.1E-08 6.6E-09 1.1E-08 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-131 Orb zenith/ISS aft   1.4E-09 1.5E-09 7.9E-07 8.6E-07 5.4E-08 8.1E-08 1.9E-12 1.9E-12
STS-131 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-132 Orb port/ISS port    7.9E-11 8.2E-11 7.6E-10 8.4E-10 1.3E-10 1.3E-10 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-132 Orb aft/ISS nadir    3.1E-09 3.1E-09 5.6E-08 5.9E-08 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-132 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1.4E-11 1.5E-11 1.4E-09 1.5E-09 2.4E-11 2.4E-11 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-132 Orb forward/ISS zenith 4.4E-11 5.8E-11 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.4E-09 1.4E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-132 Orb zenith/ISS aft   3.9E-09 4.1E-09 9.7E-07 1.1E-06 2.7E-08 2.7E-08 5.9E-11 5.9E-11
STS-132 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
 
Initial Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for SRMS Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb port/ISS port        0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb aft/ISS nadir        2.6E-09 2.6E-09 9.1E-08 9.1E-08 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 2.4E-10 2.4E-10 6.0E-08 6.2E-08 1.1E-09 2.1E-09 5.4E-12 5.4E-12
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb forward/ISS zenith   2.8E-10 3.2E-10 4.8E-08 5.4E-08 1.4E-08 2.6E-08 2.1E-10 2.1E-10
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb zenith/ISS aft       6.5E-09 6.6E-09 1.1E-06 1.1E-06 8.1E-08 1.3E-07 2.6E-11 2.6E-11
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb nadir/ISS forward    0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
SRMS Elbow Orb port/ISS port              0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
SRMS Elbow Orb aft/ISS nadir              4.7E-08 4.7E-08 5.8E-08 5.9E-08 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
SRMS Elbow Orb starboard/ISS starboard 5.8E-10 5.9E-10 4.6E-08 5.2E-08 6.4E-10 9.5E-10 1.5E-11 1.5E-11
SRMS Elbow Orb forward/ISS zenith         3.7E-11 7.2E-11 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 6.1E-09 9.5E-09 1.3E-09 1.3E-09
SRMS Elbow Orb zenith/ISS aft             1.9E-08 2.0E-08 1.1E-06 1.2E-06 6.8E-08 9.9E-08 3.1E-10 3.1E-10
SRMS Elbow Orb nadir/ISS forward          0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
*Approach, Soyuz Thruster Test, and Separation results combined
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
 
32 
Permanent Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Bulkhead Cameras (A - D)
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
A  Orb port/ISS port   0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
A  Orb aft/ISS nadir   2.8E-09 2.8E-09 2.5E-10 2.5E-10 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
A  Orb starboard/ISS starboard 3.0E-11 3.1E-11 7.9E-12 7.9E-12 1.7E-18 1.7E-18 2.9E-12 2.9E-12
A  Orb forward/ISS zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.0E-11 1.0E-11
A  Orb zenith/ISS aft  1.0E-09 1.0E-09 3.2E-10 3.2E-10 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 2.0E-10 2.0E-10
A  Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
B  Orb port/ISS port   0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
B  Orb aft/ISS nadir   1.6E-10 1.6E-10 7.9E-10 7.9E-10 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
B  Orb starboard/ISS starboard 6.8E-12 7.1E-12 3.3E-09 3.4E-09 5.7E-11 1.0E-10 3.6E-19 3.6E-19
B  Orb forward/ISS zenith 1.6E-11 1.8E-11 2.3E-09 2.6E-09 7.9E-10 1.4E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
B  Orb zenith/ISS aft  1.5E-10 1.6E-10 6.3E-08 6.4E-08 4.4E-09 7.0E-09 4.0E-12 4.0E-12
B  Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
C  Orb port/ISS port   7.3E-12 7.5E-12 3.5E-09 3.6E-09 8.3E-11 1.4E-10 4.4E-13 4.4E-13
C  Orb aft/ISS nadir   2.0E-10 2.0E-10 1.4E-09 1.4E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
C  Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
C  Orb forward/ISS zenith 9.6E-12 1.1E-11 2.3E-09 2.6E-09 5.0E-10 8.5E-10 9.4E-16 9.4E-16
C  Orb zenith/ISS aft  1.8E-10 1.8E-10 7.0E-08 7.1E-08 2.9E-09 4.3E-09 2.0E-12 2.0E-12
C  Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
D  Orb port/ISS port   6.6E-11 6.8E-11 7.3E-12 7.3E-12 4.1E-19 4.1E-19 6.2E-14 6.2E-14
D  Orb aft/ISS nadir   1.9E-09 2.0E-09 2.3E-10 2.3E-10 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
D  Orb starboard/ISS starboard 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
D  Orb forward/ISS zenith 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 2.3E-18 2.3E-18 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
D  Orb zenith/ISS aft  6.8E-10 7.0E-10 1.9E-10 1.9E-10 1.9E-16 1.9E-16 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
D  Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
 
Permanent Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for Payload Bay Keel Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
STS-131 Orb port/ISS port    1.4E-12 1.5E-12 7.5E-11 8.3E-11 2.1E-11 3.5E-11 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-131 Orb aft/ISS nadir    1.3E-11 1.3E-11 4.5E-09 4.5E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-131 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 9.7E-13 1.0E-12 5.7E-12 6.1E-12 2.2E-12 3.2E-12 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-131 Orb forward/ISS zenith 4.3E-12 5.7E-12 3.0E-09 3.4E-09 3.6E-10 6.0E-10 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-131 Orb zenith/ISS aft   7.5E-11 8.0E-11 4.4E-08 4.7E-08 3.0E-09 4.5E-09 1.1E-13 1.1E-13
STS-131 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-132 Orb port/ISS port    4.3E-12 4.5E-12 4.2E-11 4.6E-11 7.0E-12 7.0E-12 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-132 Orb aft/ISS nadir    1.7E-10 1.7E-10 3.1E-09 3.2E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-132 Orb starboard/ISS starboard 7.7E-13 8.3E-13 7.5E-11 8.3E-11 1.3E-12 1.3E-12 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-132 Orb forward/ISS zenith 2.4E-12 3.2E-12 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 8.0E-11 8.0E-11 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
STS-132 Orb zenith/ISS aft   2.2E-10 2.3E-10 5.4E-08 5.9E-08 1.5E-09 1.5E-09 3.3E-12 3.3E-12
STS-132 Orb nadir/ISS forward 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
 
Permanent Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for SRMS Cameras
Camera Receiver Surface
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb port/ISS port        0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb aft/ISS nadir        1.4E-10 1.4E-10 5.0E-09 5.0E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1.3E-11 1.3E-11 3.3E-09 3.4E-09 6.3E-11 1.1E-10 3.0E-13 3.0E-13
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb forward/ISS zenith   1.5E-11 1.8E-11 2.7E-09 3.0E-09 7.7E-10 1.4E-09 1.1E-11 1.1E-11
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb zenith/ISS aft       3.6E-10 3.6E-10 5.8E-08 6.0E-08 4.5E-09 7.3E-09 1.4E-12 1.4E-12
SRMS LEE (wrist) Orb nadir/ISS forward    0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
SRMS Elbow Orb port/ISS port              0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
SRMS Elbow Orb aft/ISS nadir              2.6E-09 2.6E-09 3.2E-09 3.3E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
SRMS Elbow Orb starboard/ISS starboard 3.2E-11 3.3E-11 2.6E-09 2.8E-09 3.5E-11 5.3E-11 8.5E-13 8.5E-13
SRMS Elbow Orb forward/ISS zenith         2.1E-12 4.0E-12 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 3.4E-10 5.2E-10 7.2E-11 7.2E-11
SRMS Elbow Orb zenith/ISS aft             1.1E-09 1.1E-09 6.1E-08 6.7E-08 3.8E-09 5.5E-09 1.7E-11 1.7E-11
SRMS Elbow Orb nadir/ISS forward          0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
*Approach, Soyuz Thruster Test, and Separation results combined
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
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Table 4-5.  Tabular Results for TCS Radiators. 
FGB Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter TCS Radiators
Radiator Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
TCS Starboard [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 307 309 3 3 0 0 311 312
TCS Port [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 736 750 16 16 2 2 754 767
TCS Starboard [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 128 128 1 1 0 0 129 129
TCS Port [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 380 382 7 7 1 1 388 390
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
DC1 Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter TCS Radiators
Radiator Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
TCS Starboard [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 27809 29692 1381 1502 201 220 29391 31414
TCS Port [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 26790 28679 1083 1204 165 185 28039 30067
TCS Starboard [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 9031 9995 392 434 50 55 9472 10485
TCS Port [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 8989 9947 393 435 50 56 9433 10439
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
SM Aft Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter TCS Radiators
Radiator Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
TCS Starboard [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 1608 2401 11 15 0 0 1619 2416
TCS Port [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 3713 6464 130 263 13 28 3856 6755
TCS Starboard [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 874 1163 4 5 0 0 878 1168
TCS Port [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 1839 2948 41 76 3 6 1883 3031
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
MRM2 Zenith Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter TCS Radiators
Radiator Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
TCS Starboard [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 601 659 0 0 0 0 601 659
TCS Port [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 596 654 0 0 0 0 596 654
TCS Starboard [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 80 87 0 0 0 0 80 87
TCS Port [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 96 104 0 0 0 0 96 104
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
Initial Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for Orbiter TCS Radiators
Radiator Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
TCS Starboard [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 9.4E-09 1.0E-08 8.8E-07 9.4E-07 4.1E-08 6.1E-08 2.2E-08 2.4E-08
TCS Port [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 2.5E-08 2.6E-08 7.9E-07 8.5E-07 1.0E-07 1.9E-07 2.2E-08 2.4E-08
TCS Starboard [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 5.3E-09 5.4E-09 2.7E-07 3.0E-07 2.2E-08 3.0E-08 3.1E-09 3.3E-09
TCS Port [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 1.3E-08 1.3E-08 2.7E-07 3.0E-07 4.8E-08 7.9E-08 3.9E-09 4.3E-09
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
 
Permanent Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for Orbiter TCS Radiators
Radiator Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
TCS Starboard [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 5.2E-10 5.5E-10 4.8E-08 5.2E-08 2.2E-09 3.4E-09 1.2E-09 1.3E-09
TCS Port [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft 1.4E-09 1.4E-09 4.3E-08 4.7E-08 5.8E-09 1.0E-08 1.2E-09 1.3E-09
TCS Starboard [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 2.9E-10 3.0E-10 1.5E-08 1.6E-08 1.2E-09 1.6E-09 1.7E-10 1.8E-10
TCS Port [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft 6.9E-10 7.1E-10 1.5E-08 1.6E-08 2.7E-09 4.4E-09 2.2E-10 2.4E-10
*Approach, Soyuz Thruster Test, and Separation results combined
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
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Table 4-6.  Tabular Results for Payload Bay Surfaces. 
FGB Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter Payload Bay Surfaces
Item Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Bottom [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft          431 432 5 5 0 0 436 437
Starboard side [Max on Surface] Orb port/ISS port        48 48 0 0 0 0 48 48
Port side [Max on Surface] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 44 44 1 1 0 0 45 45
Forward bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb aft/ISS nadir  2005 2006 40 40 3 3 2048 2049
Aft bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb forward/ISS zenith 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Bottom [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft          64 64 0 0 0 0 64 65
Starboard side [Surface Average] Orb port/ISS port        15 15 0 0 0 0 15 15
Port side [Surface Average] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 16 16 0 0 0 0 16 16
Forward bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb aft/ISS nadir  1202 1202 19 19 1 1 1222 1222
Aft bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb forward/ISS zenith 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
DC1 Nadir Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter Payload Bay Surfaces
Item Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Bottom [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft          29712 32128 1957 2169 367 407 32036 34704
Starboard side [Max on Surface] Orb port/ISS port        2285 2460 126 139 20 22 2432 2621
Port side [Max on Surface] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 2241 2414 118 131 20 22 2379 2568
Forward bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb aft/ISS nadir  442 442 0 0 0 0 442 442
Aft bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb forward/ISS zenith 1713 1907 44 46 6 6 1763 1960
Bottom [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft          15042 16648 877 971 134 148 16053 17768
Starboard side [Surface Average] Orb port/ISS port        998 1104 51 56 7 8 1056 1168
Port side [Surface Average] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 993 1099 51 56 7 8 1051 1163
Forward bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb aft/ISS nadir  73 73 0 0 0 0 73 73
Aft bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb forward/ISS zenith 1453 1618 28 30 4 4 1485 1651
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
SM Aft Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter Payload Bay Surfaces
Item Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Bottom [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft          2862 4815 63 116 4 8 2928 4939
Starboard side [Max on Surface] Orb port/ISS port        70 121 1 1 0 0 70 122
Port side [Max on Surface] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 63 122 1 3 0 0 65 126
Forward bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb aft/ISS nadir  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aft bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb forward/ISS zenith 546 1021 12 23 1 1 559 1046
Bottom [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft          1300 1823 15 24 1 1 1316 1848
Starboard side [Surface Average] Orb port/ISS port        37 52 0 0 0 0 37 52
Port side [Surface Average] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 44 76 1 2 0 0 45 77
Forward bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb aft/ISS nadir  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aft bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb forward/ISS zenith 376 678 6 10 0 0 382 688
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
MRM2 Zenith Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter Payload Bay Surfaces
Item Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Bottom [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft          123 123 0 0 0 0 123 123
Starboard side [Max on Surface] Orb port/ISS port        6 6 0 0 0 0 6 6
Port side [Max on Surface] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 18 18 0 0 0 0 18 18
Forward bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb aft/ISS nadir  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aft bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb forward/ISS zenith 59 59 0 0 0 0 59 59
Bottom [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft          3 3 0 0 0 0 3 3
Starboard side [Surface Average] Orb port/ISS port        1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Port side [Surface Average] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Forward bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb aft/ISS nadir  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aft bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb forward/ISS zenith 14 14 0 0 0 0 14 14
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
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Initial Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for Orbiter Payload Bay Surfaces
Item Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Bottom [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft          1.3E-08 1.3E-08 1.0E-06 1.1E-06 7.5E-08 1.3E-07 7.3E-09 7.5E-09
Starboard side [Max on Surface] Orb port/ISS port        1.4E-09 1.5E-09 7.5E-08 8.2E-08 1.7E-09 3.0E-09 5.1E-10 5.2E-10
Port side [Max on Surface] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1.3E-09 1.3E-09 6.9E-08 7.5E-08 1.7E-09 3.3E-09 9.4E-10 9.4E-10
Forward bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb aft/ISS nadir  5.3E-08 5.3E-08 1.8E-08 1.8E-08 1.7E-12 1.7E-12 6.2E-16 6.2E-16
Aft bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb forward/ISS zenith 3.0E-10 3.4E-10 4.1E-08 4.6E-08 1.4E-08 2.7E-08 2.3E-09 2.3E-09
Bottom [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft          3.3E-09 3.5E-09 5.0E-07 5.6E-07 3.3E-08 4.6E-08 2.7E-10 2.8E-10
Starboard side [Surface Average] Orb port/ISS port        5.8E-10 6.0E-10 3.2E-08 3.5E-08 9.0E-10 1.3E-09 4.9E-11 4.9E-11
Port side [Surface Average] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 5.9E-10 6.1E-10 3.2E-08 3.5E-08 1.1E-09 2.0E-09 6.2E-11 6.2E-11
Forward bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb aft/ISS nadir  3.2E-08 3.3E-08 4.1E-09 4.1E-09 1.0E-14 1.0E-14 6.6E-18 6.6E-18
Aft bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb forward/ISS zenith 1.4E-10 1.7E-10 3.5E-08 3.9E-08 9.6E-09 1.7E-08 5.1E-10 5.1E-10
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
 
Permanent Deposition Results (in g/cm
2
) for Orbiter Payload Bay Surfaces
Item Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Bottom [Max on Surface] Orb zenith/ISS aft          6.9E-10 7.2E-10 5.7E-08 6.3E-08 4.1E-09 7.0E-09 4.0E-10 4.1E-10
Starboard side [Max on Surface] Orb port/ISS port        7.8E-11 8.1E-11 4.1E-09 4.5E-09 9.4E-11 1.6E-10 2.8E-11 2.9E-11
Port side [Max on Surface] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 7.1E-11 7.4E-11 3.8E-09 4.1E-09 9.3E-11 1.8E-10 5.2E-11 5.2E-11
Forward bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb aft/ISS nadir  2.9E-09 2.9E-09 1.0E-09 1.0E-09 9.6E-14 9.6E-14 3.4E-17 3.4E-17
Aft bulkhead [Max on Surface] Orb forward/ISS zenith 1.6E-11 1.8E-11 2.3E-09 2.5E-09 7.9E-10 1.5E-09 1.3E-10 1.3E-10
Bottom [Surface Average] Orb zenith/ISS aft          1.8E-10 1.9E-10 2.8E-08 3.1E-08 1.8E-09 2.5E-09 1.5E-11 1.5E-11
Starboard side [Surface Average] Orb port/ISS port        3.2E-11 3.3E-11 1.7E-09 1.9E-09 5.0E-11 7.1E-11 2.7E-12 2.7E-12
Port side [Surface Average] Orb starboard/ISS starboard 3.2E-11 3.4E-11 1.7E-09 1.9E-09 6.3E-11 1.1E-10 3.4E-12 3.4E-12
Forward bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb aft/ISS nadir  1.8E-09 1.8E-09 2.2E-10 2.2E-10 5.5E-16 5.5E-16 3.7E-19 3.7E-19
Aft bulkhead [Surface Average] Orb forward/ISS zenith 8.0E-12 9.3E-12 1.9E-09 2.2E-09 5.3E-10 9.5E-10 2.8E-11 2.8E-11
*Approach, Soyuz Thruster Test, and Separation results combined
FGB Nadir DC1 Nadir SM Aft MRM2 Zenith
 
4.5 Alternative Analysis Case for Nominal RV Approach Proximity Operations 
The analysis results presented in Section 4.4 are considered to be representative (not bounding) 
given the limited RV proximity operations jet firing data. The OPO requested an alternative 
analysis case involving a more conservative RV approach trajectory and attitude. Due to reentry 
requirements, the Orbiter windows represent the limiting vehicle sensitive hardware for thruster 
plume particle impact damage. Therefore, the alternative analysis case focused on the Orbiter 
windows. RV approach to the MRM2 zenith docking port produced the highest particle fluence 
and contamination results to the Orbiter windows in the original study, so the MRM2 docking 
port was selected for the alternative analysis case.  
Per the RS Specification [12], the nominal RV lateral misalignment is limited to a 10° cone 
along the approach vector. The angular misalignment in pitch, yaw, and roll is limited to ±4° for 
nominal approach. The ISS Space Environments team performed a parametric study to determine 
the RV approach trajectory and attitude within these limits that would maximize or bound 
particle fluence/contamination results to the front Orbiter windows for the available data set. The 
selected approach trajectory and attitude is demonstrated in Figure 4-11. As shown, assuming the 
RV approaches along the forward edge of the 10° cone positions the vehicle as close as possible 
to front Orbiter windows, thus maximizing plume impingement. Additionally, assuming a 4° RV 
pitch brings the centerlines of the RV side-firing thrusters closer to the Orbiter windows for 
maximum particle fluence/contamination levels. It should be noted that the original space 
environments analysis (presented in Section 4.4) assumed no lateral or angular misalignment for 
RV approach. 
The alternative analysis case with the bounding RV trajectory and attitude assumption was 
applied to all six nominal approach cases (i.e., post-flight cases 2S, 3S, 8S Soyuz missions, and 
14P, 15P, 16P Progress missions). For conservatism, the maximum plume particle 
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fluence/contamination result to the Orbiter windows from all six approach cases was taken. No 
changes were made to the Soyuz thruster test or RV separation for the alternative analysis case.  
 
Figure 4-11.  Approach trajectory and attitude for alternative approach analysis case. 
Tabular results including particle fluence, initial contamination, and final (i.e., permanent) 
contamination to the Orbiter windows for RV proximity operations to the MRM2 zenith docking 
port are provided in Table 4-7. The particle fluence results are broken out by particle diameter 
bins (i.e., 1-5 µm, 6-10 µm, and 11-12 µm). The tabular results include a single event max, 
which corresponds to the maximum fluence/contamination value out of all individual proximity 
operations events (i.e., approach, Soyuz thruster test, and separation). The tabular results include 
the total for all three events (i.e., results for approach, Soyuz thruster test, and separation 
combined).  
The particle fluence to the Orbiter front windows for the alternative analysis case is higher than 
the predictions in the original study by a factor of about 2.2. Likewise, the contamination levels 
to front windows for the bounding RV approach trajectory and attitude were higher than 
predictions in the original study by a factor of approximately 2.1. Refer to Table 4-2 for the 
original particle fluence and contamination results to the Orbiter windows (i.e., assuming no 
lateral or angular misalignment for RV approach). 
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Table 4-7.  Tabular Results for the Alternative Analysis Case. 
MRM2 Zenith Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles/cm
2
) for Orbiter Windows
(Alternative Analysis Case with Bounding Russian Vehicle Approach Trajectory and Attitude)
Window Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 2715 2715 37 37 2 2 2754 2754
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 3693 3693 60 60 4 4 3756 3756
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 4905 4905 94 94 7 7 5006 5006
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 1333 1333 1 1 0 0 1334 1334
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 2743 2743 37 37 2 2 2781 2781
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 3817 3817 61 61 4 4 3881 3881
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 4946 4946 94 94 7 7 5047 5047
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 1341 1341 1 1 0 0 1342 1342
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles 6-10 µm Particles 11-12 µm Particles All Particles (1-12 µm)
 
Initial deposition results (in g/cm
2
) for Orbiter Windows
(Alternative Analysis Case with Bounding Russian Vehicle Approach Trajectory and Attitude)
Window Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 7.2E-08 7.2E-08
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 1.0E-07 1.0E-07
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 1.3E-07 1.3E-07
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 4.4E-08 4.4E-08
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 7.5E-08 7.5E-08
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 1.0E-07 1.0E-07
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 1.3E-07 1.3E-07
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 4.4E-08 4.4E-08
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      0.0E+00 0.0E+00
MRM2 Zenith
 
Permanent deposition results (in g/cm
2
) for Orbiter Windows
(Alternative Analysis Case with Bounding Russian Vehicle Approach Trajectory and Attitude)
Window Surface Normal Direction
Single 
Event Max
Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 4.0E-09 4.0E-09
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 5.5E-09 5.5E-09
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 7.4E-09 7.4E-09
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 2.4E-09 2.4E-09
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 4.1E-09 4.1E-09
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 5.7E-09 5.7E-09
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 7.4E-09 7.4E-09
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 2.4E-09 2.4E-09
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      0.0E+00 0.0E+00
*Approach, Soyuz Thruster Test, and Separation results combined
MRM2 Zenith
 
4.6 Synthetic RV Abort Scenario 
The analysis results presented in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 apply for nominal RV proximity 
operations. The OPO requested an analysis of a RV abort scenario. No jet firing data are 
available for RV aborts, so an abort scenario was synthesized from nominal approach jet firing 
data with OPO concurrence. As with the alternative analysis case for approach (Section 4.5), the 
synthetic abort analysis focused on the Orbiter windows which represent the limiting Orbiter 
sensitive hardware for thruster plume particle impact damage. The MRM2 docking port was 
selected for the abort scenario as the worst case docking port for the Orbiter windows.  
Ground rules for the abort scenario were established by the ISSP Integration Office/VIPER with 
OPO concurrence. An approach and backout portion was defined for the abort scenario. For the 
approach portion, the RV was assumed to operate within nominal limits for lateral and angular 
misalignment. For the backout portion, RV lateral misalignment was assumed to be limited to a 
15° cone along the approach vector. The angular misalignment in pitch, yaw, and roll was 
assumed to be limited to ±15° for off-nominal performance. The ISS Space Environments team 
performed a parametric study to determine the RV trajectory and attitude within these limits that 
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would maximize particle fluence to the front Orbiter windows for the available dataset. Example 
findings from the parametric study are shown in Figure 4-12, which gives particle fluence versus 
range for various trajectory and pitch angle assumptions. As the figure shows, the pitch angle 
assumption had a far more dramatic effect on the total particle fluence than the trajectory 
assumption. For both example cases, there is a negligible difference in results for a vehicle 
approaching along the centerline of the docking port axis versus a vehicle approaching along the 
forward edge of a 10° half angle cone. However, there is a dramatic difference in results between 
vehicle pitch angles of 0°, 4°, and 15°.  
 
a) Example results for the 8S jet firing history.  
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b) Example results for the 2S jet firing history. 
Figure 4-12.  RV approach cone and attitude variation effects on particle fluence. 
The selected trajectory and attitude for the abort scenario approach and backout are demonstrated 
in Figure 4-13. As shown, the RV approach along the forward edge of the 10° cone is assumed to 
position the vehicle as close as possible to front Orbiter window. Additionally, assuming a 4° RV 
pitch brings the centerlines of the RV side-firing thrusters closer to the Orbiter windows for 
maximum particle fluence/contamination levels during the approach portion. For the backout 
portion of the abort, the RV was assumed to follow a trajectory along the forward edge of the 15° 
cone. The RV pitch angle was adjusted for each backout firing up to the limit of 15° to hold the 
RV thruster plume centerlines as close as possible to the Orbiter windows. Finally, a range offset 
was applied such that the last lateral engine thruster firing would occur at the minimum range 
(i.e., worst case range) for Orbiter window exposure. The minimum range for Orbiter window 
exposure to a lateral engine thruster firing occurs when the RV docking interface is 5 ft (1.5 m) 
from the docking port, as demonstrated by Figure 4-14. 
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Figure 4-13.  RV trajectory and attitude assumptions for the abort scenario. 
Both approach and backout portions of the abort scenario were modeled using available jet firing 
data for nominal RV approach proximity operations. The RV trajectory and attitude assumptions 
were applied to all six nominal approach cases (i.e., post-flight cases 2S, 3S, 8S Soyuz missions 
and 14P, 15P, 16P Progress missions), and the maximum plume particle fluence results to the 
Orbiter windows from all six cases were taken. Please note that the approach jet firing data were 
applied to the backout portion rather than the separation jet firing data. This is because the 
generic timeline for RV separation only characterizes the RV braking thruster firings. The lateral 
thruster firings, which are of primary interest for pluming of the Orbiter windows during 
proximity operations to the MRM2 docking port, are not characterized in the generic separation 
timeline. Application of the approach jet firing data (for which the lateral thruster firings are 
characterized) to the backout portion is conservative in comparison for this particular scenario. 
Tabular results including particle fluence to the Orbiter windows for the synthetic abort scenario 
are provided in Table 4-8. Plume contamination analysis was not conducted since thruster plume 
particle impact damage is the primary concern due to Orbiter window reentry requirements. The 
particle fluence results are broken out by particle diameter bins (i.e., 1 to 5 µm, 6 to 10 µm, and 
11 to 12 µm). Additionally, the individual results for the approach and backout portions, and 
combined total are provided. 
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Table 4-8.  Tabular Results for the Synthetic Abort Scenario. 
MRM2 Zenith Proximity Operations Particle Fluence Results (in particles per square cm) for Orbiter Windows
Abort Scenario (Approach within 10 deg cone & 4 deg pitch to 5ft; back-out within 15 deg cone & 15 deg pitch)
5 µm Particles Only
Window Surface Normal Direction Approach Max BackOut Max Abort Total* Abort Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 2614 15086 17699 385
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 4943 23189 28132 658
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 6437 28995 35432 864
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 1712 16633 18346 314
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 2862 16035 18897 446
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 4915 23784 28699 677
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 6367 28898 35265 865
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 1728 16752 18480 321
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0 0
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      0 0 0 0
1-5 µm Particles
 
Window Surface Normal Direction Approach Max BackOut Max Abort Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 23 668 691
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 92 1141 1233
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 128 1526 1655
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 2 511 513
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 23 843 866
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 79 1208 1286
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 119 1538 1657
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 2 520 523
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      0 0 0
6-10 µm Particles
 
Window Surface Normal Direction Approach Max BackOut Max Abort Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 1 91 92
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 8 170 178
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 15 233 248
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 0 58 58
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 1 132 133
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 5 194 200
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 15 242 257
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 0 60 60
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      0 0 0
11-12 µm Particles
 
Window Surface Normal Direction Approach Max BackOut Max Abort Total*
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (side) Orb starboard/ISS starboard 2637 15845 18482
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (middle) Orb stbd-fwd/ISS stbd-zenith 5044 24499 29543
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 6580 30754 37335
Fwd-Stbd fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 1715 17202 18917
Fwd-Port fuselage window (side) Orb port/ISS port 2886 17011 19896
Fwd-Port fuselage window (middle) Orb port-fwd/ISS port-zenith 4999 25186 30185
Fwd-Port fuselage window (front) Orb forward/ISS zenith 6501 30678 37179
Fwd-Port fuselage window (overhead) Orb zenith/ISS aft 1730 17332 19062
Payload bay window (starboard) Orb aft/ISS nadir 0 0 0
Payload bay window (port) Orb aft/ISS nadir      0 0 0
*Approach and Back-out results combined
All Particles (1-12 µm)
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Range = 5 ft
 
Figure 4-14.  Hemispherical view to Orbiter front windows from RV lateral engine at range-to-
dock of 5 ft. 
The particle fluence to the Orbiter front windows for the synthetic abort scenario is higher than 
the predictions in the original study by a factor of about 16. Table 4-9 provides a summary of the 
analysis assumptions and particle fluence results to the Orbiter front windows for the original 
nominal approach analysis (Tables 4-2 through 4-6), the alternative analysis case for nominal 
approach (Table 4-7), and the abort scenario (Table 4-8). As the table indicates, the backout 
portion of the abort scenario accounts for the majority of the particle fluence results. This is 
because the pitch angle was adjusted for each firing (up to 15°) to induce worst-case plume 
impingement.  
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Table 4-9.  Analysis Case Summary for Orbiter Windows. 
Nominal Approach
Alternative/Bounded 
Nominal Approach
Abort Scenario - 
Approach
Abort Scenario -
 Back-out
Abort 
Total
Approach Cone Half-Angle
degrees
0 10 10 15 -
Russian Vehicle Pitch Angle
degrees
0 4* 4* 15** -
Offset Applied 
(to fix last firing at range = 5 ft)
N N Y Y -
Particle Fluence to Fwd-Stbd 
Fuselage Window (Front)
particles/cm
2
2279 5006 6580 30754 37335
Particle Fluence to Fwd-Port 
Fuselage Window (Front)
particles/cm
2
2274 5047 6501 30678 37179
Reference Section 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.3 5.2.3
*Pitch angle held at 4 degrees to maximize particle fluence to Orbiter front windows.
**Pitch angle of up to 15 degrees.  Pitch angles less than 15° selected as needed to maximize particle fluence to Orbiter front windows.  
It should be noted the smallest particles constitute the vast majority in the fluence results. For the 
abort scenario specifically, the 1 to 5 µm diameter particles constitute approximately 95 percent 
of the particle fluence to the Orbiter front windows. There are 5 µm particles that represent only 
about 2.3 percent of the total fluence. This could be an important consideration when interpreting 
hypervelocity impact test results since 5 µm is the smallest projectile diameter typically used. 
See Figure 4-15 for additional details on particle size distribution for the synthetic abort scenario. Particle Fluence to Orbiter Fwd-Stbd Fuselage Window (Front) 
for Russian Vehicle Abort Scenario (Approach + Backout)
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Figure 4-15.  Particle fluence by diameter to the Orbiter forward-starboard front window for the 
RV abort scenario. 
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4.7 Integrated Thruster Plume Particle Impact Damage Assessment for Orbiter RCC 
The ISS Space Environments team was first alerted to the possibility of DDO in 2006. The ISSP 
Integration Office/VIPER tasked the ISS Space Environments team to identify any potential 
issues that may require long lead times to demonstrate the feasibility of simultaneous Orbiter and 
RV operations [13]. The team identified thruster plume particle impact damage of the Orbiter 
WLE RCC (see Figure 4-16) as one such issue. The RCC protects the WLEs for maximum 
temperatures reached during atmospheric reentry. RCC uses a thin coating of silicon carbide 
(SiC) (30 ± 10 mils or approximately 500 to 1000 μm). This coating prevents oxidation and 
subsequent degradation of the carbon-carbon substrate during reentry and is of great concern for 
thruster particle impacts [14, 15]. No previous analytical or test data were available for thruster 
plume particle impact damage to RCC. 
 
 
Figure 4-16.  Orbiter on-orbit; view of RCC on WLEs. 
The SiC coating is applied with a dry pack material made up of alumina, silicon, and silicon 
carbide, and then placed in a furnace. A diffusion reaction takes place between the dry pack and 
carbon-carbon in which the outer layers of the carbon-carbon are converted to silicon carbide 
with no increase in thickness. Surface cracks can develop in the silicon carbide coating due to 
differences in thermal expansion, so the RCC is impregnated with tetraethyl orthosilicate for 
further resistance to oxidation. The RCC is then sealed with a glossy overcoat of sodium silicate 
glass, which is referred to as Type-A glass [14,15]. Figure 4-17 shows an illustration of RCC 
layers as well as a polished cross-section. The largest acceptable RCC damage from a single 
particle impact was identified by the Orbiter Leading Edge Structural System (LESS) Problem 
Resolution Team (PRT) to be 0.082 in x 0.091 in x 0.041 in (~2100 by 2300 by 1000 μm) in 
depth [16]. RCC surface erosion/coating removal due to multiple impacts must be addressed 
considering the high particle fluences present in thruster plumes.  
Image Courtesy of NASA 
RCC on Orbiter WLE 
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Figure 4-17.  Illustration of RCC material layers (left) and polished RCC cross-section (right) 
[15]. 
The ISS Space Environments team initiated a test and analysis program to characterize thruster 
plume particle damage to Orbiter RCC. Hypervelocity impact testing was performed to 
determine if a single thruster plume particle could penetrate the SiC coating (Section 4.7.1). The 
test data were then used to calibrate analysis tools to extrapolate ground test data to thruster 
plume particle conditions (Section 4.7.2). The test and analysis results were finally coupled with 
particle fluence calculations (Section 4.7.3) to characterize surface erosion due to multiple 
particle impacts (Section 4.7.4). The details of this test/analysis program will be presented 
herein.  
It should be noted that the test/analysis program to characterize thruster plume particle damage to 
Orbiter RCC was conducted prior to the 2008 revision to the thruster plume droplet flux model 
described in Section 4.1. The original model specified unburned propellant droplets with 
diameters between 1 and 100 μm [4] (see Table 4-10) and is conservative in comparison. The 
particle size and velocity distribution for the original model was used to select RCC impact 
testing conditions and to calculate thruster plume particle fluences for the RCC integrated 
damage assessment.  
Table 4-10.  Particle sizes and velocities in ISS bipropellant thruster  plumes based on the 
original droplet flux model. 
3.5E-063.051
4.0E-042.95
2.7E-032.6510
1.5E-022.220
9.3E-021.450
3.8E-011.0100
Kinetic Energy*
(kJ)
Limiting Particle 
Velocity (km/s)
Particle Size
(μm)
 
*Kinetic energy calculated for a NTO particle; density = 1.45g/cc. 
4.7.1 Hypervelocity Impact Testing of RCC 
The RCC sample used for impact testing was provided by Don Curry, an Orbiter RCC specialist 
in the thermal design branch of JSC Structural Engineering Division and a member of the LESS 
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PRT. The sample was the scrap remnant of an approximately 6 x 6 in piece. The scrap was cut to 
obtain two pieces (approximately 1.5 x 3 in each) for testing. Each piece was partitioned 
lengthwise into thirds for a total of six witness coupons with dimensions of approximately 1.5 x 
1 in each. Figure 4-18 shows a diagram of the original sample with markings to denote cuts.  
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Figure 4-18.  Diagram of RCC sample. 
Thruster-induced damage/erosion of RCC could be evaluated by exposing an RCC sample to 
thruster firings. Unfortunately, test facilities with this capability were not accessible for this 
study. Instead, RCC samples were impacted with simulated thruster plume particles. This was 
accomplished using a light gas gun and projectiles with comparable sizes, densities, and 
velocities expected in thruster plumes. The light gas gun testing was conducted by the JSC 
Hypervelocity Impact Test Facility (HITF) at Rice University. 
The impact testing was performed at normal impingement angles to maximize impact damage. 
Soda-lime glass beads with density 2.44g/cc were selected as the best available projectile to 
match density of thruster plume particles. (Note:  MMH density = 0.88g/cc; NTO density = 
1.45g/cc). Three tests were planned with glass beads at appropriate sizes and velocities for 
thruster plumes. One additional test was planned as an extreme case using 100 μm particles 
accelerated to 3 km/s (limiting velocity for a 100 μm particle is 1 km/s; see Table 4-10). It should 
be noted that the smallest thruster particle size of 1 μm has the highest flux and would be of great 
interest for ground testing. However, projectiles of this size are difficult to obtain and reliably 
impact at the intended specimen location. Therefore, this option was not considered. 
Table 4-11 provides a summary of the test conditions. Each test used multiple glass bead 
projectiles for good characterization of surface damage. However, the quantity of projectiles per 
shot was limited to minimize crater overlapping. All test velocities were greater than or equal to 
the respective limiting velocities in thruster plumes. Test 1-C experienced a large error band in 
velocity, so the projectile size and target velocity was duplicated in Test 1-E for more accurate 
results. No impact testing was performed on the sixth witness coupon.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Table 4-11.  RCC impact test summary. 
Test ID
Projectile 
Material
Projectile Density 
(g/cm
3
)
Projectile 
Diameter (µm) Velocity (km/s)
Kinetic Energy 
(J) Comment
1-A Soda-Lime Glass 2.44 4.5 - 5.5 µm 2.92 6.8E-07
1-B Soda-Lime Glass 2.44 20 - 25 µm 2.37 4.1E-05
1-C Soda-Lime Glass 2.44 95 - 105 µm 1.0 - 1.5 -
1-D Soda-Lime Glass 2.44 95 - 105 µm 3.04 5.9E-03
1-E Soda-Lime Glass 2.44 95 - 105 µm 1.03 6.8E-04 Test 1-C Repeat  
From visual inspection, it was difficult to determine that the RCC had been impacted. Only the 
witness coupon for Test 1-D showed visible signs of surface alteration. HITF provided several 
microscopic images of the RCC test samples. Figure 4-19 gives an example of these images 
taken by SEM. The smooth area on the left of the images is a strip of copper tape that was placed 
on the border between coupons. HITF used this smooth surface for inspection after each test shot 
to ensure projectiles impacted the witness coupon as intended.  
 
Figure 4-19.  SEM images of RCC samples from Test 1-A (left) and Test 1-D (right). 
Optical imagery to characterize RCC impact test samples was performed at the Combined 
Effects Test Facility (CETF) located at Boeing-Seattle. The first objective for the optical imaging 
was to estimate thickness of SiC coating on RCC. To accomplish this, several images were taken 
viewing the edge of the RCC sample. An example image is shown in Figure 4-20. This image 
was taken at 50x magnification with an optical microscope. From the image, the top surface is 
seen to be rough and uneven. The lighter color material extending downward from the top 
surface is the SiC coating. The coating thickness varied across the samples, but was generally 
greater than 0.5 mm (~20 mils) and less than 1.0 mm (~40 mils). This agrees with the SiC 
coating thickness specification of 30 ± 10 mils. It should be noted that the optical microscope 
can experience false colors at some magnifications.  
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1 mm
 
Figure 4-20.  View of silicon carbide coating from edge of RCC sample. 
In addition, optical imaging was used to characterize the surface of unshot RCC for comparison 
with impacted test articles. From visual inspection, the RCC surface was rough and textured. 
Qualitative comparison between clean and impacted samples may be important in determining 
surface degradation. To characterize the surface of the unshot sample (witness coupon #6), 14 
optical images were taken with varying magnifications from 50x to 1000x. These images 
suggested a very textured and rough surface, as shown in Figure 4-21. In this figure, long and 
short carbon fibers are clearly present. The shiny portions of the surface (especially visible at 
400x) may be an indication of the glossy top coating that seals the silicon carbide (i.e., Type-A 
glass). Several out-of-focus areas are present in the images due to the surface unevenness. CETF 
made a qualitative estimate of the size of the surface defects. In general, the surface defects had a 
minimum lateral dimension of approximately 40 μm and a vertical variance of approximately 
20 μm. Impact craters must be larger than these surface defects to be distinguished with optical 
microscope.  
 
Figure 4-21.  Unshot RCC sample at 50x (left), 100x (center), and 400x (right). 
The final objective for optical imaging was to measure crater diameters and depths for a 
representative set from each impact test sample. Characterization of crater damage as a function 
of particle size and velocity can be used to determine if thruster particle impacts may penetrate 
the SiC coating. Furthermore, this data may be used in combination with particle fluence 
calculations to determine an effective amount of surface erosion that may occur due to thruster 
firings. 
Unfortunately, the impact features on the Test 1-A sample were too small to be identified on the 
rough surface, and no measurement was made. For Tests 1-B, 1-C, and 1-E, CETF found the 
craters extremely difficult to distinguish from natural surface defects, though several 
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measurements exceeded the minimum defect dimension. Some measurements were taken for 
these samples; however, CETF advised that the results cannot be considered valid due to 
uncertainty in crater identification. Therefore, measurements for these test samples are not 
reported herein.  
Only Test 1-D resulted in craters large enough to be easily distinguished as impact features 
instead of surface imperfections. CETF measured a total of 24 craters from this sample. It was 
observed that the craters generally had two damage zones: an area of irregular shape where 
surface material has been removed to expose underlying fibers, and a smaller nearly-circular 
dark area near the center of the exposed fibers. CETF provided approximate diameters for both 
zones along with the measured crater depths. A summary of the Test 1-D sample measurements 
is provided in Table 4-12. 
Table 4-12.  Summary of Test 1-D impact crater measurements. 
Average: 129.6 251.3 43.1
Min: 90.0 180.0 4.0
Max: 180.0 330.0 100.0
Std Dev: 24.8 44.2 22.2
* Measurement error of +/-10mm applies.
Center Diameter*
(mm)
Flake Diameter*
(mm)
Crater Depth*
(mm)
 
To determine the crater depth, CETF focused on the surface of the sample, and then on the 
bottom of the crater, with the distance between focal planes giving an estimate of the crater 
depth. Some judgment is associated with this technique, especially in identifying the top of the 
uneven surface. Figure 4-22 shows an example of this technique for the deepest crater measured. 
The image on the left shows the impact feature with focus on the top surface, and the image on 
the right shows the same feature with focus on the bottom of the crater.  
Results from Test 1-D crater measurements show a minimum crater depth of 4 μm and maximum 
of 100 μm (average 43 μm). Crater diameters were typically 3 to 5 times the depth, with the 
largest crater diameter of 330 μm for the flake zone. It is hypothesized that the flake zone is due 
to shattering of the glass coating applied to the top surface, but additional testing would be 
required to investigate this. 
.   
Figure 4-22.  Deepest crater observed from Test 1-D with focus on RCC surface (left) and 
bottom of crater (right) to determine depth. 
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No impact testing measurements showed craters that penetrated the SiC coating (minimum depth 
of 20 mils or approximately 500 μm), with margin to spare. Test 1-D produced the largest impact 
features, but the velocity for this test exceeded the limiting velocity for thruster particles of the 
same size by a factor of three. In addition, the density of the glass bead projectile used for testing 
was higher than the density of particles in thruster plumes. Combining these factors, the Test 1-D 
sample experienced approximately 15 times the maximum kinetic energy expected in the most 
energetic thruster plume particles. In conclusion, test results show no concern for exposure of 
carbon-carbon material due to a single thruster plume particle impact.  
4.7.2 Analytical Damage Characterization 
Although RCC impact test results show no issue for SiC coating penetration due to individual 
thruster particle impacts, excessive material removal/surface erosion resulting from multiple 
impacts must be addressed. Crater damage due to smaller particles (≤5 μm in diameter) was not 
characterized by the impact testing, and particles of this size are the highest flux in thruster 
plumes. The ISS Space Environments team took an analytical approach to characterizing surface 
erosion due to multiple particle impacts by extrapolating impact test data for larger particles (i.e., 
diameters ~100 μm) to the highest flux thruster plume particles (i.e., smaller particle diameters 
~1 to 5 μm). This analytical approach involved simulation of thruster plume particle impacts 
using the Los Alamos National Laboratory SPHINX (Smooth Particle Hydrodynamics) code. 
See Figure 4-23 for an example particle impact simulation from SPHINX.  
 
 
Normal Impact
[Damage]
 
Figure 4-23.  Example SPHINX particle impact simulation. 
The general approaches for analytical damage characterization were to: 
1. Use SPHINX to duplicate measurements from Test 1-D. 100 μm diameter particle, 
normal impact of glass bead to SiC at 3.04 km/s. 
2. Perform SPHINX analyses to characterize damage for thruster plume particle impacts. 
a. 5 μm diameter particle, normal impact of NTO to SiC at 2.9 km/s. 
b. 20 μm diameter particle, normal impact of NTO to SiC at 2.2 km/s.  
c. 100 μm diameter particle, normal impact of NTO to SiC at 1.0 km/s. 
3. Calculate particle fluence to Orbiter RCC due to RV thruster firings during proximity 
operations. 
4. Linearly scale damage for a single particle impact by predicted particle fluence for an 
integrated damage assessment. 
The first step in the approach is critical for calibrating the RCC material properties in SPHINX 
so that it accurately models impact damage. SPHINX is particularly sensitive to the material 
yield strength. Material properties for the SiC layer (specifically, the yield strength) were of chief 
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concern since most of the thruster plume particle impact damage would affect this layer. RCC 
specialists in the LESS PRT provided an estimated yield strength range for the SiC coating of 
3,000 to 50,000 psi. For comparison, the yield strength for bulk SiC is approximately 300,000 psi 
(single crystal) [17]. The SiC coating yield strength is especially difficult to estimate due to the 
nonuniformity of the conversion coating as well as strain rate effects for hypervelocity impacts. 
The velocities that the thruster plume particles are traveling at will produce shock waves upon 
impact. As a result, material properties such as yield strength will vary significantly from readily 
available material properties. For example, the rate of deformation or the strain rate in a 
hypervelocity impact will be orders of magnitude (>104 s-1) greater than the strain rates applied 
in typical engineering stress-strain measurements (~10-3 s-1) that are used to determine yield 
strength. 
The ISS Space Environments team performed a parametric study with SPHINX to simulate 
ground Test 1-D (i.e., 100 μm glass bead projectile impacting SiC at 3.04 km/s) using increasing 
yield strengths for Type A and SiC. Results from the parametric study were compared against 
crater measurements from the hypervelocity impact testing to gauge appropriate yield strengths. 
Figure 4-24 through Figure 4-26 show SPHINX analysis results for various SiC yield strengths 
compared to the minimum, average, and maximum crater diameter, depth, and volume from Test 
1-D. The parametric study showed that assuming a SiC yield strength of 90,000 psi gave the best 
correlation of SPHINX analysis results with ground test measurement. These values were 
applied for subsequent analyses of thruster plume particle impacts to RCC. 
SPHINX Results for Test 1D - Crater Diameter
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Figure 4-24.  Crater diameters predicted by SPHINX analysis for various SiC yield strengths 
compared to measured crater diameters from Test 1-D. 
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SPHINX Results for Test 1D - Crater Depth
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1000 10000 100000 1000000
Yield Strength (psi)
D
e
p
th
 (
m
ic
ro
n
)
SPHINX Result
SPHINX 3D
Test 1-D Min
Test 1-D Avg
Test 1-D Max
Note:  SPHINX Plot measurements have an error band of +/- 20μm and Test 1-D crater measurements have error band of +/-
10μm  
Figure 4-25.  Crater depths predicted by SPHINX analysis for various SiC yield strengths 
compared to measured crater depths from Test 1-D. 
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Figure 4-26.  Crater volumes based on SPHINX analysis for various SiC yield strengths 
compared to crater volumes determined from Test 1-D measurements. 
A summary of Type A, SiC, and RCC substrate material properties are shown in Table 4-13. 
Most of these material properties were provided by the LESS PRT; however, the SiC yield 
strength of 90,000 psi for SPHINX analyses was based on the parametric study findings. The 
LESS PRT concurred to the use of the SiC yield strength of 90,000 psi for SPHINX analyses of 
thruster plume particle impacts to RCC. However, the LESS PRT requested that some analysis 
cases be performed with a SiC yield strength of 30,000 psi as a comparison point for sensitivity.  
Table 4-14 shows the SPHINX analysis case summary for thruster plume particle impacts to 
RCC. The first three cases corresponded to three plume particle sizes and velocities of interest. 
Cases 4 and 5 were comparison cases assuming a lower SiC yield strength (of 30,000 psi). A 
comparison case for the 100 μm plume particle was not included considering the low flux 
expected for particles this size. As the table indicates, the Type A coating was neglected for 
SPHINX simulations of thruster plume particle impacts. The Type A was difficult to model since 
there is no thickness specification and assuming there is no Type A present is conservative (i.e., 
results is more damage to the SiC layer). The LESS PRT concurred to this assumption. 
Additionally, modeling of the RCC substrate was not required. The SiC layer thickness was 
sufficient to prevent boundary effects for simulations, and omitting the unnecessary RCC 
substrate from the model greatly improved computational efficiency. Finally, all SPHINX 
analyses were performed with normal impingement angles to maximize crater depths. (Crater 
depth is maximum for normal incidence angles vs. oblique.) 
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Table 4-13.  RCC material properties. 
Type A 
[1] SiC
RCC 
Substrate
Shear 
Modulus (psi)
4.06x10
6
4.07x10
6
 
[2]
1.09x10
6
Yield 
Strength (psi)
4,500 90,000 
[3]
800 - 12,000 
[4]
Density (g/cc) 2.44 2.3 1.67
Thickness (mils) 1.5 20 - 40 n/a
[1] Modeled in SPHINX as Soda Lime Glass
[2] Based on Young's Modulus of 1x10
7
 psi (from Fig. 8.10 of JSC-63036) and Poisson's Ratio of 0.23
[3] From parametric study comparing Test1-D measurements with SPHINX analysis results
[4] 800 psi in tension and 12,000 psi in compression  
Table 4-14.  SPHINX analysis case matrix (numbered by priority) 
SiC Yield Strenth (psi) 30000 90000
Type A Yield Strength n/a n/a
Particle Diameter / Velocity
(Expected Particle Fluence)
5 μm / 2.9 km/s
(high particle fluence)
4 1
20 μm / 2.2 km/s
(moderate particle fluence)
5 2
100 μm / 1.0 km/s
(low particle fluence)
3
 
The SPHINX simulations consisted of single particle impacts (i.e., 1 projectile) to a SiC target. 
The 3-D SPHINX simulations used for the plume particle analysis had high computational 
demands, so the minimum SiC surface area necessary to prevent boundary effects was selected. 
Figure 4-27 shows example SPHINX output for Analysis Case 1 at the moment of the projectile 
impact and the subsequent crater formed.  
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10μm 4μm
 
Figure 4-27.  Example SPHINX analysis result:  Case 1  (5 μm particle at 2.92 km/s), SiC yield 
strength = 90,000 psi 
SPHINX analysis results for crater diameter, depth, and volume are shown in  
Figure 4-28 through Figure 4-30. These SPHINX results represent impact damage due to a single 
thruster plume particle impact. This damage must be scaled by the predicted RV thruster plume 
particle fluence to the Orbiter RCC due to DDO for an integrated damage assessment. 
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Figure 4-28.  Crater diameters predicted by SPHINX analysis for thruster plume particle impacts 
to SiC. 
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SPHINX Results - Crater Depth
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Figure 4-29.  Crater depths predicted by SPHINX analysis for thruster plume particle impacts to 
SiC. 
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Figure 4-30.  Crater volumes based on SPHINX analysis for thruster plume particle impacts to 
SiC. 
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4.7.3 Particle Fluence Calculation 
Particle fluence to the Orbiter RCC was calculated for nominal RV approach and separation 
proximity operations using input data and methodology described in Section 4.1 with three 
exceptions. First, at the time the RCC test/analysis program was conducted, the ISS 
configuration did not include the MRM2 zenith docking port, which was incorporated in 
subsequent DDO studies (refer to Figure 4-3). Secondly, the RCC particle fluence was calculated 
prior to the 2008 revision to the thruster plume droplet flux model described in Section 4.1. The 
original model, which specified unburned propellant droplets with diameters between 1 and 100 
μm, produced more conservative particle fluence results for the RCC. Finally, rather than 
calculating particle fluence on Orbiter NASTRAN™ model surfaces, particle fluence contour 
plots were generated in the approximate plane of the wings. A to-scale Orbiter outline (traced 
from Figure 4-31) was overlaid on the contour plots to allow quick estimation of the particle 
fluence at different points on the wings.  
 
Figure 4-31.  To-scale Orbiter schematic used to generate outline superimposed on contour plots 
[18]. 
RV proximity operations were analyzed for each of the three RS docking ports. Contour plots 
were generated to show the maximum particle fluence results per event. In checks of results, the 
separation results were usually minor compared to the approach results. However, given the 
limited available data, applying the max values for evaluating RV approach or separation is 
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recommended for conservatism. Soyuz thruster tests were not included in the RCC analyses, but 
this is expected to be enveloped by the results reported for RV approach and separation. 
For each docking port, three separate contour plots were generated to show maximum particle 
fluence per event (i.e., approach or separation) for three particle size groups: 1-5, 6-20, and 21-
100 µm. These size bins were selected to correspond with particle sizes used in the RCC impact 
testing and subsequent SPHINX analyses. All plots were generated at the X = 65 ft plane in the 
ISS Structural Reference Frame because the X = 65 ft plane is approximately coplanar with the 
dorsal surface of the Orbiter wings (i.e., the surface facing ISS) when Orbiter is docked to 
Pressurized Mating Adapter 2 (PMA2) located on Node 2 forward. A resolution of 1.0 ft by 1.0 
ft was used for the contour plots. Result plots apply to the plane of the Orbiter wings and are not 
valid for other surfaces (e.g., radiators, TPS, windows, etc.). 
Figure 4-32 shows the particle fluences due to a nominal RV approach or separation with the 
DC-1 nadir docking port. The Orbiter WLE RCC panels are enveloped within the “bands” 
outlined on the wings. As shown in Figure 4-32a, the predicted fluence of 1 to 5 µm particles is 
as high as 2.15 to 4.64 million particles per square centimeter on some parts of the RCC. Figure 
4-32b shows the 6 to 20 µm diameter particle fluence for the same RV proximity operations 
event. The highest particle fluence level on the RCC for this particle size range is between 464 
and 1000 particles per square centimeter. The 21 to 100 µm diameter particle fluence for the DC-
1 nadir docking port is provided in Figure 4-32c. Less than one particle of this size per square 
centimeter is estimated on the RCC. 
RCC
Particle Diameters: 1-5 μm
(Velocity ~ 3 km/s) 
Max Particle Fluence ≤ 4.64E+6/cm2
Particle Diameters: 6-20 μm
(Velocity ~ 2.5 km/s) 
Max Particle Fluence ≤ 1000/cm2
Particle Diameters: 21-100 μm
(Velocity ~ 1 to 2 km/s) 
Max Particle Fluence < 1/cm2
 
Figure 4-32.  Particle fluences due to nominal RV approach to or separation from the DC-1 nadir 
docking port for (a) 1-5 µm diameter particles, (b) 6-20 µm diameter particles, and (c) 21-100 
µm diameter particles. 
Figure 4-33 provides the particle fluence results for a RV approach to or separation from the SM 
aft port. Figure 4-34 provides the particle fluence results for a RV approach or separation with 
the FGB nadir docking port. The peak particle fluence from all three docking ports resulted from 
proximity operation to DC-1 Nadir, with up to 4.64 million particles per square centimeter 
possible. Since these results were produced with the original plume droplet flux model (rather 
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than the revised 2008 droplet flux model), they are expected to be conservative by roughly 1 to 2 
orders of magnitude.  
Particle Diameters: 1-5 μm
(Velocity ~ 3 km/s) 
Max Particle Fluence ≤ 2.15E+6/cm2
Particle Diameters: 6-20 μm
(Velocity ~ 2.5 km/s) 
Max Particle Fluence ≤ 464/cm2
Particle Diameters: 21-100 μm
(Velocity ~ 1 to 2 km/s) 
Max Particle Fluence < 1/cm2
 
Figure 4-33.  Particle fluences due to nominal RV approach to or separation from the SM aft 
docking port for (a) 1-5 µm diameter particles, (b) 6-20 µm diameter particles, and (c) 21-100 
µm diameter particles. 
Particle Diameters: 1-5 μm
(Velocity ~ 3 km/s) 
Max Particle Fluence ≤ 1E+6/cm2
Particle Diameters: 6-20 μm
(Velocity ~ 2.5 km/s) 
Max Particle Fluence ≤ 215/cm2
Particle Diameters: 21-100 μm
(Velocity ~ 1 to 2 km/s) 
Max Particle Fluence < 1/cm2
 
Figure 4-34.  Particle fluences due to nominal RV approach to or separation from the FBG nadir 
docking port for (a) 1-5 µm diameter particles, (b) 6-20 µm diameter particles, and (c) 21-100 
µm diameter particles. 
It should be noted that the ISS elements provide limited shielding for Orbiter against thruster 
firings, though little, if any, shielding is afforded for the WLE RCC. The particle fluence in 
white areas is off-scale low, in some instances due to this shielding effect. It should be noted that 
the Orbiter payload doors, which are open when the Orbiter is mated to the ISS, will provide 
additional shielding to some RCC panels, though this is not accounted for in the analysis. It 
should be noted that accounting for lateral translation or attitude variation on the part of the RV 
may result in higher or lower particle fluence to the RCC (i.e., effectively shifting the contours). 
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Sufficient information for accurate modeling of translation or attitude dispersions during 
approach and separation proximity operations is not available. 
Subsequent analyses were performed (contemporary with analysis reported in Section 5.2) to 
address particle fluence to Orbiter WLE RCC associated with RV proximity operations to the 
MRM2 zenith port. In contrast to the other docking ports, particle fluences to RCC for MRM2 
proximity operations were calculated with the 2008 revised droplet flux model to surfaces on an 
Orbiter NASTRAN™ model. RCC analysis results for the 1 to 5 µm diameter particles were 
dramatically lower than the results for the other docking ports – less than 100 particles per square 
centimeter per event. This result may be used as a bounding value for the 6 to 10 µm and 11 to 
12 µm particle size groups. Figure 4-35 shows example particle fluence results for RV approach 
to the MRM2 zenith docking port. 
Particles/cm2
  
a) Results for the 8S-based jet firing history.  b) Results for the 15P-based jet firing history. 
Figure 4-35.  Example particle fluence results for RV approach to MRM2 zenith (1 to 5 µm 
particles). 
4.7.4 RCC Integrated Damage Assessment 
The RCC integrated damage assessment was performed by linearly scaling impact damage for a 
single particle by the predicted thruster plume particle fluence. The impact damage for a single 
particle was determined analytically using the SPHINX code with correlations to ground test 
data (as described in Section 4.1). Thruster induced particle fluence was calculated for RV 
approach and separation to each RS docking port to determine the maximum particle fluence per 
event (as described in Section 4.1). The integration of these results into an RCC damage estimate 
will be presented herein. 
Thruster plume induced damage to WLE RCC during DDO was calculated as a SiC coating 
erosion depth. Recall that the RCC uses a thin coating of silicon carbide (30±10 mils) to prevent 
oxidation of the substrate during reentry. Therefore, depth of coating removal is of primary 
interest. Two methods were utilized to evaluate damage. 
a. Method 1:  Average erosion depth estimate based on crater damage volume for single 
particles scaled linearly by particle fluence for a single event. 
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b. Method 2:  Maximum erosion depth estimate based on total damage surface area and 
individual crater depths. 
Additionally, recall that the baseline SPHINX analyses were performed assuming a SiC yield 
strength of 90,000 psi, which had the best agreement with ground test data. However, the LESS 
PRT requested that SPHINX analyses be performed assuming a reduced SiC yield strength of 
30,000 psi as a comparison point. Naturally, the reduced SiC yield strength assumption resulted 
in increased thruster plume particle impact damage compared to the baseline assumption. To 
support LESS PRT review of the comparison data for analysis sensitivity to yield strength, the 
RCC integrated damage was calculated for two cases: 
a. Case 1 (Baseline Case):  Crater damage for all particle sizes based on SPHINX results 
for SiC yield strength of 90,000 psi. 
b. Case 2 (Comparison Case):  Crater damage for 1 to 5 µm and 6 to 20 µm particles based 
on SPHINX results for SiC yield strength of 30,000 psi. Crater damage for 21-100 
µm particles based on SPHINX results for SiC yield strength of 90,000 psi. 
Both methods for estimating damage were applied to each case to give a range of thruster 
induced erosion depths. For conservatism, impact damage was taken for the largest particle in 
each size bin (i.e., particles in 1 to 5 μm size range all modeled as 5 μm diameter particles), 
although the smallest particles have the greatest contribution to particle fluence. In addition, the 
damage estimates were taken for the highest fluence point of the RCC for the worst docking port 
(DC-1 Nadir).  
A summary of the estimated erosion depths for each case and method is provided in Table 4-15. 
As shown in this table, the estimated depth of SiC erosion ranges from 0.11 to 0.87 mils based 
on baseline SPHINX results for SiC yield strength of 90,000 psi. For the comparison case (using 
SPHINX results for the reduced SiC yield strength of 30,000 psi), the estimated depth of erosion 
ranges from 0.61 to 1.88 mils. Both cases show little SiC erosion compared to the SiC thickness 
of 30±10 mils. Figure 4-36 and Figure 4-37 demonstrate the different methods for estimating 
damage in more detail using Case 1 as an example. 
Table 4-15.  Integrated Damage Assessment Results: Estimated Depth of SiC Coating Erosion. 
Note:  SiC thickness is 3010 milsParticle fluence taken from max 
results for DC1 docking port.
Particle  Particle
Diameter (μm) Fluence (#/cm
2
) Average (Method 1) Max (Method 2) Average (Method 1) Max (Method 2)
5 4.64E+06 1.13E-01 0.28 6.02E-01 1.13
20 1000 1.60E-03 0.39 3.69E-03 0.55
100 1 1.27E-05 0.20 1.27E-05 0.20
Total: 0.11 0.87 0.61 1.88
Case 1 Estimated Erosion Depth (mils) Case 2 Estimated Erosion Depth (mils)
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Particle  Particle Crater  Vol. Total Vol. Avg. Depth Avg. Depth
Diameter (μm) Fluence (#/cm
2
) per particle (cm
3
) (cm
3
/cm
2
) (cm) (mils)
5 4.64E+06 6.17E-11 2.86E-04 2.86E-04 1.127E-01
20 1000 4.06E-09 4.06E-06 4.06E-06 1.598E-03
100 1 3.22E-08 3.22E-08 3.22E-08 1.269E-05
TOTAL: 2.90E-04 2.90E-04 0.114
Particle fluence taken from max 
results for DC1 docking port. Represent crater volume as an 
equivalent rectangular volume to 
estimate average depth.
Length = 1 cm
Width = 1 cm
Depth = 2.86E-04 cm
 
Figure 4-36.  Demonstration of Method 1 average erosion depth estimate for Case 1 integrated 
damage calculation. 
Particle  Particle Crater Total SA
Diameter (μm) Fluence (#/cm
2
) Diameter (μm) (cm
2
/cm
2
)
5 4.64E+06 7.6 2.10E+00
20 1000 30.0 7.07E-03
100 1 128.0 1.29E-04
TOTAL: Maximum Depth:  0.87 mils 
(μm and mils)
2.1 Layers of 2.4μm deep pits.  
Maximum depth is 3 layers:  
2.4μm * 3 = 7.2μm ( or 0.28 mils)
Less than 1 layer of 10μm deep pits.  
Maximum depth is 1 layer:  
10μm * 1 = 10μm (or 0.39 mils)
Less than 1 layer of 5μm deep pits.  
Maximum depth is 1 layer:  
5μm * 1 = 5μm (or 0.20 mils)
Maximum Depth 
To calculate maximum depth, assume 
depth of each layer is the same as the 
depth of a single crater.  Then add crater 
depths linearly (as if craters are stacked).
Particle fluence taken from max 
results for DC1 docking port.
Depth = 2.4 + 2.4 + 2.4 = 7.2 mm
2.4 mm
2.4 mm
2.4 mm
7.2 mm
 
Figure 4-37.  Demonstration of Method 2 maximum erosion depth estimate for Case 1 integrated 
damage calculation. 
There were several conservative aspects to the analysis approach that should be considered when 
evaluating the results. To maximize crater depth, the ISS Space Environments team assumed 
normal impacts of all thruster plume particles to the RCC, although many of the particles are 
expected to impact at oblique angles. (Crater depth is maximum for normal incidence angles vs. 
oblique.)  Additionally, the team assumed that all thruster plume particles were traveling at the 
limiting velocity, though the majority of particles are expected to travel at less than the limiting 
velocity. Crater damage was then taken for the largest particle in each size bin (i.e., particles in 1 
to 5 μm size range all modeled as 5 μm diameter particles), though the smaller particles are the 
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highest flux. The integrated damage assessment was performed for the highest fluence point on 
the RCC for the worst-case docking port (DC-1 Nadir). Additionally, the particle fluence for the 
DC-1 nadir docking port was calculated with the original plume droplet flux model, which is 
conservative in comparison to the current model (2008 droplet flux model). It should be noted, 
however, that linearly scaling damage for a single particle impact by the predicted particle 
fluence may not be conservative. Furthermore, the available RV jet firing data used for the 
analysis is limited and is not believed to envelope all thruster plume conditions. 
The OPO must determine acceptability of RV thruster induced damage to Orbiter WLE RCC. 
Therefore, this integrated damage assessment was delivered to the LESS PRT for review and 
evaluation [19]. The RCC test and analysis program was conducted in coordination with the 
Orbiter Structures Loads and Dynamics Panel and the LESS PRT. No technical issues were 
identified with the ground test or analysis approach. 
4.8 Plume Pressure Force 
4.8.1 Nominal Approach/Separation Plume Pressures 
The ISS LDT analyzed the effects of plume impingement on the Orbiter-mated ISS configuration 
due to Soyuz vehicle approach to the different RV docking ports. This analysis identified the 
peak normal and shear plume pressures on the Orbiter components.  
These data are applicable to all future Space Shuttle flights to ISS given no expected changes in 
the ISS configuration that will change the plume pressure results. 
4.8.1.1 Plume Pressure Calculation 
The plume impingement trajectory database for RV proximity operations contains 270 approach 
jet firing history cases, which were derived from 8 Russian as-flown trajectories and 1 generic 
trajectory. These trajectories do not cover failed capture or aborts. 
The 270 trajectories were evaluated for induced loads on ISS for all preflight ISS verifications 
analysis cycles. Recently, the 270 cases were filtered to the 126 approach cases that consistently 
produced the maximum loading on the ISS. The two generic separation cases were included for 
completeness for a total of 128 cases. For the STS-132/ULF4 flight, this set of 128 cases was 
assessed for plume impingement pressures on the mated Orbiter/ISS configuration and identified 
peak normal and shear plume pressures on Orbiter components. 
The ISS system, surface geometry models used were per the Verification Analysis Cycle (VAC)-
ULF4 analysis, based on the Rev AC assembly sequence. The models reflected the ULF4 final 
mated configuration with the MRM1 module attached to the FGB nadir docking port. RV 
approach/separation to/from the SM aft, DC-1 nadir, and MRM2 zenith ports was assessed. For 
the case of the FGB/MRM1 nadir port, DDO was ruled out “due to Kurs antenna cone 
impingement” with the Orbiter. Only separation was analyzed. 
All approach and separation plume impingement cases were applied to the mated Orbiter/ISS 
model. The overall peak normal and shear plume pressures with their corresponding plume 
duration for the Orbiter components are given in Table 4-16 for each docking port (units of 
lbs/sq. ft (psf) and seconds) and includes data for all Orbiter surfaces that were analyzed.  
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Plume pressure contour plots of the Orbiter PLBDs were created for selected cases to illustrate 
the pressure distribution over the doors. Representative plume pressure contours on the Orbiter 
PLBD are shown in Figure 4-38 and Figure 4-39. 
Table 4-16.  Peak Normal and Shear Plume Pressures 
 Approach/Separation for DC-1 Nadir 
 Normal Shear 
Orbiter Pressure Pressure 
Component/Hardware psf psf 
AIRBRAKE 0.0123 0.0023 
PAYLOAD BAY 0.0019 0.0016 
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR PORT 0.0111 0.0038 
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR STBD 0.0112 0.0034 
COCKPIT 0.0080 0.0015 
AFT ENGINES 0.0156 0.0056 
ODS 0.0106 0.0032 
OMS 0.0148 0.0023 
PORT_SIDE 0.0028 0.0040 
STBD_SIDE 0.0027 0.0039 
TAIL 0.0278 0.0077 
TAILTIP 0.0287 0.0092 
WINGS 0.0115 0.0016 
 
 Approach/Separation for SM Aft 
 Normal Shear 
Orbiter Pressure Pressure 
Component/Hardware psf psf 
AIRBRAKE 0.0015 0.0003 
PAYLOAD BAY 0.0000 0.0000 
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR PORT 0.0025 0.0008 
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR STBD 0.0025 0.0008 
COCKPIT 0.0027 0.0005 
AFT ENGINES 0.0020 0.0007 
ODS 0.0029 0.0009 
OMS 0.0020 0.0005 
PORT_SIDE 0.0002 0.0004 
STBD_SIDE 0.0002 0.0004 
TAIL 0.0019 0.0008 
TAILTIP 0.0020 0.0007 
WINGS 0.0020 0.0005 
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 Approach/Separation for MRM2 Zenith 
 Normal Shear 
Orbiter Pressure Pressure 
Component/Hardware psf psf 
AIRBRAKE 0.0008 0.0004 
PAYLOAD BAY 0.0000 0.0000 
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR PORT 0.0069 0.0023 
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR STBD 0.0077 0.0024 
COCKPIT 0.0098 0.0017 
AFT ENGINES 0.0013 0.0005 
ODS 0.0087 0.0028 
OMS 0.0017 0.0004 
PORT_SIDE 0.0001 0.0008 
STBD_SIDE 0.0001 0.0008 
TAIL 0.0016 0.0007 
TAILTIP 0.0012 0.0005 
WINGS 0.0047 0.0014 
 
 Separation from MRM1 Nadir 
 Normal Shear 
Orbiter Pressure Pressure 
Component/Hardware psf psf 
AIRBRAKE 0.0005 0.0001 
PAYLOAD BAY 0.0001 0.0001 
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR PORT 0.0018 0.0004 
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR STBD 0.0013 0.0003 
COCKPIT 0.0007 0.0002 
AFT ENGINES 0.0010 0.0004 
ODS 0.0008 0.0003 
OMS 0.0013 0.0003 
PORT_SIDE 0.0002 0.0004 
STBD_SIDE 0.0002 0.0003 
TAIL 0.0008 0.0004 
TAILTIP 0.0007 0.0003 
WINGS 0.0025 0.0005 
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RCS Plume Analysis - Element Normal Pressure (psf)
RESULTS: 1-B.C. 0,LOAD 1, UNKNOWN SCALAR_1
UNKNOWN SCALAR - MAG MIN: 0.00E+00 MAX: 1.01E-02 VALUE OPTION:ACTUAL
SHELL SURFACE: TOPCRITERION:ABOVE   : 0.00E+00
 0.00D+00
 1.01D-03
 2.03D-03
 3.04D-03
 4.05D-03
 5.06D-03
 6.08D-03
 7.09D-03
 8.10D-03
 9.11D-03
 1.01D-02
 
Figure 4-38.  Peak normal pressure on port PLBDs - DC-1-Nadir. 
RCS Plume Analysis - Element Normal Pressure (psf)
RESULTS: 2-B.C. 0,LOAD 1, UNKNOWN SCALAR_2
UNKNOWN SCALAR - MAG MIN: 0.00E+00 MAX: 9.10E-03 VALUE OPTION:ACTUAL
SHELL SURFACE: TOPCRITERION:ABOVE   : 0.00E+00
 0.00D+00
 9.10D-04
 1.82D-03
 2.73D-03
 3.64D-03
 4.55D-03
 5.46D-03
 6.37D-03
 7.28D-03
 8.19D-03
 9.10D-03
 
Figure 4-39.  Peak normal pressure on starboard PLBDs - DC-1-Nadir. 
4.8.1.2 Recommendations for Orbiter Team Dynamic Analyses 
The nominal pressure values in Error! Reference source not found. were delivered to the OPO 
for the Orbiter specific analyses. For the PLBD dynamic loads analyses, the LDT provided 
Orbiter with the recommendation to assume 10 consecutive pulses in the dynamic analysis. This 
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number was based on a survey of the trajectory database, which showed a maximum of six 
firings that could be considered consecutive firings. These firings were not of the same duration 
nor were they in the same direction. Since this number came from a limited set of as-flown 
histories, the LDT recommended that the Orbiter team assume a maximum of 10 consecutive 
firings of the peak pressure (in the same direction) for their analysis. 
4.8.2 Plume Pressures for Off-Nominal Abort Case 
The LDT worked with the JSC Applied Aerosciences team plume specialists to develop an off-
nominal plume pressure case. The off-nominal case would assume a firing of a dual jet pair 
pointed directly normal to the Orbiter PLBD, with an interaction amplification factor applied to 
the plume pressure derived from the Soyuz jet plume flow field. The distance from the Orbiter 
would be the closest distance from an approved RV port, assuming a 15° abort corridor. 
The Soyuz jet plume flow field data provided to the ISSP and the Applied Aerosciences team 
were used to develop the off-nominal abort case. The data were provided to the LDT in tabular 
format by the Applied Aerosciences team. To determine the correct region in the plume flow 
field, the closest distance from the edge of the 15° corridor approaching/departing from the DC-1 
nadir port was determined. This distance was approximately 80 feet, yielding a plume pressure of 
0.0043 psf per Soyuz jet firing. For the PLB, the distance was determined to be approximately 95 
ft, yielding a plume pressure of 0.0027 psf per Soyuz jet firing. 
The Applied Aerosciences team developed and recommended a bounding plume interaction 
amplification factor of 1.634. Therefore, to calculate the peak plume pressures for this case, refer 
to the following: 
PLBD: 2 x 0.0043 psf x 1.634 = 0.014 psf 
PLB: 2 x 0.0027 psf x 1.634 = 0.0088 psf 
This peak pressure value for the off-nominal abort case was provided to the OPO for their 
Orbiter loads analyses. As for the nominal pressures, the LDT recommended that the OPO use a 
maximum of 10 consecutive pulses for the off-nominal case. However, for this abort case, it was 
recommended that only the first five pulses be at the peak abort plume pressure, with the next 
five at the peak nominal plume pressure. 
4.8.3 Dual Jet Plume Interaction 
This section documents the development of a bounding amplification factor to be applied to 
account for the firing of two jets simultaneously as opposed to the operation of a single jet. 
The RV on occasion will simultaneously fire two jets in close proximity during maneuvers. It is 
known that under such circumstances a region of amplified dynamic pressure will develop in 
between the two thrusters. The magnitude of this amplification is above the value of just adding 
the two associated single jet environments together (i.e., superposition). To assess a bound for 
the magnitude of this amplification, high fidelity computational simulations were performed 
using a technique known as Direct Simulation Monte Carlo (DSMC). DSMC uses millions of 
representative molecules to simulate rarefied gas flows and is an appropriate method for 
simulating flows (e.g., a spacecraft reaction control system plume expanding into vacuum). 
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The single jet environment for the 13.3 kg (29.8 lb) RV thrusters has been developed by RSC-E 
and is of the source flow type. The algebraic form of this model is documented in SSP 50129, 
Annex 1.1.  
Figure 4-40 shows the results of a DSMC simulation for the Soyuz dual jet firing with the most 
severe amplification (due to these thrusters having the minimum separation). The right-hand side 
of the figure shows the Soyuz vehicle and the “in flow” boundaries (colored by the flow density 
on these surfaces) for the two jets being simulated. The conditions on these “in flow” boundaries 
were obtained from a computational fluid dynamics simulation of the flow in 13.3 kg thruster 
nozzle and near plume flow. The results of the DSMC simulation are on the left-hand side of 
Figure 4-40. The region of amplified dynamic pressure between the two jets can be seen, 
especially in the region near the nozzle exit planes. This is the case because the magnitude of the 
amplification falls as the distance “downstream” in the plume increases. Note that the domain of 
simulation is finite and extends to about the length of the Soyuz solar array. This was necessary 
to ensure that there was sufficient resolution to adequately capture the relevant physics while 
keeping the simulation computationally tractable. A larger domain would have required 
significantly more simulated molecules than the 150 million employed in the simulation shown 
in Figure 4-40. However, since the purpose of this simulation was to determine a bound for the 
amplification and, as noted, this amplification factor falls as the distance downstream increases, 
it was decided that the maximum value of the furthest constant “y” plane in Figure 4-41 (i.e., y = 
6 m (19 ft)) would bound the amplification factor at larger distances. Furthermore, this value 
would serve as a bounding value for all distances of interest since at distances less than 6 m, the 
Orbiter would have made contact with the Soyuz array. 
To get a quantitative value for the amplification factor on this y = 6 m plane, additional DSMC 
simulations were performed for the two jets firing independently. The amplification factor could 
then be computed as the ratio of the simulation shown in Figure 4-40 to the sum of the 
simulations of the two jets firing independently. The results of such a computation are shown in 
Figure 4-41 where the peak amplification was found to be 1.634. This value will be conservative 
for this application since for distances greater than 6 m, the value of the amplification factor will 
be lower and since for application to the DDO scenario, the entire Orbiter will be more than 6 m 
from RV dual jets. 
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Figure 4-40.  DSMC simulation of Soyuz dual jet firing. 
 
Figure 4-41.  Dual jet amplification factor on y = 6 m plane. 
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In summary, conservative plume flow field environments have been developed and provided for 
single and dual jet firings of the RV 13.3 kg thrusters. These environments are suitable for 
assessing plume impingement loads during DDO. 
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5.0 Trajectory Clearance Assessments 
DDO can be defined as the dynamic operations of the one or more RVs while the Orbiter is 
docked to the ISS. The purpose of this chapter is to describe trajectory analysis approach, discuss 
results, and provide recommendations for the Soyuz vehicle departure from all ISS ports. To 
ensure safe separation, the analysis has to be performed to demonstrate sufficient structure 
clearance between Soyuz vehicle, ISS structure, and any other docked vehicles, including the 
Orbiter. When docked at the PMA at Node 2 forward, the Orbiter body and tail extend below and 
under the ISS structure, thus adding constraints on the departing vehicle trajectory, which in turn 
may add constraints to the undock attitude.  
This chapter details the analysis of Soyuz separations for a variety of initial conditions. Because 
the primary separation concerns involve nadir port docked Soyuz vehicles, the separations are 
focused on FGB nadir port separations only since it represents the most constraining case. 
However, as time and resources allow analysis can be extended to include the DC-1, MRM1, 
MRM2, Multipurpose Laboratory Module (MLM) and SM Aft port separations.  
The described analysis is performed for the ISS at the STS-129/ULF3 flight configuration with a 
docked Orbiter at the PMA at Node 2 forward and the 19S Soyuz vehicle departing from FGB 
port. The atmospheric conditions chosen will be consistent with the ones predicted for the STS-
129/ULF3 flight. 
With the Orbiter present, the ISS has two preferred attitude control methods: the Orbiter VRCS 
control and the RS thruster control, each having their own defined attitude and attitude rate 
deadbands. The analysis will be performed for each of these attitude control methods and for a 
variety of initial ISS attitudes. These attitudes include the +X-axis Vertical Velocity (+XVV) 
+Z-axis Local Vertical (+ZLV) (Yaw-Pitch-Roll (YPR) 0,0,0 [0,0,0 Roll-Pitch-Yaw (RPY)]) 
attitude, the ISS 180 yaw or -XVV +ZLV (YPR 180,0,0 [0,0,180 RPY]) attitude, and the ISS 
180 yaw attitude coupled with a 90° pitch or -XLV -ZVV (YPR 180,90,0 [0,-90,180 RPY]) 
attitude, and dispersions around these attitudes due to the individual attitude control options 
deadbands. The +XVV +ZLV attitude is used as the reference case for the analysis. The -XVV 
+ZLV attitude is the standard attitude for the Orbiter-ISS stack. Maneuvering to the undock 
attitude will be performed from this attitude. Orbiter VRCS vs. RS control method may be 
evaluated based on final undock attitude and amount of propellant required for specific 
maneuvers. The -XLV -ZVV attitude is an approved ISS attitude, and it was previously analyzed 
and approved for uncrewed Orbiter undockings in the Contingency Shuttle Crew Support 
(CSCS) scenario. Furthermore, -XLV -ZVV attitude meets the intent of Hazard Report RSCE-
0021 for minimal pitch angle to provide for safe long-term clearance between the departing 
Soyuz and ISS in case of the Soyuz motion control system failure.  
The performance of the Russian docking mechanism and the Soyuz vehicle motion control 
system determine the separation dynamics and relative motion. The docking mechanism nominal 
performance discrepancies and the potential failure of Soyuz motion control system drive are 
specific conditions that may lead to collision. 
The relative motion analysis described further in this section addresses the mentioned conditions 
in a parametric fashion. Resulting relative motion trajectories represent the Soyuz vehicle center 
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of gravity (c.g.) motion, which in turn is used for the detailed structural clearance analysis by the 
Configuration Analysis Modeling and Mass Properties (CAMMP) team. 
Even though this separation analysis focuses on the ISS/Orbiter stack and Soyuz vehicle relative 
motion, the resulting trajectories and initial conditions are applicable to the Progress vehicle. 
Conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis results are presented. 
5.1 Assumptions 
This section discusses the assumptions that are made as a part of the analysis. Wherever possible, 
details and references are provided for the assumptions, and a detailed discussion follows. The 
assumptions include data assumptions, where choices of initial conditions are specified and 
referenced, and analysis assumptions, where analysis methods are discussed with particular 
concentration on the limitations of the methods chosen.  
The ISS and RV parameters are primarily obtained from JSC-26557, Revision AD1, On-Orbit 
Assembly, Modeling, and Mass Properties Data Book, with the exception of certain parameters 
provided by VIPER. 
The RV separation follows a defined timeline, which begins when the ISS is commanded to free 
drift. One minute later the Soyuz crew or Mission Control Center-Moscow issues a command to 
the vehicle to open the RV docking mechanism hooks. At this point, hooks on the ISS side are 
already open. Once the “hook open” command is issued, the RV motion control system takes a 
“snapshot” of current ISS attitude and begins propagating it based on the attitude rate sensor 
data. This process allows the vehicle to maneuver to the proper attitude for the first separation 
burn that will follow physical separation. Note that the “starting” attitude in the motion control 
system is the undocking attitude, and it is set via an uplinked quaternion several orbits before 
undock. The hook opening process takes 180 (nominal, two hook drive motors operating) to 310 
(off-nominal, one hook drive motor operating) seconds, at which time the physical separation 
occurs. 
The separation analysis begins at physical disconnect. At this time, the vehicle receives an initial 
push-off velocity from springs in the docking port mechanism, allowing it to clear the structure. 
The RV motion control system is in the free drift mode in this timeframe, so the vehicle is 
subject to dispersions in the spring push-off velocity, and attitude and velocity dispersions due to 
separation dynamics. The springs generate a push-off velocity in the longitudinal direction 
(along the docking axis) that varies between 0.09 and 0.15 m/second as a function of the mass of 
the separating RV, docking mechanism spring pushers performance, docking mechanism 
operational dispersions, etc. Additionally, the effect of unequal spring contribution or unequal 
guide pin travel during separation may result in a 0.03 m/s velocity component in the transverse 
direction. This transverse velocity component is applied in the XY plane direction and is positive 
in the forward ISS direction and negative towards the aft.  
                                                 
 
1 A later revision (AG) is available.  Version referenced was used for most of the work in the report as it was the 
latest at the time [43]. 
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Ten seconds after physical separation, the RV motion control system becomes active and 
commands the vehicle to return its attitude to the snapshot attitude obtained at the time of “hooks 
open” command. This attitude is held through the 15 second longitudinal body burn, which 
occurs 180 seconds after physical separation and increases separation velocity to approximately 
0.6 m/s depending on RV mass properties. The attitude provides a general alignment with the 
docking port for purposes of monitoring the separation dynamics via the external camera view 
and sets the separation vector in the direction opposite from the ISS. This first burn sets up 
conditions for RV deorbit burn two orbits later and allows the vehicle to clear the ISS Keep-Out 
Sphere (KOS) within 22 minutes. 
The vehicle may perform an optional retrograde burn to further distance itself from the ISS 
vicinity at 550 seconds after physical separation. This second burn is 30 seconds long bringing 
RV separation velocity to 1.4 to 2.0 m/s based on RV mass properties. This burn was developed 
for nadir port separations, but since ± ZVV -XLV attitudes had been approved for RV 
undockings, this burn is never applied.  
The analysis employs relative motion calculations using the Clohessy-Wiltshire (CW) linearized 
relative motion equations coupled with rigid body rotation dynamics equations for attitude 
propagation and burn direction determination. The CW relative motion propagation is a three 
degrees-of-freedom (3-DOF) simulation and the ISS stack (ISS + Orbiter) and Soyuz are treated 
as point masses. Certain secondary effects, such as gravity gradient, solar flux, etc., have been 
ignored for this first-level analysis because they are negligible over the short duration during 
which the separating RV is in close proximity to the ISS. Additionally, the effect of the ISS stack 
mass change following the RV separation is also ignored as the mass change is negligible in 
comparison to the total ISS stack mass. 
Each separation trajectory is simulated for 500 seconds. This duration is sufficient to cover the 
short-term clearance of ISS-stack structure as well as to capture the relative motion for nearly 5 
minutes following the time of the expected first RV burn.  
The ISS and RV relative motion and clearance assessment is not a part of this current analysis. 
5.2 Scenario 
The analysis was performed for 19S undock during STS-129/ULF3 flight; however, this 
approach can be used for a generic ISS-Orbiter and RV combination. 
In this configuration, the RVs are docked at FGB, DC-1, and SM aft. The Orbiter is docked at 
the PMA at Node 2 Forward.  
5.3 ISS Parameters 
Mated configuration parameters selected per Configuration 268 - Step 020. Data for this stage 
was obtained from JSC-26557, Revision AD, On-Orbit Assembly, Modeling, and Mass 
Properties Data Book, Volume I, “ULF3 - Before Separation [MATED]” on page 7-143. 
The ISS coefficient of drag (Cd) is not available in the aforementioned data book. A value of 
2.07 was provided by the Trajectory Operations Officer (TOPO) group. 
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Figure 5-1.  STS-129/ULF3 flight (before separation) [MATED], configuration 268 - Step 020. 
Table 5-1.  ULF3 Stage - ISS Parameters 
Parameter Value [Reference] 
Mass 439941 kg [Ref: 1] 
Center of Mass 0.88, -0.69, 6.18 m (Relative to ISS Analysis Coordinate System (ISSACS))  
[Ref: 1] 
Coefficient of Drag (Cd) 2.07 [Ref: 2] 
Cross-Sectional Area 1080.32 m2 (X projected area, used for the YPR 0,0,0,  
YPR 180,0,0 attitudes) 
3214.46 m2 (Z projected area, used for the YPR 180,+90,0 attitude) 
[Ref: 1] 
Inertia Tensor [ 138170844. 1369308. -20643473. ] 
[. 1369308. 126205020. -244627. ] 
[ -20643473. -244627. 208345629. ]kg*m2 
[Ref: 1] 
Ref 1: JSC 26557 Revision AD “On-Orbit Assembly, Modeling, and Mass Properties Data Book,” Volume I, 
“ULF3 - Before Separation [MATED],” Configuration 268, Step 020, on page 7-143 
Ref 2: TOPO group 
5.3.1 Soyuz Parameters 
Mass Properties 
The Soyuz parameters were obtained from JSC-26557, Revision AD, On-Orbit Assembly, 
Modeling, and Mass Properties Data Book, Volume I, for the specified docking ports detailed 
below. The coefficient of drag (Cd), 2.00, was provided by the TOPO group. 
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Figure 5-2.  Soyuz vehicle. 
Table 5-2.  Soyuz Parameters 
Parameter Value [Reference] 
Mass 6745 kg [Ref: 1] 
Center of Mass 
(Relative to ISSACS) 
FGB:.   
.  -11.140,  0.000,  9.420 m [Ref: 1, Page 7-56] 
DC-1: 
.  -23.700,  0.000, 13.450 m [Ref: 1, Page 7-56] 
SM Aft:  
.  -39.820, -0.040,  4.160 m [Ref: 1, Page 7-103] 
MRM1 (mass at this port is 6700 kg): 
.  -11.140,  0.000, 15.420 m [Ref: 1, Page 7-263] 
MRM2 (mass at this port is 6700 kg):.  
.  -23.700,  0.000, -5.160 m [Ref: 1, Page 7-160] 
MLM: 
.  No current data are available. 
Coefficient of Drag (Cd) 2.00 [Ref: 3] 
Cross-Sectional Area 24.2 m2 for the YPR 0,0,0 and YPR 180,0,0 attitudes 
6.0 m2 for the YPR 180,90,0 attitude [See details below] 
Inertia Tensor [ 4639.. -161.. -589. ] 
[ -161.  24412..  418. ] 
[ -589..  418.  24454. ]kg*m2 
[Ref: 1, based on Soyuz at SM aft port orientation.] 
Ref 1: JSC 26557 Revision AD “On-Orbit Assembly, Modeling, and Mass Properties Data Book,” Volume I 
Ref 2: TOPO group 
Ref 3: VIPER/Evgeny Menkin 
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Source: JSC 26557 Revision AC “On-Orbit Assembly, Modeling, and Mass  
Properties Data Book,” Volume I, page 7-89 (not available in Revision AD) 
Figure 5-3.  Soyuz vehicle structural reference data. 
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Source: USA001667 “Data Book: Soyuz/Progress,” November 15, 2000, page 2-5 
Figure 5-4.  Soyuz modules sizing data. 
5.3.1.1 Cross-Sectional Areas 
The cross-sectional area of the Soyuz is a function of ISS stack attitude, docking port location, 
and the relative attitude of the vehicle at the port. Figures 5-2 to 5-4 serve as the source of data 
used to calculate the approximate planar cross-sectional areas: 
X: ~ 6.0 m2  
Defined as the Soyuz YZ plane area or along the longitudinal direction and calculated 
using the largest radius component of 1.35 m (half of 2.7 m). The final result is rounded 
to 6.0 m2 to account for area contributed to by the edges of the Soyuz solar arrays. 
Y: ~ 28.0 m2 
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Defined as the Soyuz XZ plane area or the top view, including the full solar array span. 
This area is calculated by summing up the rectangular areas of each module plus the 
area of the solar arrays: 
 Orbital module area = 5.72 m2 (2.2 m x 2.6 m) 
 Descent module area = 4.62 m2 (2.2 m x 2.1 m) 
 Instrumentation/Propulsion module area = 5.5 m2 (2.2 m x 2.5 m) 
 Solar Array area = 11.6 m2 (10.6 m wingspan minus the 2.2 m middle section 
multiplied by the 1.385 m height) 
Z: ~16.0 m2 
Defined as the Soyuz XY plane area or the side view, looking edge on to the solar 
arrays. This area is calculated like the Y planar area, excluding the solar array 
contribution. 
45° area (e.g., Roll at FGB nadir port): ~24.2 m2 
While docked at the FGB nadir port, the Soyuz vehicle is rotated approximately 45° 
around its X axis. This results in a reduced cross-sectional area facing along the velocity 
vector. This area is calculated using the Soyuz Z side area plus the projected area of its 
solar arrays when rotated by 45° (16.0 m + 11.6 m * cosine [45]). 
5.3.1.2 Contact Sphere 
 
Data/Coordinate Source: JSC 26557 Revision AC “On-Orbit Assembly, Modeling,  
and Mass Properties Data Book,” Volume I, page 7-89 (not available in Revision AD) 
Figure 5-5.  Soyuz at FGB Nadir ISSACS coordinates. 
The contact sphere serves as first order analysis object to determine if potential contact exists 
between the RV and any other structure. It is defined as a 6.0 m radius sphere originating at the 
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RV center of mass, as seen in Figure 5-5, and large enough to account for any attitude of the 
vehicle enclosed within it.  
The “MAX POINT” has been identified as the furthest point from the RV c.g. and was calculated 
to be (-5.687, 0.0, 11.738) m in the ISS Analysis Coordinate System (ISSACS) reference frame, 
based on a Soyuz vehicle docked at the FGB nadir port. The distance from this point to the 
Soyuz vehicle center of mass at FGB nadir was calculated to be 5.926 m within the bounds of the 
6.0 m radius contact sphere defined for analysis purposes. Because of the physical similarity of 
the RVs, the 6.0 m radius analysis limit is valid for both vehicles. 
If any interference is determined through the first order analysis, the contact sphere would be 
excluded, and direct structure to structure clearance would be analyzed. This analysis is 
performed by the CAMMP team.  
5.4 Simulation Tools 
The analysis was performed using the Proximity Analysis for Dynamic Motion Effects 
(PADME) tool and verified using the Flight Design and Dynamics (FDD) CW Spreadsheet tool. 
PADME is a Java-based program developed within the Automated Rendezvous and Docking 
(AR&D) group specifically for RV separation analyses. The tool employs 3-DOF relative motion 
propagation algorithms, coupled with rigid body rotation dynamics for attitude propagation. The 
tool has shown good agreement with past analysis results provided by RSC-E, and has been in 
good agreement in 3-DOF relative motion with the NASA/FDD CW Spreadsheet tool. 
Independent verification of the PADME results is achieved by using the FDD CW Spreadsheet 
tool, a certified analysis tool used by the ISS Visiting Vehicle Officer (VVO). This tool is limited 
to only providing 3-DOF relative motion analysis and verification. 
5.4.1 3-DOF Relative Motion 
A 3-DOF relative motion analysis was performed using the CW linearized relative motion 
equations (i.e., Hill’s equations). 
5.4.2 Rigid Body Rotation Dynamics 
To increase the fidelity of the analysis, ISS stack attitude propagation was performed using a 
rigid body rotation dynamics algorithm available in the PADME analysis tool. This method 
employs vehicle inertia parameters to propagate the vehicle rotational parameters and more 
accurately account for the attitude rates at the time of physical separation.  
The damping of the ISS stack attitude rates due to environmental, inertial, or forced effects is not 
accounted for as a part of this analysis because this model is not currently available within the 
PADME tool. Instead, it is assumed that a rotational effect will continue to propagate unimpeded 
for the duration of the simulation. 
The source for the rigid body rotation dynamics implementation is the algorithm developed by 
William Lear [44]. 
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5.5 Rotation Sequence 
The SSP rotation sequence basis is the Roll-Pitch-Yaw (RPY) or the 1-2-3 sequence, while the 
ISSP rotation sequence basis is Yaw-Pitch-Roll (YPR) or the 3-2-1 sequence. For this analysis, 
the YPR sequence is primary, and any alternative sequences are explicitly noted in brackets “[ ]”. 
5.6 Altitude 
The altitude chosen for this analysis is 370 km and is based on previous similar analyses. The 
choice of altitude only affects the period of an orbit because the atmospheric density is assumed 
constant for this analysis. 
5.7 Atmospheric Density 
The atmospheric density for STS-129/ULF3 flight timeframe provided by VIPER is 2.46e-12 
kg/m3. 
5.8 Gravity Gradient Effects 
Gravity gradient is a slow acting force and is assumed to have a negligible effect over the short 
duration during which the separating RV is in close proximity to the ISS. The effect on the RV is 
even less once the vehicle regains active attitude control 10 seconds following separation. Once 
attitude control is active, the gravity gradient effects are counterbalanced and therefore have no 
direct effect on the vehicle. 
5.9 Aerodynamic Torques 
The effect of aerodynamic torques is ignored for this analysis. This effect is assumed to be 
equally applied on the ISS stack and the separating RV, and, much like the gravity gradient 
effect discussed, its effect is minimal over the short duration during which the separating RV 
remains in close proximity to the ISS. 
5.10 RV Separation Timeline 
Every RV separation follows the same predefined timeline. A graphical representation of this 
timeline was provided by RSC-E during AR&D Mini-TIM no. 10 (October 2 to 13, 2006) in the 
presentation, “Gravitational Moment Effect on Initial Conditions of Vehicles Separation” and 
updated by VIPER, as shown in Figure 5-6. 
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Source: Presentation, “Gravitational Moment Effect on Initial Conditions of Vehicles  
Separation,” RSC-E, AR&D Mini-TIM #10 (October 2-13, 2006) with VIPER updates 
Figure 5-6.  RV separation timeline. 
The nominal separation sequence initiates with a “Hooks OPEN” command, at which time the 
RV motion control system obtains a “snapshot” of the current attitude. For approximately the 
next 180 seconds, the RV docking mechanism active hooks are driven open, and the vehicle 
separates with an initial velocity imparted to it by the compressed docking springs in the ISS 
docking mechanism. At the time of physical separation, the RV is in a free drift mode, so any 
initial attitude rates and velocities imparted on the vehicle due to imperfect separation dynamics 
(e.g., failed spring, caught hook, etc.) cause it to move away from the ISS and changes attitude. 
Ten seconds after separation, the RV motion control system begins to maneuver back into the 
“snapshot” attitude it had at the time of the “Hooks OPEN” command. At 180 seconds after 
physical separation, the RV performs the separation burn. This 15 second longitudinal body burn 
increases separation velocity to approximately 0.6 m/s, depending on RV mass properties. 
In the off-nominal separation sequence, the time between “Hooks OPEN” command initiation 
and physical separation can increase to 310 seconds. This off-nominal sequence would most 
likely be the result of a hook drive motor failure, resulting in extended hook opening duration 
and hence a delay in physical separation. The events that follow physical separation are the same 
as for the described nominal separation sequence. 
5.10.1 ISS Attitude Profile during RV Separations 
During the standard RV separations under RS control, the ISS stack is in free drift from 1 minute 
prior to the initiation of the separation sequence to 5 minutes after the vehicle has separated. For 
the duration of the free drift period, the ISS stack is not actively controlled, and hence its attitude 
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is based on the attitude rates determined by the initial rate plus any additions or subtractions due 
to external forces.  
The magnitude of the initial rates, and the magnitude of the initial attitude, is primarily based on 
the attitude control scheme that maintains the stack attitude. The available attitude control 
schemes and their properties are covered in Section 5.12. 
Figure 5-7 through Figure 5-12 describe the time ordered sequence of attitudes that the ISS could 
be at following the initiation of the separation sequence at a positive pitch attitude deadband and 
a positive pitch attitude rate deadband. The deadband attitude and attitude rate, and the final 
attitude and attitude rates, presented in the images are nonspecific and are dependent on the 
selected attitude control scheme.  
+Z LVLH
+X LVLH
Attitude Pitch Rate
Docked RV
 
time = tsep – ∆tHooksOpen – 60 sec 
Figure 5-7.  ISS attitude at maximum of deadband range, ISS commanded to “Free Drift”. 
 
time = tsep – ∆tHooksOpen 
Figure 5-8.  ISS in “Free Drift” for 60 seconds, RV commanded to “Hooks Open” and 
“Snapshot” attitude taken. 
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time = tsep 
Figure 5-9.  ISS hooks drive for 180 (nominal) to 310 (off-nominal) seconds, vehicle separates. 
  
time = tsep + 10 sec 
Figure 5-10.  RV has separated and is maneuvering back to “Snapshot” attitude. 
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time = tsep + 180 sec 
Figure 5-11.  RV - first separation burn with 0.6 m/s magnitude, 15 seconds duration. 
  
time = tsep + 300 sec 
Figure 5-12.  ISS returns to attitude control. 
5.10.2 Pertinent Flight Rules 
The following Flight Rule is relevant to RV separations from the ISS and this analysis [45]. 
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D4-101 SOYUZ/progress automated UNDOCKING AND SEPARation sequence [rC] 
A. UNDOCKING (PHYSICAL SEPARATION) WILL OCCUR 3-6 MINUTES AFTER THE UNDOCKING 
COMMAND.  SEPARATION WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE SPRING PUSHERS AND THE INITIAL RELATIVE 
VELOCITY WILL BE 0.09 TO 0.15 METERS/SECOND.  ®[CR 7186]   ®[072706-7094B]  
B. TEN SECONDS AFTER UNDOCKING, THE SOYUZ/PROGRESS WILL MODE AUTOMATICALLY TO 
ACTIVE CONTROL TO KEEP THE SOYUZ/PROGRESS ALIGNED WITH THE DOCKING PORT. 
1. WHILE IN ACTIVE CONTROL, SOYUZ WILL HOLD THE ATTITUDE IDENTICAL TO THE ISS 
ATTITUDE AT THE INSTANT OF PHYSICAL SEPARATION.  ®[ED]  
THE UNDOCK ATTITUDE QUATERNION IS PUT ONBOARD IN THE UNDOCK SETPOINTS.  THE 
SOYUZ WILL PROPAGATE THE ATTITUDE BASED ON ATTITUDE RATE DATA STARTING AT 
THE TIME THE UNDOCK COMMAND IS ISSUED, AND THE SOYUZ WILL RETURN TO THIS 
ATTITUDE WHEN IT MODES TO ACTIVE CONTROL. 
2. WHILE IN ACTIVE CONTROL, PROGRESS WILL HOLD THE ATTITUDE IDENTICAL TO THE ISS 
ATTITUDE AT THE INSTANT OF PHYSICAL SEPARATION.  ®[ED]  
THE UNDOCK ATTITUDE QUATERNION IS PUT ONBOARD IN THE UNDOCK SETPOINTS.  THE 
PROGRESS WILL PROPAGATE THE ATTITUDE BASED ON ATTITUDE RATE DATA 
STARTING AT PHYSICAL SEPARATION, AND THE PROGRESS WILL RETURN TO THIS 
ATTITUDE WHEN IT MODES TO ACTIVE CONTROL. 
C. 180 SECONDS AFTER UNDOCKING, THE SOYUZ/PROGRESS WILL AUTOMATICALLY PERFORM 
A 15-SECOND BURN AWAY FROM THE DOCKING PORT WITH THE ДПО +X THRUSTERS (APPROXIMATE 
delta V 0.6 M/S). 
D. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE BURN, AN AUTOMATED TEST OF THE ДПО +X THRUSTERS WILL 
BE PERFORMED.  IF ONE OR MORE OF THE THRUSTERS ARE FOUND TO BE FAILED, THE THRUSTERS 
WILL BE RECONFIGURED AND THE BURN WILL BE REPEATED WITHIN 45 SECONDS.  ®[072706-7094B]  
E. A SETPOINT FOR COMPLETING THE REMAINING STEPS (F, G) FOR UNDOCKING IN 
AUTOMATIC MODE WILL BE SET REGARDLESS OF ISS ATTITUDE, EXCEPT IN CASES OF TRANSVERSAL (± 
VELOCITY VECTOR) SEPARATION AND THEN ONLY BY DECISION OF MCC-M.  ®[072706-7094B]  
F. 420 SECONDS AFTER UNDOCKING, THE SOYUZ/PROGRESS WILL AUTOMATICALLY 
MANEUVER TO AN ATTITUDE THAT POINTS THE BODY +X AXIS ALONG THE NADIR AND THE BODY +Y 
AND -Z AXES BISECTING THE VELOCITY VECTOR. 
G. 550 SECONDS AFTER UNDOCKING, THE SOYUZ/PROGRESS WILL AUTOMATICALLY PERFORM 
A 30-SECOND BURN WITH THE ДПО -Y AND +Z THRUSTERS.  THIS IS A RETROGRADE BURN WITH 
APPROXIMATE DELTA V 1.4 to 2.0 M/S.  ®[CR 7186]  
DOCUMENTATION:  HAZARD REPORT RSTV-0026; REPORT:  SOYUZ-TM AND PROGRESS-
M SOFTWARE VERIFICATION FOR ISS (VERSION [МО-17]); AND AUGUST 25, 2005 
AR&D TELECON MINUTES, ATTACHMENT 2.   ®[072706-7094B]  
FLIGHT/STAGE EFFECTIVITY:  ALL FLIGHTS  
 
 
5.11 Docking Port Separation Dynamics 
Due to the design of the Russian docking mechanism, separation cannot always be assumed to be 
perfect. Potential snags of docking mechanisms can impart additional dynamics on the separating 
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vehicles. These dynamic dispersions have been identified by RSC-E and can be grouped into 
three distinct dispersion categories: longitudinal velocity, transverse velocity, and rotational. 
These categories are discussed in the following sections. 
5.11.1 Longitudinal Velocity Dispersions 
Nominally, the velocity imparted on the separating vehicle by the compressed docking port 
springs can vary from 0.09 to 0.15 m/s, depending on the mass of the departing vehicle. In the 
case of a single failed spring and heaviest departing vehicle, the smallest possible imparted 
velocity would be 0.09 m/s. For this analysis, only the minimum longitudinal velocity of 0.09 
m/s is used since it provides the most conservative results and cannot be ruled out via experience 
or vehicle mass planning. 
 
Figure 5-13.  Longitudinal velocity component. 
5.11.2 Transverse Velocity Dispersions 
Due to possible misalignments in the Russian docking mechanism, an additional velocity 
component can be imparted on the separating vehicles. The transverse component has been 
calculated to be approximately 0.03 m/s and can be in any direction of the ISS XY plane 
perpendicular to the vehicle longitudinal axis. In the case of relative motion analysis, the in-plane 
positive and negative transverse components are of most interest because they have the most 
potential to negatively impact short- and long-term clearance. These transverse components are 
displayed in Figure 5-14. For this analysis, the positive and negative transverse components were 
used in separation calculations to determine the overall separation profile. 
 
Figure 5-14.  Transverse velocity components 
87 
5.11.3 Rotational Rate Dispersions 
In addition to the velocity dispersions, it is possible that rotational rate is imparted into the 
separating RV resulting from the same imperfections in the ISS and RV docking mechanisms. 
These dispersions can be projected in both the lateral and longitudinal axes with the following 
values: 
a. 0.2 degrees/s (longitudinal axis) - A roll attitude rate 
b. 0.5 degrees/s (lateral axis) - A pitch/yaw attitude rate 
To reduce the number of analysis cases, the rotational rate dispersion can be characterized by 
using a 6.0 m radius sphere encompassing all possible RV attitudes, thereby eliminating the need 
to vary this dispersion. From the “Contact Sphere” section 5.3.1.2, the 6.0 m radius sphere 
envelopes all the possible attitudes and attitude rates the RV could have at any point in its 
trajectory. 
Use of the 6.0 m sphere, in lieu of rotational rate dispersions, has been agreed upon by the 
NASA AR&D team and RSC-E per the November 20, 2003, AR&D telecon. 
 
Figure 5-15.  Rotational dispersions. 
5.12 Attitude Control 
The ISS attitude can be controlled through Russian or US attitude control methods. These 
include: 
a. Control moment gyroscope (CMG) Momentum Management (MM) - 
Nonpropulsive 
b. CMG Attitude Hold (AH) - Automatic thruster assist 
c. RS Thruster Control - SM plus Progress and/or ATV 
d. Orbiter VRCS 
Source:  
https://viperweb.jsc.nasa.gov/team_mai/web/VAC_MAPS.shtml 
Below link no longer valid. 
http://viperweb.jsc.nasa.gov/team_ei/MAPSData2004ISSOrbiterAttitudeControlModes.php 
88 
The RS thruster control and Orbiter VRCS attitude control schemes are discussed in the 
following sections. 
5.12.1 RS Thruster Control 
The RS implements a propulsive attitude control scheme using thrusters on the SM and attached 
Progress and ATV vehicles. 
Per SSP 41163H, RS Specification, Section 4.3.7.2.3.57, Control Attitude - Propulsive, 
paragraph 14, there is a requirement for the SM Motion Control System (MCS) to have the 
capability to control the ISS stack attitude to within ±3.0° per axis when controlling to a Local 
Vertical/Local Horizontal (LVLH) or inertial attitude. In effect, these are the attitude deadband 
limits unless alternative operational limits are implemented. 
The SM MCS shall maintain attitude within +/− 3.0 degrees per axis in the SM reference 
frame when controlling to a LVLH or inertial attitude with propulsive effectors or with 
nonpropulsive effectors assisted by propulsion effectors. 
The attitude rate requirement is ±0.03° per second for the X-axis and ±0.015° per second for the 
Y and Z axes, as defined in paragraph 17. In effect, these are the attitude rate deadband limits 
unless alternative operational limits are implemented. 
The SM shall control attitude rates to within +/− 0.03 degrees per second for the X−axis 
and +/− 0.015 degrees per second for the Y− and Z−axes with respect to the commanded 
attitude when not performing translational or rotational maneuvers. … 
The operational limits, as defined in Flight Rule D2-303, ISS Attitude for Soyuz/Progress 
Undocking, Volume D, state that the total attitude error (root sum squared (RSS)) should be no 
greater than 3.0°, and the total attitude rate error (RSS) should be no greater than 0.02° per 
second [45]. 
5.12.2 Orbiter VRCS 
The Orbiter digital auto pilot (DAP) has multiple attitude control schemes that can be selected, 
one of which is the VRCS. For attitude hold of the mated Orbiter-ISS stack, VRCS control is 
certified to 0.02° per second per axis rate deadband with a 1.0° attitude deadband, as provided by 
EG/Kenneth Lindsay for STS-128/17A. These values will be used to represent the VRCS attitude 
control capabilities for this analysis. 
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D2-303 ISS ATTITUDE FOR SOYUZ/PROGRESS UNDOCKING [HC] [RC]  ®[052401-7519]  
A. FOR SOYUZ/PROGRESS UNDOCKING FROM AN ISS NADIR PORT, THE ISS WILL MANEUVER TO AN 
APPROVED PITCH DOWN ATTITUDE PER RULE {B2-204}, PERMISSIBLE ISS STAGE ATTITUDES AND 
ATTITUDE DEVIATIONS [RC].  FOR NOMINAL UNDOCKING, ISS RS СУДН WILL MAINTAIN ISS 
ATTITUDE WITH A TOTAL ATTITUDE ERROR MAGNITUDE NO GREATER THAN 3 DEGREES AND 
TOTAL ATTITUDE RATE ERROR MAGNITUDE NO LARGER THAN +0.02 DEG/SEC.  THE MANEUVER 
TO THIS ATTITUDE MUST BE COMPLETE NO LATER THAN 5 MINUTES PRIOR TO THE PLANNED 
UNDOCKING COMMAND TIME.  ®[072706-5609B]  
Analysis has shown that this attitude provides safe short term and long term clearance between an 
unmanned Progress and ISS for the unlikely case that the Progress MCS fails after undocking and no 
separation burns are performed.  In this unlikely scenario, sufficient time would not be available for the 
ISS crew to set up the ТОРУ equipment and perform a burn manually. 
Reference:  Hazard Report RSCE-0021, Collision of a Spacecraft with the Station After Separating, Cause 2. 
B. FOR SOYUZ/PROGRESS UNDOCKING FROM THE SERVICE MODULE AFT PORT, THE ISS WILL 
MANEUVER TO THE XVV ATTITUDE.  FOR NOMINAL UNDOCKING, ISS RS СУДН WILL MAINTAIN 
ISS ATTITUDE WITH TOTAL ATTITUDE ERROR MAGNITUDE AND TOTAL ATTITUDE RATE ERROR 
NO GREATER THAN 3 DEGREES AND +0.02 DEG/SEC, RESPECTIVELY.  THE MANEUVER TO THIS 
ATTITUDE MUST BE COMPLETE NO LATER THAN 5 MINUTES PRIOR TO THE PLANNED 
UNDOCKING COMMAND TIME. 
C. THE ISS WILL BE MODED TO FREE DRIFT 1 MINUTE PRIOR TO THE TIME SEPARATION IS 
COMMANDED. 
D. THE ISS WILL REMAIN IN FREE DRIFT UNTIL UNDOCKING +5 MINUTES.  AFTER THAT, THE ISS 
WILL INITIATE MANEUVER TO THE PLANNED ATTITUDE.  ®[072706-5609B]  
FLIGHT/STAGE EFFECTIVITY:  12A THROUGH 12A.1  ®[072706-5609B] minutes, Attachment 2.   
®[072706-7094B]  
FLIGHT/STAGE EFFECTIVITY:  ALL FLIGHTS  
 
 
5.13 Initial Conditions 
The initial conditions, which determine the number of simulation runs that will be required, are 
made up of the ISS-Orbiter stack attitude and attitude rates prior to separation (defined by the 
selected attitude control scheme), the separation velocities and separation dispersions, and 
varying inclusion of the two RV separation burns. 
5.13.1 Attitude Control 
For the purpose of this analysis, only the RS thruster control and Orbiter VRCS attitude control 
schemes will be analyzed. The RS thruster control is analyzed because it is the primary attitude 
control scheme employed for RV separations. Orbiter VRCS was chosen as an alternative 
attitude control scheme because its use would allow for ISS propellant conservation with the 
Orbiter expending its own resources for all necessary maneuvers and attitude control. 
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5.13.2 Attitude and Attitude Rate Data 
Separation analyses are to be performed for three primary ISS attitudes and a series of dispersed 
attitudes resulting from variations in starting attitude, attitude rates, and hook opening time. The 
three primary attitudes are as follows: +XVV +ZLV, -XVV +ZLV, and -XLV -ZVV. 
The +XVV +ZLV attitude was chosen because it is the primary attitude flown by the ISS 
(without Orbiter present). Unfortunately, this attitude is not a valid attitude for RV separations. 
As a result, it serves as a mathematical exercise only. 
  
Figure 5-16.  +XVV +ZLV (YPR 0,0,0 [RPY 0,0,0]) attitude. 
The -XVV +ZLV attitude was chosen because it represents the primary attitude flown when the 
Orbiter is docked with the ISS. This attitude is not a valid attitude for RV separations. 
 
 
Figure 5-17.  -XVV +ZLV (YPR 180,0,0 [RPY 0,0,180]) attitude. 
The -XLV -ZVV attitude is the primary attitude of interest for DDO requiring RV separations. 
RV separations at this attitude are known to meet the requirement of Hazard Report RSCE-0021 
to provide for safe long-term clearance between the departing Soyuz and ISS in case of a failure 
of the its thrusters. The primary concern for this attitude is the short-term clearance with the 
Orbiter and other ISS structure. 
  
Figure 5-18.  -XLV -ZVV (YPR 180,90,0 [RPY 0,-90,180]) attitude. 
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The dispersed attitudes, originating from the primary attitudes, account for the following 
variations: 
a. Maximum and minimum attitude deadband limits, using in-plane Pitch deadband. 
The deadband limits represent the starting ISS attitude prior to any forthcoming 
attitude propagations. 
b. Maximum attitude rate deadband in the positive and negative pitch directions. The 
direction of the attitude rate will drive the final attitude position at separation and 
the amount of rotation the ISS experiences. 
c. Hook opening times of 180 or 310 seconds, for nominal and off-nominal 
operations, respectively. The hook opening time drives the amount of rotation the 
ISS experiences during the free drift period prior to separation when experiencing 
any attitude rates. 
The following section provides an example of the separation attitude dispersions for the +XVV 
+ZLV primary attitude. Similar dispersions must be applied to the other analysis attitudes. 
5.13.2.1 +XVV +ZLV (YPR 0,0,0) Attitude and Dispersions 
The +XVV +ZLV attitude is depicted in Figure 4-16. 
Dispersions around this attitude include an upper pitch dispersion and a lower pitch dispersion, 
the magnitudes of which depend on the attitude control scheme being used. For VRCS control, 
the attitude deadband is 1.0°, resulting in maximum pitch dispersions of ±1.0° from the X LVLH 
axis.  
Per the RV separation timeline, the ISS stack modes to free drift from 240 (60 seconds + 180 
seconds) to 370 (60 seconds + 310 seconds) seconds prior to physical separation, for the nominal 
and off-nominal hooks opening events, respectively. With a maximum potential pitch attitude 
rate of 0.02° per second, the attitude at separation can be dispersed an additional 4.8° (for 
240 seconds of free drift) to 7.4° (for 370 seconds of free drift) from the starting deadband 
attitude and in the direction of the attitude rate (either positive or negative pitch direction). 
Figure 5-19 and Table 5-3 show the range of possible separation attitudes for nominal (180 
seconds) hook opening times. Figure 5-20 and Table 5-4 show the range of possible separation 
attitudes for off-nominal (360 seconds) hook opening times. 
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Positive Pitch Attitude, Positive Pitch Rate: 
Negative Pitch Attitude, Positive Pitch Rate: 
Zero Pitch Attitude, Positive Pitch Rate: 
Positive Pitch Attitude, Negative Pitch Rate: 
Negative Pitch Attitude, Negative Pitch Rate: 
Zero Pitch Attitude, Negative Pitch Rate: 
+X LVLH 
+Z LVLH 
Positive Pitch Attitude, Zero Attitude Rate 
Negative Pitch Attitude, Zero Attitude Rate 
Zero Pitch Attitude, Zero Attitude Rate 
Negative Pitch Rate 
Positive Pitch Rate 
 
Figure 5-19.  Graphical representation of dispersed separation attitudes for the +XVV +ZLV 
(YPR 0,0,0) attitude, with nominal (180 seconds) hook opening time. 
Table 5-3.  Tabular Representation of Dispersed Separation Attitudes for the +XVV +ZLV (YPR 
0,0,0) Attitude, with Nominal (180 seconds) Hook Opening Time. 
Description 
Starting Free-
Drift 
Pitch Attitude 
[deg] 
Attitude Rate 
in Pitch 
Direction 
[deg/s] 
Final 
Separation 
Pitch Attitude 
[deg] 
Positive Pitch Attitude    
Positive Pitch Rate 0.0 0.02 5.8 
Zero Attitude Rate 0.0 0.00 1.0 
Negative Pitch Rate 0.0 -0.02 -3.8 
Zero Pitch Attitude    
Positive Pitch Rate 1.0 0.02 4.8 
Zero Attitude Rate 1.0 0.00 0.0 
Negative Pitch Rate 1.0 -0.02 -4.8 
Negative Pitch Attitude    
Positive Pitch Rate -1.0 0.02 3.8 
Zero Attitude Rate -1.0 0.00 -1.0 
Negative Pitch Rate -1.0 -0.02 -5.8 
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Negative Pitch Rate 
Positive Pitch Rate 
+X LVLH 
+Z LVLH 
Positive Pitch Attitude, Positive Pitch Rate: 
Negative Pitch Attitude, Positive Pitch Rate: 
Zero Pitch Attitude, Positive Pitch Rate: 
Positive Pitch Attitude, Negative Pitch Rate: 
Negative Pitch Attitude, Negative Pitch Rate: 
Zero Pitch Attitude, Negative Pitch Rate: 
Positive Pitch Attitude, Zero Attitude Rate 
Negative Pitch Attitude, Zero Attitude Rate 
Zero Pitch Attitude, Zero Attitude Rate 
 
Figure 5-20.  Graphical representation of dispersed separation attitudes for the +XVV +ZLV 
(YPR 0,0,0) attitude, with off-nominal (310 seconds) hook opening time. 
Table 5-4.  Tabular Representation of Dispersed Separation Attitudes for the +XVV +ZLV (YPR 
0,0,0) Attitude, with Off-Nominal (310 seconds) Hook Opening Time 
Description 
Starting Free-
Drift 
Pitch Attitude 
[deg] 
Attitude Rate 
in Pitch 
Direction 
[deg/s] 
Final 
Separation 
Pitch Attitude 
[deg] 
Positive Pitch Attitude    
Positive Pitch Rate 0.0 0.02 8.4 
Zero Attitude Rate 0.0 0.00 1.0 
Negative Pitch Rate 0.0 -0.02 -6.4 
Zero Pitch Attitude    
Positive Pitch Rate 1.0 0.02 7.4 
Zero Attitude Rate 1.0 0.00 0.0 
Negative Pitch Rate 1.0 -0.02 -7.4 
Negative Pitch Attitude    
Positive Pitch Rate -1.0 0.02 6.4 
Zero Attitude Rate -1.0 0.00 -1.0 
Negative Pitch Rate -1.0 -0.02 -8.4 
5.13.3 Velocities and Dispersions 
As discussed in Section 5.1, the velocities obtained at physical separation are the combination of 
the spring push-off imparted velocities and velocity dispersions due to possible imperfect 
docking mechanism dynamics.  
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The spring push-off separation velocity is the longitudinal velocity component, and for this 
analysis only the velocity component of 0.09 m/s (i.e., single spring failure and highest mass 
Soyuz vehicle) was used. 
The velocity dispersions are 0.03 m/s positive transverse velocity, and 0.03 m/s negative 
transverse velocity. 
5.13.4 Burn Profiles 
There are no known failures that will cause a shortened burn, so no dispersions on the magnitude 
or duration of the burns were included. However, the failure of the RV motion control system to 
initiate the burn is a credible scenario. Therefore, for this analysis, both the no burn (spring-only) 
and the one burn trajectory profiles have been analyzed. 
5.14 Analysis Planning 
The separation analysis is performed by the RV Automated Vehicles team and Orbit Analysis 
Group in the MOD Flight Design and Dynamics Division. 
This analysis was requested by the ISSP because of a potential overlap between the planned 19S 
undocking from the FGB nadir port and the planned STS-129/ULF3 flight, and because it 
provides an example “Soyuz undock from FGB Nadir” case for the generic analysis of DDO.  
The analysis will be performed for the three primary attitudes discussed in Section 3.2: +XVV 
+ZLV, -XVV +ZLV, and -XLV -ZVV. For each of these primary attitudes, an additional set of 
separation attitudes have been chosen that account for the variation in attitude control mode, 
hook opening time duration, and deadband pitch attitude and deadband attitude rate and rate 
direction. An example of the varied number of separating attitudes was discussed in Section 
5.13.2.1 for the +XVV +ZLV primary attitude, and similar dispersed attitudes will be used for 
the remaining two primary attitude cases. 
In addition to the initial separating attitudes, the remaining dispersion that must be accounted for 
includes the burn profile and the transverse velocity components. The burn profile consists of a 
“no burn” separation using only springs, and a “one burn” separation that employs both springs 
and the first separation burn at 180 seconds. For the transverse velocity component, the analysis 
concentrates on dispersions within the LVLH X-Z plane, hence both a forward (positive) and aft 
(negative) transverse component is used, relative to the ISS body and perpendicular to the 
separation direction of the RVs. 
Based on the number of variables that affect the analysis, there will be 144 individual separating 
trajectories per primary attitude for a total of 432 for all three attitudes. 
Once the entire set of analyses runs is complete, comprehensive documentation of the data and 
results will follow. As there are multiple parameters that are being varied in this analysis, the 
resulting output will try to explain the effect each has on the separating trajectories. 
A run matrix example is presented in Table 5-5 to illustrate the analysis runs. This run matrix 
will be used to present the run results in the Preliminary Results in the next section. Each run 
matrix is for a specific primary attitude and for the selected attitude control method. The results 
for each primary attitude will include two run matrices: the VRCS attitude control run matrix, 
and the RS attitude control run matrix. For each contact case, a reference to the plot is provided 
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by the use of a superscript text for the corresponding figure number (e.g., DC-190 signifies DC-1 
vehicle contact shown in Figure 5-90). 
Following each run matrix are two pages of result plots. The first page represents the results for 
the “no burn” and “one burn” profiles for the 180 second hook opening duration. The second 
page represents the same results, but for the 310 second hook opening duration. 
Table 5-5.  Sample Run Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 VRCS Attitude Control (1.0 deg, 0.02 deg/sec) 
Hook Opening Duration: 180 sec  310 sec 
Burn Profile:  No Burn One Burn  No Burn One Burn 
Transverse Velocity Direction: +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg  +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg 
 
 
Positive Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate           
Zero Attitude Rate           
Negative Attitude Rate           
 
 
Zero Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate           
Zero Attitude Rate           
Negative Attitude Rate           
 
 
Negative Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate           
Zero Attitude Rate           
Negative Attitude Rate           
 
 No contact detected. 
 Possible contact detected. 
 Definite contact detected. 
First 
Page 
of Plots 
Second 
Page 
of Plots 
no  = No vehicle contact. 
ORB  = Orbiter contact (likely tail contact) 
DC1  = Vehicle docked at DC1 nadir contact 
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5.15 Preliminary Results 
5.15.1 Results Introduction 
The following analysis results are preliminary and require the concurrence of the Russian and 
International Partners before they can be used to make operational decisions. 
Following this short introduction is a section describing the plots, which is followed by the 
results sections. Section 5.15.3 displays the composite plots for all the separating trajectories and 
Sections 5.15.4 through 5.15.6 detail the results for each of the three primary attitudes: +XVV 
+ZLV, -XVV +ZLV, and -XLV -ZVV. 
Each primary attitude result section includes a short description of the results followed by a 
composite plot of the trajectories for the current analysis attitude. These are followed by two 
subsections that present the run matrix and the plots for each of the two attitude control schemes: 
RS and VRCS. 
5.15.2 Plot and Key Information 
Note that each plot shows the separation trajectories in the ISSACS coordinate system. The lines 
represent the center of mass location of the separating vehicle over time. An additional 6.0 m 
radius circle around each trajectory point should be used to represent the boundaries of the 
separating vehicle and consequently contact when that circle encroaches onto any ISS stack 
structure. 
The ISS/Orbiter image is not a true representation. It is to be used for informational purposes 
only or for identification of possible cases for further evaluation. 
The following line style and color key applies to all trajectory plots that follow. 
 
5.15.3 Composite Plots for All Attitudes 
The following show the composite trajectories for all the three primary attitudes. Figure 5-21 
shows a composite of the “no burn” trajectories corresponding to the spring-only separations. 
Figure 5-22 shows a composite of the “One Burn” trajectories. Spring separation is followed by 
the first separation burn at 180 seconds. 
Negative Attitude Rate at Separation - Positive Transverse Velocity 
Negative Attitude Rate at Separation - Negative Transverse Velocity 
Zero Attitude Rate at Separation - Positive Transverse Velocity 
Zero Attitude Rate at Separation - Negative Transverse Velocity 
Positive Attitude Rate at Separation - Positive Transverse Velocity 
Positive Attitude Rate at Separation - Negative Transverse Velocity 
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Figure 5-21.  Composite plot of “no burn” trajectories for all attitudes.  
  
Figure 5-22.  Composite plot of “one burn” trajectories for all attitudes. 
Composite plots show the range of the trajectories that are displayed and the effect that the 
transverse component direction has. The positive transverse velocity component, or the velocity 
component towards the +X ISSACS direction, pushes the separation trajectories closer to the 
Orbiter tail, while the negative transverse velocity component, or the velocity component 
towards the -X ISSACS directions, pushes the separation trajectories away from the Orbiter tail 
and closer to vehicles docked at the DC-1 nadir port. 
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Based on the result plots, the effect of hook opening duration is not as significant as the effect of 
transverse velocity component direction, as can be observed by the nearly identical trajectory 
paths for these results. 
Additionally, the selection of attitude control scheme results in a minor difference in the final 
separation trajectories. The effect is primarily observed in the numerical results and partially by 
the flared trajectory lines shown in the composite plots. 
The “no burn” composite plot (Figure 5-21) shows definite structural contact due to the 
trajectories directly crossing the Orbiter tail. These trajectories are in the +XVV +XLV (YPR 
0,0,0) attitude, which is not a primary concern and can be ignored. Likewise, though not directly 
apparent from the plots, the “one burn” composite plot (Figure 5-22) contains Orbiter tail contact 
for trajectories in the +XVV +XLV (YPR 0,0,0) attitude. Again, these results are of no concern. 
Though this analysis was primarily concerned with RV to Orbiter contact, the results show that 
contact may exist with a vehicle docked at the DC-1 nadir port. These contact cases were found 
for the -XLV -ZVV (YPR 180, 90, 0) attitude and are of concern as this attitude is the primary 
attitude proposed for DDO operations that may require Soyuz vehicle separations. More detailed 
results for this attitude are presented in Section 5.15.6. 
5.15.4 Results for the +XVV +ZLV (YPR 0, 0, 0) Attitude 
5.15.4.1 Results Discussion 
As previously mentioned, the +XVV +ZLV attitude case has been analyzed as a mathematical 
problem to provide a base reference for separation trajectories. Therefore, it can be excluded 
from any operational DDO decisions. 
From the composite plots represented in Figure 5-23 and Figure 5-24, contact has been shown to 
occur primarily for the positive transverse velocity component. For the “no burn” (spring only) 
trajectories, the transverse component curves the trajectory directly over the Orbiter tail, clearly 
resulting in structural contact with high potential for damage. The composite plots are shown in 
Figure 5-23 with individual analysis results shown in Figure 5-25, Figure 5-27, Figure 5-29 for 
the 180 seconds hook opening and Figure 5-31, Figure 5-33, Figure 5-35 for the 310 seconds 
hook opening. When the first separation burn is activated, contact was shown for the positive 
transverse velocity component when coupled with a negative attitude rate of the ISS stack. The 
composite plots are shown in Figure 5-24 with individual analysis results in Figure 5-26, Figure 
5-28, Figure 5-30 for the 180 seconds hook opening, and Figure 5-32, Figure 5-34, Figure 5-36 
for the 310 seconds hook opening. 
The effect of hook opening duration or attitude control method used does not have as significant 
of an impact as the effect of transverse velocity component direction.  
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5.15.4.2 Composite Plots 1.1.1.1  
  
Figure 5-23.  Composite plot of “no burn”  
trajectories for +XVV +ZLV attitude.  
  
Figure 5-24.  Composite plot of “one burn”  
trajectories for +XVV +ZLV attitude. 
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5.15.4.3 VRCS Attitude Control Results 
 VRCS Attitude Control (1.0 deg, 0.02 deg/sec) 
Hook Opening Duration: 180 sec  310 sec 
Burn Profile:  No Burn One Burn  No Burn One Burn 
Transverse Velocity Direction: +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg  +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg 
 
 
Positive Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch  
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 5.8 ORB25 no no no 8.4 ORB31 no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate 1.0 ORB25 no no no 1.0 ORB31 no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -3.8 ORB25 no ORB26 no -6.4 ORB31 no ORB32 no 
 
 
Zero Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch  
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 4.8 ORB27 no no no 7.4 ORB33 no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate 0.0 ORB27 no no no 0.0 ORB33 no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -4.8 ORB27 no ORB28 no -7.4 ORB33 no ORB34 no 
 
 
Negative Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch  
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 3.8 ORB29 no no no 6.4 ORB35 no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate -1.0 ORB29 no no no -1.0 ORB35 no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -5.8 ORB29 no ORB30 no -8.4 ORB35 no ORB36 no 
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+XVV +ZLV (YPR 0,0,0), VRCS, 180 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-25 - 5-26.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-27 - 5-28.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-29 - 5-30.  Negative deadband pitch attitude. 
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+XVV +ZLV (YPR 0,0,0), VRCS, 310 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-31 - 5-32.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-33 - 5-34.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-35 - 5-36.  Negative deadband pitch attitude. 
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5.15.4.4 RS Attitude Control Results 
 RS Attitude Control (3.0 deg, 0.02 deg/sec) 
Hook Opening Duration: 180 sec  310 sec 
Burn Profile:  No Burn One Burn  No Burn One Burn 
Transverse Velocity Direction: +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg  +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg 
 
 
Positive Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch  
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 7.8 ORB37 no no no 10.4 ORB43 no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate 3.0 ORB37 no no no 3.0 ORB43 no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -1.8 ORB37 no ORB38  no -4.4 ORB43 no ORB44 no 
 
 
Zero Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch  
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 4.8 ORB39 no no no 7.4 ORB45 no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate 0.0 ORB39 no no no 0.0 ORB45 no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -4.8 ORB39 no ORB40 no -7.4 ORB45 no ORB46 no 
 
 
Negative Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch  
Attitude 
[deg]  
 
Positive Attitude Rate 7.8 ORB41 no no no 4.4 ORB47 no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate -3.0 ORB41 no no no -3.0 ORB47 no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -1.8 ORB41 no ORB42 no -10.4 ORB47 no ORB48 no 
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+XVV +ZLV (YPR 0,0,0), RS, 180 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-37 - 5-38.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-39 - 5-40.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
+XVV +ZLV (YPR 0,0,0), RS, 310 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-41 - 5-42.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
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Figure 5-43 - 5-44.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-45 - 5-46.  Negative deadband pitch attitude. 
5.15.5 Results for the -XVV +ZLV (YPR 180, 0, 0) Attitude 
5.15.5.1 Results Discussion 
Though the -XVV +ZLV attitude is the standard DDO attitude, it is not a valid Soyuz separation 
attitude, and hence any possible contact during this case is of no concern. 
No contact has been found for any of the separating trajectories in this attitude. With the ISS 
stack yawed by 180°, the Orbiter is aft facing (-XVV LVLH frame) while the separating 
trajectories are similar to the +XVV +ZLV attitude and hence no Orbiter contact was found. The 
only close approach observed was with the RV docked at the DC-1 nadir port. This approach 
was outside the 6.0 m radius sphere, so it has not been logged as a contact. Further investigation 
of this close approach would be required if this separation attitude is approved. 
As for the previous attitude case, the direction of the transverse velocity component has the 
largest effect on the separating trajectories, and the effect of hook opening duration or selection 
of attitude control scheme are not significant, in comparison.  
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5.15.5.2 Composite Plots 
1.1.1.1  
  
Figure 5-47.  Composite plot of “no burn” 
trajectories for -XVV +ZLV attitude. 
 
  
Figure 5-48.  Composite plot of “one burn” 
trajectories for -XVV +ZLV attitude. 
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5.15.5.3 VRCS Attitude Control Results 
 VRCS Attitude Control (1.0 deg, 0.02 deg/sec) 
Hook Opening Duration: 180 sec  310 sec 
Burn Profile:  No Burn One Burn  No Burn One Burn 
Transverse Velocity Direction: +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg  +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg 
 
 
Positive Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 5.8 no no no no 8.4 no no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate 1.0 no no no no 1.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -3.8 no no no no -6.4 no no no no 
 
 
Zero Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 4.8 no no no no 7.4 no no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate 0.0 no no no no 0.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -4.8 no no no no -7.4 no no no no 
 
 
Negative Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 3.8 no no no no 6.4 no no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate -1.0 no no no no -1.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -5.8 no no no no -8.4 no no no no 
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-XVV +ZLV (YPR 180,0,0), VRCS, 180 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-49 - 5-50.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-51 - 5-52.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-53 - 5-54.  Negative deadband pitch attitude 
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-XVV +ZLV (YPR 180,0,0), VRCS, 310 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-55 - 5-56.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-57 - 5-58.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-59 - 5-60.  Negative deadband pitch attitude. 
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5.15.5.4 RS Attitude Control Results 
 RS Attitude Control (3.0 deg, 0.02 deg/sec) 
Hook Opening Duration: 180 sec  310 sec 
Burn Profile:  No Burn One Burn  No Burn One Burn 
Transverse Velocity Direction: +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg  +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg 
 
 
Positive Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 7.8 no no no no 10.4 no no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate 3.0 no no no no 3.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -1.8 no no no no -4.4 no no no no 
 
 
Zero Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 4.8 no no no no 7.4 no no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate 0.0 no no no no 0.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -4.8 no no no no -7.4 no no no no 
 
 
Negative Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 1.8 no no no no 4.4 no no no no 
Zero Attitude Rate -3.0 no no no no -3.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate -7.8 no no no no -10.4 no no no no 
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-XVV +ZLV (YPR 180,0,0), RS, 180 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-61 - 5-62.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-63 - 5-64.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-65 - 5-66.  Negative deadband pitch attitude. 
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-XVV +ZLV (YPR 180,0,0), RS, 310 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-67 - 5-68.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-69 - 5-70.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-71 - 5-72.  Negative deadband pitch attitude. 
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5.15.6 Results for the -XLV -ZVV (YPR 180, 90, 0) Attitude 
5.15.6.1 Results Discussion 
The -XLV -ZVV attitude is the primary DDO attitude of concern. This attitude meets the RV 
separation attitude requirement and meets all the safe trajectory requirements. 
No Orbiter contact has been found for any of the separating trajectories in this attitude, but 
potential contact was found between the separating vehicle and the vehicle docked at the DC-1 
nadir port. This contact was the result of the encroachment of the 6.0 m contact sphere with the 
bottom of the DC-1 docked vehicle.  
The DC-1 Nadir vehicle contact was primarily found for the negative transverse velocity 
component (component directed aft towards the -X ISSACS direction), coupled with a positive 
attitude rate of the ISS stack at separation. With the ISS stack pitching up, the aft end of the ISS 
(including the DC-1 nadir port) begins to curve closer to the separating trajectory resulting in 
these contacts.  
This contact, with VRCS attitude control, is shown in Figure 5-75 through Figure 5-82 for the 
180 seconds hook opening, and Figure 5-81 through Figure 5-88 for the 310 seconds hook 
opening. With the RS attitude control method, contact is shown in Figure 5-87 through Figure 5-
94 for the 180 seconds hook opening, and Figure 5-93 through Figure 5-100 for the 310 seconds 
hook opening. 
5.15.6.2 Composite Plots 
1.1.1.1  
  
Figure 5-73.  Composite plot of “no burn” 
trajectories for -XLV -ZVV attitude. 
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Figure 5-74.  Composite plot of “one burn” 
trajectories for -XLV -ZVV attitude. 
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5.15.6.3 VRCS Attitude Control Results 
 VRCS Attitude Control (1.0 deg, 0.02 deg/sec) 
Hook Opening Duration: 180 sec  310 sec 
Burn Profile:  No Burn One Burn  No Burn One Burn 
Transverse Velocity Direction: +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg  +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg 
 
Positive Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 95.8 no DC177 no DC178 98.4 no DC183 no DC184 
Zero Attitude Rate 91.0 no no no no 91.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate 86.2 no no no no 83.6 no no no no 
 
Zero Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 94.8 no DC179 no DC180 97.4 no DC185 no DC186 
Zero Attitude Rate 90.0 no no no no 90.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate 85.2 no no no no 82.6 no no no no 
 
Negative Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 93.8 no DC181 no DC182 96.4 no DC187 no DC188 
Zero Attitude Rate 89.0 no no no no 89.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate 84.2 no no no no 81.6 no no no no 
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-XLV -ZVV (YPR 180,90,0), VRCS, 180 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-75 - 5-76.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-77 - 5-78.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-79 - 5-80.  Negative deadband pitch attitude. 
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-XLV -ZVV (YPR 180, 90, 0), VRCS, 310 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-81 - 5-82.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-83 - 5-84.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-85 - 5-86.  Negative deadband pitch attitude. 
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5.15.6.4 RS Attitude Control Results 
 RS Attitude Control (3.0 deg, 0.02 deg/sec) 
Hook Opening Duration: 180 sec  310 sec 
Burn Profile:  No Burn One Burn  No Burn One Burn 
Transverse Velocity Direction: +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg  +Pos -Neg +Pos -Neg 
 
Positive Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 97.8 no DC189 no DC190 100.4 no DC195 no DC196 
Zero Attitude Rate 93.0 no no no no 93.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate 88.2 no no no no 85.6 no no no no 
 
Zero Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 94.8 no DC191 no DC192 97.4 no DC197 no DC198 
Zero Attitude Rate 90.0 no no no no 90.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate 85.2 no no no no 82.6 no no no no 
 
Negative Deadband Pitch Attitude 
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg]  
Separation 
Pitch 
Attitude 
[deg] 
 
 
Positive Attitude Rate 91.8 no DC193 no DC194 94.4 no DC199 no DC1100 
Zero Attitude Rate 87.0 no no no no 87.0 no no no no 
Negative Attitude Rate 82.2 no no no no 79.6 no no no no 
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-XLV -ZVV (YPR 180, 90, 0), RS, 180 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-87 - 5-88.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-89 - 5-90.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-91 - 5-92.  Negative deadband pitch attitude. 
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-XLV -ZVV (YPR 180, 90, 0), RS, 310 seconds Hook Opening Duration 
No Burn (springs only) One Burn 
            
Figure 5-93 - 5-94.  Positive deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-95 - 5-96.  Zero deadband pitch attitude. 
 
            
Figure 5-97 - 5-98.  Negative deadband pitch attitude. 
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5.16 Close Clearance Analysis 
The data acquired from the VVO analysis was provided to CAMMP specialists to perform RV 
and ISS clearance assessment for -ZVV -XLV (YPR 180, 90, 0) attitude. This attitude was 
chosen to meet RV separation requirements and to provide clearance with the Orbiter. It was 
agreed the +ZVV -XLV attitude was unacceptable since departing vehicle trajectory could cross 
the Orbiter tail. 
From over 500 cases performed by the VVO, only 12 worst-cases were selected for detailed 
vehicle clearance analysis. Cases include RV failed MCS and nominal separation scenarios. The 
close clearance trajectories were selected from composite plots provided by the VVO. 
CAMMP specialists used the ProEngineering® tool to build trajectories and the STS-129/ULF3 
flight simplified ISS model to determine relative position of the RV and ISS. Relative position of 
c.g. points were populated into the model and provided relative trajectory of the RV that 
encompasses initial ISS attitude determination error, ISS initial drift rates, docking mechanism 
operation dispersions (e.g., longitudinal, transverse, and rotational components). To account for 
the rotational component, a 6 m sphere around the RV c.g. was used. 
The analysis results have shown interference between the sphere around the departing RV and 
RV docked to DC-1 nadir port for -ZVV -XLV YPR (180°, 90°, 0°), with hook opening time at 
180 and 310 seconds. Interference occurs when the RV fails to execute the post separation burn 
at 180 seconds and when ISS had max positive pitch and max positive pitch rate with a negative 
transverse component from the RV.  
A close proximity of 0.3 m was determined between the sphere around the departing RV and RV 
docked to DC-1 nadir port for -ZVV -XLV YPR (180°, 0°, 0°), with hook opening time at 180 
and 310 seconds. Interference occurs when the RV fails to execute the post separation burn at 
180 seconds and when ISS had max negative pitch and max positive pitch rate with a negative 
transverse component from the RV.  
Closest distance between the sphere around the RV and Orbiter was determined to be ~8.0 m. 
Such clearance was determined for -ZVV -XLV YPR (180°, 0°, 0°), with hook opening time at 
180 and 310 seconds. The closest distance occurs when the RV fails to execute the post 
separation burn at 180 seconds and when ISS had max negative pitch and max negative pitch rate 
with positive transverse component from the RV. The same close proximity was determined for 
two cases in -ZVV -XLV YPR (180°, 90°, 0°) attitude, with hook opening time at 180 and 310 
seconds, when the RV executes the post separation burn at 180 seconds and when ISS had 
maximum positive pitch, maximum negative pitch rate with positive transverse component from 
the RV.  
Graphical representation of analysis results is shown on Figure 5-99 through Figure 5-105. 
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8.2 m
 
Figure 5-99.  -XVV +ZLV, hook time 180s, RV no Burn, ISS NegPitch,  
NegRate, RV PosTrans. 
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19.7 m
0.3 m
 
Figure 5-100.  -XVV +ZLV, hook time 180s, RV no Burn, ISS NegPitch,  
PosRate, RV NegTrans. 
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Figure 5-101.  -XVV +ZLV, hook time 310s, RV no Burn, ISS NegPitch,  
NegRate, RV PosTrans. 
20.2 m
Interference between 
sphere and Progress 
at DC1
 
Figure 5-102.  -ZVV -XLV, hook time 180s, RV No Burn, ISS PosPitch,  
PosRate, RV NegTrans. 
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Figure 5-103.  -ZVV -XLV, hooks time 180s, RV one Burn, ISS PosPitch,  
NegRate, RV PosTrans. 
20.3 m
Interference between 
sphere and Progress 
at DC1
 
Figure 5-104.  -ZVV -XLV, hooks time 310s, RV one Burn, ISS PosPitch,  
PosRate, RV NegTrans. 
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Figure 5-105.  -ZVV -XLV, hooks time 310s, RV one Burn, ISS PosPitch,  
NegRate, RV PosTrans. 
Additional analysis was performed for the two cases that have shown interference between the 
sphere around the departing RV and RV docked to DC-1 nadir port. CAMMP team used worst-
case RV rotation rates to determine the closest proximity.  
Detailed analysis has demonstrated that departing RV clears the vehicle docked to DC-1 nadir 
port with close clearance. Figure 5-106 through Figure 5-109 show the results of detailed 
analysis. 
The closest proximity of 0.51 m (Figure 5-109) was determined between the departing RV and 
the RV docked to DC-1 nadir port for -ZVV -XLV YPR (180°, 90°, 0°), with hook opening time 
at 180 seconds. This occurs when the RV fails to execute the separation burn at 180 seconds post 
separation and when ISS had maximum positive pitch and max positive pitch rate with a 
negative transverse component from the RV with 0.5°/s pitch/yaw and 0.2°/s roll rates. 
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Figure 5-106.  -ZVV -XLV, hooks time 180s, RV no Burn, ISS PosPitch,  
PosRate, RV NegTrans with 0.5°/s pitch/yaw rate 
1.12m
Soyuz at 122s after 
separation causing 61°
pitch/yaw (closest rotation 
point to probe)
 
Figure 5-107.  -ZVV -XLV, hooks time 180s, RV no Burn, ISS PosPitch,  
PosRate, RV NegTrans with 0.5°/s pitch/yaw rate 
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Figure 5-108.  -ZVV -XLV, hooks time 180s, RV no Burn, ISS PosPitch,  
PosRate, RV NegTrans with 0.28°/s pitch/yaw rate 
0.51m
Soyuz at 143s after 
separation causing 71.5°
pitch/yaw and 28.6° roll
 
Figure 5-109.  -ZVV -XLV, hooks time 180s, RV no Burn, ISS PosPitch,  
PosRate, RV NegTrans with 0.5°/s pitch/yaw and 0.2°/s roll rate 
5.17 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This section will provide a summary of clearance analysis results, discuss uncertainties and 
caveats, and provide recommendations for future DDO and required analysis. 
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5.17.1 Conclusions 
DDO scenario for 19 Soyuz departure during STS-129/ULF3 flight has shown that the RV when 
undocked from FGB port with ISS in -ZVV -XLV (YPR 180, 90, 0) attitude can clear ISS and 
Orbiter structure. However, close clearances were predicted between RV undocking from FGB 
port for the worst-case docking mechanism disturbances and failed RV MCS. Figure 5-110 
shows minimum vehicle approach to the Orbiter and docked RV structures. 
 
Figure 5-110.  -ZVV -XLV, RV worst-case trajectories. 
The review of RS Specifications document has shown that there is no requirement for minimal 
clearance between ISS structure and ISS-docked vehicles. Even though the analysis has shown 
that there is no collision between the departing vehicle and the ISS structure, there were several 
factors (e.g., gravity gradient effects and Aero Torques) that were not accounted for in analysis 
that may lead to increased ISS rates and lead to potential collision.  
The later studies have shown that delta rates imparted into the ISS by spring pushers cause 
significant increase in ISS pitch rates to 0.015°/s post departure, which provides additional 
uncertainty to the position of the ISS elements. The ISS LVLH body rates increase post RV 
separation as shown in Figure 5-111. 
8.6 m 
0.51m 
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Figure 5-111.  Additional rates imparted into ISS by RV pushoff. 
Given all the analysis uncertainties, the 0.51 m between the RV docked to DC-1 nadir port and 
departing RV represent a close clearance. 
5.17.2 Other ISS Ports Assessment 
VIPER, VVO, and CAMMP teams agreed that RV undocking from FGB port for DDO 
represents the worst-case scenario. All other scenarios will significantly improve the clearance, 
and some may not require additional analysis. The teams have agreed that RV departure 
trajectories from FGB port may be applied to determine generic relative motion trajectories for 
MRM1, MRM2, DC-1, and SM aft ports since, due to orbital mechanics, relative motion 
trajectories will be similar, but not exact.  
The RV departure from MRM1 and DC-1 ports in -ZVV -XLV attitude will be safer than from 
FGB since MRM1 extends FGB port by 6 m (19.7 feet), reducing the time of the RV in close 
proximity of the Orbiter or the RV on DC-1 nadir port. DC-1 is located 14 m (45.9 feet) below 
the FGB port, does not have the ISS structure or elements close to departure trajectory, and 
moves departing vehicle trajectory further from the Orbiter tail. Relative trajectories for MRM1 
and DC-1 ports are shown on Figure 5-112. 
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Velocity Vector
Velocity Vector
 
Figure 5-112.  RV departure trajectories from MRM1 and DC-1 ports in -ZVV -XLV. 
RV undocking from MRM2 port in the ISS -ZVV -XLV (YPR 180°, 90°, 0°) attitude may 
potentially lead to the departing RV passing in close proximity to the Orbiter. This would be 
possible only in the case of RV MCS failure. If the decision is made to undock in -ZVV -XLV 
(YPR 180°, 90°, 0°), attitude-specific analysis will be required. However, the ISS +ZVV -XLV 
(YPR 0°, 90°, 0°) attitude provides safest separation trajectory from MRM2 and will not require 
additional analysis. Generic separation trajectories of the RV from MRM2 port in ISS ±ZVV -
XLV attitude are shown on Figure 5-113. 
Velocity Vector Velocity Vector
 
Figure 5-113.  RV departure trajectories from MRM2 in -ZVV -XLV  
and +ZVV -XLV attitudes. 
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RV undocking from SM aft port represents the most safe separation trajectory from all DDO 
scenarios. SM aft docking port is the furthest from the Orbiter, and the departing vehicle 
trajectory had been analyzed for the ISS structural clearance many times and was proven to be 
the safest. The other benefit of undocking from SM aft port is that no maneuver will be required, 
and undocking can be performed in mated Torque equilibrium attitude (TEA). This attitude 
satisfies maximum pitch angle required for safe separation and second orbit clearance for the 
departing RV.  
Potentially, undocking can be performed under CMG momentum management (no free drift), 
which provides the attitude with the best known parameters and reduces separation corridor. 
However, mission-specific GN&C analysis may be required. The departure trajectory from SM 
aft port is shown on Figure 5-114. 
Velocity Vector
 
Figure 5-114.  RV departure trajectory from SM aft port in mated TEA (-XVV +ZLV). 
5.17.3 Recommendation 
The analysis has shown that the RV undock from FGB port represents the worst-case DDO 
scenario and brings the RV closest to the ISS elements and the Orbiter. Detailed analysis limiting 
uncertainties is required if DDO is performed for FGB port. 
SM aft undockings do not pose a threat to the Orbiter or the ISS structure, and specific separation 
analysis is not required. 
If RV undocking is performed from MRM2 port with the Orbiter present, the ISS +ZVV -XLV 
(YPR 0, 90, 0) attitude must be used to avoid additional analysis. If the decision is made to use 
ISS -ZVV -XLV (YPR 180°, 90°, 0°), specific analysis is required.  
The only analysis that was determined to be mandatory for DDO is the RV undocking from 
MRM1 port. 
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6.0 SSP Assessments 
This section provides analysis and study results based on the environments discussed in Section 
4.0, and the visiting vehicle trajectories described in Section 5.0. Included in these sections are 
results from the FO&I JTWGs, FO&I functional areas, and the OPO.  
The goal of each of these assessments was to evaluate the viability and readiness of the SSP to 
protect for DDO on any given mission. Where possible generic assessments were performed and 
for those subsystems and/or functions where mission specific analysis is required, operational 
impacts and future work have been defined.  
6.1 Flight Operations and Integration JTWGs 
All JTWGs have assessed the ISSP-provided environments for viability to perform DDO. 
Power/Avionics, ECLSS, Power/Avionics, and C&T, and electromagnetic effects panels have 
completed generic assessments with no issues identified. The TCS, VC, Loads and Dynamics, 
and Flight Control and Structures panels require mission-specific analyses and documentation 
updates. 
6.1.1 Power/Avionics 
Mated ISS/Orbiter avionics interfaces and operations do not change for DDO flights. DDO 
flights could result in mission duration changes, which require consumables adjustments and will 
be addressed on a mission-specific basis. Engineering products are not impacted since the 
Orbiter configuration is not expected to change for DDO flights. 
6.1.2 Vehicle Configuration 
The VC JTWG is responsible for defining the on-orbit mission physical interface configurations 
of the mated stack from prelaunch through post undocking activities. These mission 
configurations are documented in Section S.3.0 of the mission specific on-orbit ICDs.  
Section S.3.0 is developed with ISS configuration data from several sources, including the 
Increment Definition and Requirements Document (IDRD), End-to-End Berthing Integration 
Team (EBIT), Assembly Matrix, and Blue Book 3-Dimensional Computer Aided Drawing 
(CAD) models. The tactical plan for the flight is reviewed, and CAD models are updated to 
produce figures documenting the configuration pre, during, and post Orbiter/ISS mated stack. 
The models are used to generate ISS dimensions. For DDO, each on-orbit ICD’s Section 
S.3.0.1.10.5 entitled “ISS Visiting Vehicle Docking Ports” provides a list of available docking 
ports for all ISS visiting vehicles. Figures shown within Section S.3.0 are a representative case of 
the visiting vehicle port utilization. Any combination of nominal or contingency docking ports 
may be used for a given flight. 
All on-orbit ICDs for the remaining SSP manifests have been approved and contain the current 
combination of nominal or contingency docking ports utilization plan for that specific flight. 
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6.1.3 Proximity Operations, Plumes, Structures, and Flight Control JTWG 
6.1.3.1 Loads and Dynamics Team 
The LDT is a joint ISS/SSP team responsible for defining the on-orbit loads that include 
proximity operations plume effects from various vehicles, and docking and undocking loads. 
Analyses are performed on a mission-specific basis with environments and constraints 
documented in mission-specific on-orbit ICDs. For DDO, the LDT’s work and results are 
discussed in Section 4.8. 
6.1.3.2 Flight Control and Structures JTWG 
The Flight Control and Structures JTWG prepares a mission-specific Digital Auto Pilot (DAP) 
Modes and Constraints memo for each flight. This memo addresses Orbiter control of the mated 
stack during the mission. To protect for potential SSP launch slips, this memo typically certifies 
Orbiter mated control for multiple ISS visiting vehicle configurations. However, propellant 
usage estimates are typically provided only for the nominal configuration and sometimes a 
contingency configuration. 
As long as both ISS configurations (before and after DDO) have been certified, then from a 
flight control perspective, Orbiter control is acceptable outside of close range proximity 
operations. This is based on the assumption that the Orbiter attitude hold DAP settings (currently 
1°, 0.02°/s) will be acceptable if Orbiter attitude control is to be used immediately prior to 
undocking. The Flight Control team will need to be informed if this assumption changes. Orbiter 
control during close range proximity operations is not expected because the RS is expected to 
have attitude control during a docking approach, and the Orbiter/ISS mated stack is expected to 
be in free drift for undocking until a sufficient separation distance has been achieved. 
However, to support a planned DDO event, the operations team will need propellant estimates to 
determine if Orbiter propellant is available to support the attitude maneuvers to and/or from the 
docking (or undocking) attitude. The Flight Control team will need to include these operations in 
the propellant usage estimates in the DAP Modes and Constraints memo. To produce these 
estimates, the Flight Control team will need to know the docking (or undocking) attitude. If the 
Orbiter will be used to recover attitude control after undocking, then the Flight Control team will 
need to know the planned timeline, including free drift time before and after physical separation 
and the plume time history in terms of force and torque on the mated Orbiter/ISS stack. 
The DAP Modes and Constraints memos (portions pertaining to DDO) for STS-130/20A, STS-
131/19A, and STS-132/ULF4 are found in references [33,34,35]. 
6.1.4 Thermal Control System - Active/Passive JTWG 
The TCS JTWG is chartered to verify that shading effects from a docked RV do not negatively 
impact thermal environments. They verify the Orbiter and payloads are thermally compatible 
during DDO predocking, docking, mated, undocking and post-undock attitudes. Since thermal 
attitudes are highly dependent on mission timelines and seasonal parameters, it was consciously 
decided that these analyses would be performed on a mission-specific basis and folded into the 
standard thermal verification analysis process for each mission. 
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6.1.5 Environmental Control and Life Support System JTWG 
The ECLSS JTWG assessment of DDO was discussed in September 2009. Results of these 
discussions found that no special life support system analyses are required since consideration of 
joint crew sizes greater than 13 were ground ruled out. Operations associated with DDO are not 
expected to interrupt nominal functioning of Orbiter or ISS life support systems, and brief 
interruptions in power to ISS systems can be tolerated. Joint vehicle ECLSS systems are mission 
specific and generically compatible with all currently defined DDO scenarios. For each mission, 
the ECLSS JTWG will take into account approaching/departing vehicles when planning pre-
docked and post-undocked water dumps. 
6.1.6 Communications and Tracking 
The C&T panel assessed the DDO impacts on the communications systems of the Orbiter, ISS 
and RVs. An assessment of Soyuz transmitters on Orbiter receivers was performed with no issue 
found [22]. An assessment of Orbiter transmitters on Soyuz receivers was completed with no 
issue found [23]. An assessment of Orbiter transmitters on the Russian ground station receivers 
supporting Soyuz operation identified two potential system conflicts. They are the Orbiter WLE 
Impact Detection System to Russian command link and the Space to Space Communication 
System (SSCS) to Russian TV link. Additional information has been requested from the 
Russians to ensure there are no DDO impacts. That data request is pending. A short turnaround 
assessment is anticipated when that information is received. 
6.1.7 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects 
The Payload Electromagnetic Effects Working group assessed the DDO impacts on the payloads 
manifested for the last two flights of the Orbiter to the ISS. No payload impacts were identified. 
6.2 Flight Operations and Integration Payload Cargo Engineering 
The following assessment summarizes the DDO impacts to SSP cargo integration flight products 
and hardware for which Payload Cargo Engineering provides support. Payload Integration 
Hardware is exposed during DDO to emissions, fuels, and loads generated during the final RV 
approach through docking.  
General assumptions used in the assessment are: 
a. The Orbiter is docked to the PMA2 of Node 2. 
b. A RV is approaching or has docked to any port identified in the STS-130/ISS-20A mission-
specific ICD, ICD-A-21549-OOR, Table S.3.0.1.10.5-1 (ISS Visiting Vehicle Docking 
Ports). 
1. A Soyuz spacecraft docks to the FGB nadir port. 
2. A Progress spacecraft docks to the SM aft port. 
c. Thermal operational profile is similar to STS-131/19A with a March 2010 launch. 
d. Structural on-orbit loads were assessed with a Orbiter configuration to generate worst-case 
responses for STS-132/ULF4 and subs. 
e. STS-134/ULF6 Orbiter mass properties and payload configuration. 
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f. Contamination is limited to varying states of expended propellants and nitrite salts (present 
in the propellant mixture). 
Refer to the following detailed assessments for specific assumptions. 
6.2.1 Cargo Avionics 
Cargo avionics interfaces are not affected during DDO. The performance of avionic interfaces to 
cargo elements will meet all requirements documented in the payload unique ICD and SSP 
Mission Integration Plan (MIP) for any flight environment including DDO.  
6.2.2 Payload Integration Hardware (PIH) and Contamination 
During DDO, PIH will be exposed to combustion effluents. The products of combustion will 
include unconsumed and partially combusted UDMH and noncombustible impurities. The DC-1 
nadir docking location was assessed for impacts to PIH operation, life, and ground handling [36]. 
The docking port orientation imparted the greatest contamination on the Orbiter. The DDO 
environment will not impact PIH operation or ground personnel. PLB surface temperatures 
during the ISS docked and post undock planned attitudes are expected to exceed the surface 
temperature above which UDMH evaporates (-71°F). The presence of UDMH will be 
insignificant because the temperatures in the PLB are expected to volatize any unconsumed or 
partially combusted UDMH.  
Though residual UDMH is not anticipated, precautionary PLB surface sampling should be 
planned to ensure ground personnel are not exposed to residual contaminants. 
6.2.3 Cargo Thermal and Environmental Control and Life Support System 
DDO is expected to have a minimal effect on cargo thermal compatibility [37,38]. ECLSS 
parameters for Orbiter supply water production and Lithium Hydroxide canister consumption 
may be impacted as a result of DDO operations. Generalized impacts cannot be captured because 
of the number of influencing variables. A specific mission analysis is required to define the 
magnitude of consumable impacts  
6.2.4 Cargo Structures 
All cargo structural on-orbit loads resulting from DDO events are within the Interface Definition 
Document (IDD) ISS parameters for the Orbiter Docking system (ODS) interface and were 
enveloped by the Verification Loads Analysis (VLA) for launch and landing for the cargo 
elements [39]. Significantly lower undocking loads are enveloped by the DDO docking loads and 
are considered within IDD ISS parameters.  
6.2.5 Reconfiguration Engineering 
Cargo reconfiguration engineering is not impacted by DDO. Cargo will be configured to meet all 
IDD ISS requirements as documented in the payload unique Interface ICD and the SSP MIP for 
any flight environment to include DDO.  
6.2.6 Cargo Safety 
Cargo safety is not impacted by DDO. Cargo elements and payloads are screened by appropriate 
Safety Review Panels (SRPs) to ensure and verify compliance with IDD ISS requirements as 
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documented in the payload unique ICD, and the MIP for any flight environment to include DDO. 
PIH will not be impacted by DDO nor will PIH cause an impact to Cargo Elements or payloads.  
6.2.7 Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications (OMRS) Document 
DDO will not impact OMRS for the handling and testing of PIH. Cargo Elements and PIH post-
flight processing assessments suggest that precautionary PLB surface sampling should be 
performed to ensure ground personnel will not be exposed to any unexpected residual 
contamination of DDO. Documentation of a non-repetitive sampling requirement is 
appropriately documented in a chit to provide optimal implementation flexibility. 
6.2.8 Cargo Electro Magnetic Emission (EME) 
There are no credible EME threats to PIH or payload hardware that could occur during DDO. 
The worst-case proximity of RV transmitter antennas (21 m) is outside the minimum allowable 
calculated distance (6.2 m) to the PLB that could cause RF interference [40].  
6.3 OPO Assessments 
The OPO was originally tasked to assess DDO for a November 2008 Soyuz 31P dock to DC-1 
Nadir during STS-126/ULF2, but a manifest change alleviated the dual dock scenario. The 
concern was raised for the May 2009 Soyuz 19S dock to FGB Nadir during STS-127/2J/A, but a 
slip in the SSP launch alleviated that dual dock condition. SSP management directed that specific 
flight assessment efforts be expanded to a generic study for a Soyuz docking operation while the 
Orbiter was docked to ISS in February 2009. The scope was expanded further in July 2009 to 
include RVs as potential docking/undocking vehicles. 
For the February 2010 Program Verification Review (PVR), the only RV environment available 
for assessment was the nominal trajectory. OPO’s assessment of DDO at the February PVR was 
that the SRMS cameras and the OBSS sensors should be parked in a protected position, the PLB 
cameras should be pointed away from the plume field, and that the star tracker doors should be 
closed. It was recommended that post-flight testing of the thermal control blankets and cleaning 
of the trajectory control sensor be performed. For the February PVR, the windows testing had 
not yet been completed.  
During the February PVR, board members pushed back on the lack of a dispersed nominal 
trajectory and an abort case. Consequently, a request was made to ISSP to provide such cases 
with updated analysis results be presented at a delta PVR. For the August 2010 PVR, OPO 
personnel provided results for the bounded nominal and abort cases. No new constraints were 
added based on this data. The Windows PRT reported that for the nominal and bounded nominal 
cases the pane strength test of lab created specimens showed no adverse degradation to the 
thermal pane strength as a result of the nominal and bounded nominal DDO environments. The 
assessment enveloped the ascent loads environment for future flights. Visibility for these 
environments was assessed by the JSC Crew Office, and no concerns were expressed. However, 
the testing that had been performed did not encompass the abort scenario. The PRT does know 
from previous analysis and experience that the cumulative effects of the solid rocket booster 
plume demonstrate that there is a threshold at which the fluence degrades the pane strength. It is 
unknown whether the prescribed abort scenario crosses that threshold. The PRT concluded for 
the abort scenario that the pane would perform its function as thermal protection, but the pane 
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could crack in atmospheric conditions. Therefore, the worst-case consequences could be glass 
debris impacting the Orbiter Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) pod or rudder speed brake and 
reduced commander/pilot visibility through the windows. OPO’s recommendation was to 
perform additional windows testing using the abort environment so that the risk could be 
quantified. 
6.3.1 Windows 
Impact testing was conducted at the JSC White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) to investigate the 
performance of Orbiter thermal panes when impacted by 5 and 10 µm glass beads, simulating the 
thruster plume debris environment from RV docking operations on ISS. Impact density, 
projectile sizes, and impact speeds were provided by the ISS Space Environments team [9, 10]. 
Glass test specimens were created based on the prescribed environments. Figure 6-1 and Figure 
6-2 represent the WSTF specimens created to simulate the 5 and 10 µm particle impacts. 
 
Figure 6-1.  Typical distributed 5 µm impact test specimens. 
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Figure 6-2.  Typical distributed 10 µm impact test specimens. 
Retired Orbiter thermal panes were used as targets. Testing revealed the possibility of minimal 
damage to the Orbiter thermal panes from such impacts. However, all damage was below the 
0.0006 in (15.24 µm) allowable depth per MT0501-514, and below the allowable thermal pane 
damage limits for impact assessment of 0.0025 in (63.5 µm) for descent, indicating that single-
flaw strength reduction is within the acceptable limits of thermal panes. 
Additionally, subsequent strength testing of the cored out glass specimens was conducted at 
Southwest Research Institute to evaluate erosion-related strength reduction [46]. The residual 
strength test consisted of a ring-on-ring test setup as shown in Figure 6-3. Glass specimens’ 
residual strength was recorded and evaluated, and a Weibull statistical assessment was 
performed by the Window Problem Resolution Team (WPRT) to quantify the effects and 
potential risks associated with the exposure of orbiter windows to the DDO environments.  
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Figure 6-3.  Residual strength ring on ring test setup. 
The collected residual strength testing data were evaluated relative to the use of the glass 
ultimate strength values employed for Orbiter certification method. The data were converted to 
equivalent static fatigue strength values that match the static fatigue assumptions used for 
certification and then plotted in a probabilistic manner to determine minimum ultimate strength 
values for comparison to certification standards. For minimum probabilistic strength 
determination, a best fit Weibull distribution is used as a tool for determining 99.865 percent or 
“3-σ” Ftu strength values (see Figure 6-4). Using the combined 5 and 10 µm samples and the 
resulting 3-parameter Weibull curve fit allows for minimum strength predictions at the 3-σ level 
for comparison to certification values for descent (DES) (t = 10 seconds) and ascent (ASC) (t = 2 
seconds) Ftu parameters. The minimum strength prediction at the 3-sigma level of the combined 
5 and 10 µm samples (FtuDDO) was 6,233 psi. The current thermal fused silica glass Ftug values, 
which are based on a proof test derived maximum surface flaw depth of 0.0006 in (15.24 µm), 
are Ftug = 5,234 psi (ASC) and Ftug = 5,010 psi (DES). 
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Figure 6-4.  Three parameter Weibull distribution - combined 5 and 10 µm data. 
Therefore, the assessment concluded that for the environments provided by ISS Space 
Environments team on November 24, 2009, and March 5, 2010 (nominal and bounded nominal 
docking/undocking operations), particle impingement does not adversely affect the ascent and 
descent certification thermal pane strength (FtuDDO > Ftug). The test specimens enveloped the 
environments using particle fluences ranging from 100 particles/cm2 to approximately 7,400 
particles/cm2.  
However, after testing was completed, the WPRT was requested to assess an additional plume 
environment simulating an MRM2 contingency abort. The total estimated particle fluence 
associated with this case, including approach and backout environments, is approximately 37,000 
particles/cm2. This particle fluence is outside the limitations of the test data, and the conclusions 
from the test cannot be extrapolated to these higher fluences. Therefore, the WPRT concluded 
the degree of window degradation (visual and strength) is unknown, and acceptance rationale 
cannot be generated. A subsequent WPRT request to disclose abort cases for other docking ports 
to determine/verify environments were within the bounds of the previously tested specimens, 
was dismissed. Testing or analysis has not been performed for any off-nominal docking events. 
Therefore, the extent of the hazing or degradation of the windows for these cases is unknown. 
Exposing the Orbiter windows to any off-nominal event may constitute an increase in risk. 
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6.3.2 ECLSS (Life Support and Active Thermal) 
6.3.2.1 Radiators - Particle Impingement 
For the analytical evaluation, the ISSP-provided environments were used and compared to 
requirements. The results showed that worst-case impingement affects 0.5 percent of radiator 
surface area. The vendor specifications allows for a loss of up to 10 percent of radiator surface 
area. The loss of the 0.5 percent would cause the Orbiter active thermal water usage to increase 
by 12 pound-force (lbm) for a 10-day mission, and the flash evaporator system would use more 
water to offset radiator system reduced thermal performance. 
This assumes total loss of emissive properties in the affected area. However, this would not be 
considered a constraint to DDO, and mission and flow impacts would be negligible, producing 
an increased possibility of having to perform a standard repair.  
6.3.3 Fuel Cell/Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (PRSD) Systems 
The fuel cells and the PRSD subsystem were determined to not be affected by DDO.  
6.3.4 Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)/Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Systems 
The APU/hydraulics/water spray boiler subsystems were determined to not be affected by DDO.  
6.3.5 Structures and Mechanisms/ODS  
6.3.5.1 Payload Bay - Particle Impingement 
The concern of the PLB exposure to RV particle impingement environment was degradation to 
line-of-sight surfaces, in particular surface coatings. The PLB structures and mechanisms/orbital 
docking systems surfaces were assessed based on impact tests on window and RCC targets. The 
conclusion is that the particle impingement will likely result in a superficial hazing of exposed 
coatings surfaces, with possible minor erosion, leaving surface pits on the same order of 
magnitude as the impactor size. There are no expected issues for metal or soft goods. Any 
coating degradation due to RV particle impingement environment in the midbody is not a 
constraint to DDO. If the environment results in degradation, then standard OMRS inspections 
will detect and appropriately disposition. 
6.3.5.2 PLBD - Plume Force 
The Orbiter PLBDs  and radiators were assessed for plume pressure loads imparted by a Soyuz 
vehicle during approach to and separation from the various docking ports of the ISS ULF4 
configuration. The maximum nominal and off-nominal plume pressures assessed were 0.0112 
and 0.014 psf, respectively. For the doors, a bounding assessment case was constructed by 
assuming a maximum of 10 consecutive firings, 5 nominal and 5 off-nominal. The plume force 
was conservatively applied uniformly over the entire door. The resulting hinge moment of this 
case was determined to be 8,687 in-lb. The PLBDs and drive mechanism have been certified to 
10,000 in-lb, so structural capability is maintained in the identified plume force environment. 
The capability of the radiators was originally demonstrated by acoustic testing at 148 decibels 
(dB) (31.5 psf peak) [20]. The test level of 31.5 psf is greater than the worst-case off-nominal 
plume force of 0.014 psf, so the radiators can be cleared by inspection. 
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The assessment results of the plume pressure forces on the Orbiter PLBDs and radiators imparted 
by the approach and separation of a Soyuz vehicle suggest that there are no related constraints to 
DDO. Further assessment would be required if the docking of a RV was considered at the 
MRM1 port. 
6.3.5.3 ODS - Dock/Undock Loads 
The data used for analysis were forcing functions originally provided by RSC-E to the LDT; 
reference Section 4.2. The peak loads and accelerations were determined at the Orbiter to PMA-2 
interface. Results of the flight-specific analysis, which was performed for STS-130/20A, 
indicated no load exceedances at the interface. Therefore, there are no constraints to DDO. 
6.3.6 Avionics, Communication, Tracking, and Instrumentation Systems 
6.3.6.1 Ku-Band Deployed Assembly - Particle Impingement 
The worst-case window test results were reviewed and applied to the Ku-band Deployed 
Assembly. The window testing showed micropits on the window glass. Likewise, micropitting 
could occur on the Ku-band Deployed Assembly surfaces, but the impact should be insignificant. 
Visual inspections are nominally done during OMRS evaluation. Any visual damage can be 
addressed by existing Fair Wear and Tear or material report-repair activities. Therefore, there are 
no constraints to using the Ku-band antenna systems if exposed to DDO particle impingement.  
6.3.6.2 Ku-band Deployed Assembly - Plume Force   
The Orbiter Ku-band antenna assembly was assessed for plume pressure loads imparted by a 
Soyuz vehicle during approach and separation to the various docking ports of the ISS ULF4 
(STS-132), configuration. The maximum nominal and off-nominal plume pressures assessed 
were 0.0019 and 0.0088 psf, respectively. The capability of the Ku-band antenna was originally 
demonstrated by acoustic testing designed to represent the acoustic environment for the ascent 
flight phase [21]. The tests were conducted at 141 dB, which is approximately equivalent to 4.68 
psf root mean square (rms). The test level of 4.68 psf is greater than the worst-case off-nominal 
plume force of 0.0088 psf, so the Ku-band antenna can be cleared by inspection. 
The assessment results of the plume pressure forces on the Orbiter Ku-band antenna imparted by 
the approach and separation of a Soyuz vehicle suggest that there are no related constraints to 
DDO. Further assessment would be required if the docking of a RV was considered at the 
MRM1 port. 
6.3.6.3 RF Interference Assessments 
The impact of the RV transmitters on communication links was examined during proximity 
operations while the Orbiter is docked to the ISS and the RV is in the final approach for docking 
or already docked with the ISS. The Orbiter is docked to the PMA-2 of Node 2, and the RVs are 
docked to any of the following docking ports: DC-1, FGB Nadir, MRM2, or SM Aft. The closer 
a RV is to the Orbiter the greater the interference. Therefore, DC-1 Nadir envelopes all other 
docking ports:  FGB Nadir, MRM2 and SM Aft. 
The degradation of the Orbiter communication systems by the RV transmitters is determined by 
a three-step process, each with a different level of accuracy depending on the potential for link 
susceptibility. 
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First-order Analysis 
In this analysis, several simplifying assumptions are made, where the goal is to determine 
whether the Orbiter receiver noise floor has been degraded by more than 0.5 dB due to 
interference. The simplifying assumptions include: (a) no structural blockage exists between 
transmitter and receiver, which implies that line-of-sight conditions are applicable; (b) the 
transmitter antenna and the receiver antenna are aligned boresight-to-boresight such that 
maximum antenna gain can be used in the analysis; and (c) the transmit spectrum roll-off versus 
frequency is conservative, which implies a steep decay with frequency that may not hold true in 
practice. If this first-order analysis does not result in an interference condition, then the Orbiter 
link in question is considered free of interference, and step 2 analysis (i.e., more precision) is not 
required. 
Second-order Analysis 
If the first-order analysis leads to the result that an inference condition exists, then a second-
order analysis is employed where structure blockage is taken under consideration. The analysis is 
repeated with the addition that a nominal structural blockage exists, and its impact consists of 
reducing the potential interference by 20 dB. If the second-order analysis does not result in an 
interference condition (i.e., noise floor degradation greater than 0.5 dB), then the Orbiter link in 
question is considered free of interference, and step 3 analysis is not required. 
Third-order Analysis 
This analysis is rigorous in several respects: the separation distance between transmitter and 
receiver is more realistic, the antenna gains take into consideration any off-boresight roll-off, and 
structural blockage is included at the 20 dB rate. An interference condition is considered to exist 
whenever the Orbiter link margin reduced by the calculated noise floor degradation drops below 
a value of 10 dB. 
Based on the most rigorous analysis, the potential for interference exists in the following two 
cases: 
RV tracking transmitter operating at 2860 megahertz (MHz) may cause interference with 
the Orbiter wireless video system (WVS) video receiver operating at 2410/2470 MHz if 
the crewman on EVA strays a distance greater than 28 m from the nearest S-band WVS 
antenna. 
RV tracking transmitter operating at 2860 MHz may cause interference with the Orbiter 
WVS telemetry receiver operating at 2410/2470 MHz if the crewman on EVA strays a 
distance greater than 65 m from the nearest S-band WVS antenna. 
EVA activities should not take place during DDO. Otherwise, a constraint on EVA crewman 
movement would be necessary (i.e., EVA crewman must remain within a distance of 28 m of the 
Orbiter PLB, Starboard or Port sides to prevent the RV S-band Tracking Radar (2860 MHz) from 
interfering with either of the Orbiter S-band video or telemetry link). These links relay video and 
telemetry data from the EVA helmet-mounted camera back to an Orbiter-based S-band receiver.  
This assessment concluded that with the exception of EVA activities, RF interference 
environment from RV to Orbiter is not a DDO constraint. Further details on analyses used to 
support these conclusions can be found in references [22] and [23]. 
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6.3.6.4 Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) 
The impact of the RV transmitters on the Orbiter subsystems was examined during proximity 
operations while the Orbiter is docked to the ISS and the RV is in the final approach for docking, 
or already docked with the ISS. The Orbiter is docked to the Node 2 PMA-2, and the RVs are 
docked or preparing to dock to any of the following docking ports: DC-1, FGB Nadir, MRM2, or 
SM Aft. The closer a RV is to the Orbiter, the greater the interference; thus, DC-1 Nadir 
envelopes all other docking ports:  FGB Nadir, MRM2 and SM Aft. 
The incident electromagnetic field (E-field) on the Orbiter that is produced by each RV 
transmitter radiation is compared to an allowable incident E-field limit for the Orbiter equipment 
as specified in NSTS 21000-IDD-ISS, ISS Interface Definition Document, or SSP-30237, Space 
Station Electromagnetic Emission and Susceptibility Requirements. NSTS 21000-IDD-ISS 
defines applicable E-field limits for pyros, avionics, windows, and crewmen. SSP-30237 defines 
applicable E-field limits for the OBSS components. The separation distance between a RV 
transmitter and an Orbiter equipment or subsystem below which the allowable limit is exceeded 
is then recorded as the boundary below which the Orbiter equipment or subsystem may become 
susceptible. 
The following Orbiter equipment or subsystems have potential susceptibilities as indicated in 
Table 6-1, due to radiation from RV transmitters. 
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Table 6-1.  Orbiter Systems Susceptible to Transmitters 
 
Soyuz/Progress Vehicle Transmitters 
Potential 
SSO 
Victims 
Voice Telemetry TV Command Tracking KURS-A 
Exceedances 
will occur at a 
separation 
distance less 
than or equal to 
R  (meters) 
Plausibility 
Statement 
Frequency [MHz] 
121.75 166 463 922.76 2860 3294.2 
E-field 
[V/m] 
E-field 
[V/m] 
E-field 
[V/m] 
E-field 
[V/m] 
E-field 
[V/m] 
E-field 
[V/m] 
EMU 5.0 5.0     
2.9 (voice) 
3.5 (telemetry) 
EVA events are 
unlikely when Soyuz 
or Progress 
Transmitters are still 
active. 
RMS 
Avionics 
7.1 7.1 8.0    
2.0 (voice) 
2.5 (telemetry) 
3.0 (TV) 
The Shuttle arm end 
effector electronics 
need to come within 
3 meters of 
Soyuz/Progress 
antennas; Not likely 
to occur. 
ORBITER 
Avionics 
and 
Windows 
4 4 4 8.8  45.8 
3.6 (voice) 
4.4 (telemetry) 
6.1 (television) 
2.0 (command) 
1.4 (KURS-A) 
The Soyuz/Progress 
Antennas need to 
come within 6.2 
meters of the Cargo 
Bay, or ODS pyros, 
during docking or 
undocking; this 
scenario is not likely 
to occur. 
ODS Pyros     29.9 29.9 
1.2 (tracking) 
2.2 (KURS-A) 
Orbiter 
Payloads 
4.0 4.0 4.0 8.1 20.0 20.0 
3.6 (voice) 
4.5 (telemetry) 
6.2 (television) 
2.2 (command) 
1.7 (tracking) 
3.3 (KURS-A) 
OBSS: 
LDRI, IDC 
Camera, 
and LCS 
Sensor 
     60.0 1.1 (KURS-A) 
The Soyuz/Progress 
Antennas need to 
come within 1.1 
meters of the OBSS, 
while the OBSS is 
performing its scan 
maneuvers. This 
scenario is not likely 
to occur. 
 
Under all approach and departure scenarios that can be prescribed, the separation distance 
between the RV and the Orbiter should be at least 10 m. When this taken into consideration, all 
Orbiter potential susceptibilities drop off except for the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) 
hardware that is carried by an EVA astronaut. To guarantee that the Orbiter equipment will not 
be impacted by the RV radiation, EVA activities should not take place during DDO. Otherwise, a 
constraint on EVA crewman would be necessary (i.e., EVA crewman must keep a distance of at 
least 3.5 m from RV very high frequency (VHF) transmitter antennas that are used for voice and 
telemetry services.) 
EVA activities should not be scheduled while DDO are in progress. EMU hardware may 
malfunction due to RV radiation, causing interruption of audio, video, and telemetry between the 
EVA crewman and the Orbiter vehicle and by extension mission control personnel. This 
assessment concluded that with the exception of EVA activities, EMI environment from RV to 
Orbiter is not a DDO constraint. 
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6.3.7 Integrated GN&C 
6.3.7.1 Star Trackers 
Due to the optical properties of the star tracker there is a concern for contaminants entering the 
star tracker cavity and degrading the performance. The degraded performance, worst case, may 
make it difficult to track dim stars. Therefore, the recommendation is to close star tracker doors 
during DDO. If the constraint cannot be met, beside the mission impact, the star tracker may 
require removal for cleaning. 
6.3.8 Passive Thermal  
6.3.8.1 TCS Blankets/Liners - Payload Bay - Particle Impingement 
The potential effects to the TCS blankets/liners were assessed based on results from window and 
RCC impact tests. The conclusion is the energy imparted by the 10 µm particles at 3 km/s would 
be absorbed by the soft goods resulting in no impact damage. Thus, particle impingement on the 
TCS blanket/liners from RV firings is not a constraint to DDO. 
6.3.8.2 Thermal Control Blankets - Payload Bay - Contamination 
The evaluation used a predicted worst-case DC-1 Nadir approach with available predicted 
impingement and contamination data. A worst-case particle fluence of ~10,000 particles/cm2 
would be expected in the PLB aft portion, for DC-1 Nadir approach, with expected particles 
sizes of 1 to 5 µm. Predicted worst-case initial contamination deposition for DC-1 Nadir is 
~2.93x10-7 g/cm2. Predicted worst-case permanent contamination deposition for DC-1 Nadir is 
~2.51x10-8 g/cm2. Estimate of deposition of nonvolatile salts for midbody area is ~0.046 grams. 
Based on predicted contamination data for DDO [9], and data from PIC experiments [1] 
significant contamination deposition are unlikely. However, optical properties of blanket covers 
may deteriorate. 
The UDMH/nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) propulsion systems on the RVs generate non-combustion 
product residues that contain toxic chemical species. The product residue is referred to as 
UDMH Fuel Oxidizer Reaction Products (UFORP). Of the multitude of chemical compounds in 
UFORP, NDMA is a major concern. One method of NDMA formation is by the partial oxidation 
of UDMH. A second method of formation is by the reaction of non-combustion products 
(UFORP) with water. Specifically, dimethylamine and nitrite can react with water to form 
NDMA. The dimethylamine and nitrite are bound in a nonvolatile salt and do not liberate in a 
vacuum. This was noted as a concern with deposition on space suits during EVA, resulting in 
possible ISS contamination. Upon entering the airlock, water could cause the NDMA formation. 
There is a possibility that these nonvolatile compounds/salts could contaminate TCS blankets, 
but not in the course of a single event. No Orbiter Hazard Reports exist to address this concern 
for hardware or processing personnel, although it appears this hazard has been evaluated for 
astronaut safety [30]. 
The potential contamination on TCS blankets/liner from a single DDO is not sufficient to 
constrain the operation. The TCS Hardware PRT recommends sampling after the first DDO to 
gather empirical data on contaminant quantity and chemical composition. All current data are 
based on test plates and model predictions. Sampling would provide valuable information for 
extrapolation of cumulative deposition of all nonvolatile contaminants should DDO become 
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commonplace. Sampling would consist of destructive testing of TCS blanket beta cloth cover, in 
area of highest particle fluence, to determine worst-case contaminant quantity and contaminant 
chemical composition. Possible Orbiter processing changes may be invoked if personnel hazards 
exist. Nondestructive testing of a TCS blanket is recommended, in area of highest particle 
fluence, to determine if optical properties are affected. There is no impact to processing unless 
optical properties are significantly degraded. 
6.3.8.3 Thermal Control Blankets - Payload Bay - Plume Force 
The evaluation was performed using predicted pressure data from worst-case DC-1 Nadir 
approach and available Orbiter delta pressure data from purge, vent, drain analysis. The 
predicted pressure for DC-1 Nadir for the PLB is 0.00474 psf. The plume pressure is below the 
delta pressure of approximately 8.064 psf, across the blankets from normal venting during 
ascent. Plume pressure was eliminated as a concern for TCS blankets and hardware. Blankets are 
inspected for damage per OMRS requirements during subsequent vehicle processing. RV plume 
forces on the TCS in the PLB are not a constraint to DDO. 
6.3.9 GFE and Flight Crew Equipment  
6.3.9.1 Cameras - Particle Impingement and Contamination 
For evaluation purposes, the forward and aft bulkhead cameras and the SRMS elbow and wrist 
camera in the SRMS stowed position were used. One of the initial concerns was possible 
degradation of the thermal blankets, the outer surface of which is Teflon™ coated aluminized 
Mylar®. The SPIFEX report [2] indicates that a Teflon™ ring involved in the test was pristine 
after exposure. Therefore, the PRT concluded that the concern of degradation of the thermal 
blankets is a non-problem. The illuminator electronics box and the light emitting diode (LED) 
box housings plus the Orbiter RMS sideview camera (RSC) housing all are aluminum painted 
with white paint (Aeroglaze A276). The PRT concluded that the plume contamination and 
residue will not cause any damage to these painted surfaces other than possibly to require 
cleaning post mission. The top surface of the camera is a reflective, silver tape with a Teflon™ 
outer surface without any thermal blanket. Using the same rationale as for the thermal blanket 
surfaces, the PRT concluded that the concern of degradation of the reflective surfaces is a non-
problem. The exposed front element of the lens of the color television camera (CTVC) and 
intensified (black and white) television camera (ITVC) cameras (located on the forward and aft 
bulkheads, the SRMS elbow and wrist locations, and OBSS sensor package (SP)-1) is a high-
quality optical glass with a magnesium fluoride antireflective coating. The PRT concluded that 
this is the part of the CCTV hardware that is most sensitive to damage. It can be pitted by the 
plume particles and degraded by the contaminant residue. The PRT concluded that the damage 
cannot be accurately quantified and therefore the camera lenses must be protected to the extent 
possible. They concluded that the forward and aft bulkhead cameras (A, B, C, and D) and the 
SRMS elbow camera must be pointed away from the plume flow to avoid direct particle contact. 
The PRT further concluded that the SRMS wrist camera and the RSC should be protected from 
direct contact by the plume particles. The protective cover over the illuminator LEDs is Lexan. 
The PRT concluded that the plume material will not damage the Lexan. The effect of the 
contamination on the illuminator front face will be limited to a possible coating of plume residue, 
which can be cleaned post mission. This residue would result in a reduced illumination capability 
for the rest of the mission. The front cover of the RSC pressurized housing is Pyrex®. The PRT 
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concluded that the plume material will not damage the Pyrex®. The effect of the contamination 
on the RSC front face will be limited to a possible coating of plume residue, which can be 
cleaned post mission. This residue would result in degraded, blurred video for the rest of the 
mission. The front cover of the keel camera pressurized housing is Pyrex®. The PRT concluded 
that the plume material will not damage the Pyrex®. It concluded that the keel camera (if 
manifested) cannot be protected if the multi-purpose logistics module (MPLM) has been 
removed from the PLB and, therefore, may sustain damage to the front lens surface. The damage 
will be limited to a possible coating of plume residue, which can be cleaned post mission. This 
residue would result in degraded, blurred video for the rest of the mission. The PRT concluded 
that the pan tilt unit (PTU) pan and tilt moveable rotating surfaces will not be degraded due to 
the protective covering provided by the thermal blankets. The bearings of both the pan and tilt 
mechanisms are contained within a protective housing where the plume material cannot 
penetrate. Minimal contaminant will be able to be deposited on the moving surfaces and is not 
expected to result in hampering the PTU motion.  
Given the results, the PRT consider the following constraints to DDO activities: 
1. The forward and aft bulkhead cameras, and the SRMS elbow camera must be pointed away 
from the plume flow. 
2. The SRMS wrist and sideview cameras should be protected from direct contact by the plume 
particles. 
If these constraints are not met, then the mission impacts would be degraded video caused by 
unwanted glints from pits on the wrist camera lens, and/or blurring from the residue. The flow 
impacts would be that all lenses would have to be examined and inspected to determine if 
cleaning or replacement will be required. 
6.3.9.2 OBSS Sensors - Contamination 
The OBSS sensors were evaluated, assuming the stowed position in the Orbiter PLB with the 
manipulator pedestal mounts (MPMs) rolled out. For the SP-1 ITVC/laser dynamic range imager 
(LDRI) sensors, it has been determined that they are not hermetically sealed. The biggest risk is 
getting internal contamination onto the LDRI laser diode. Any condensation/contamination on 
this surface will result in the diode failing upon laser activation and failing the LDRI. In all 
proximity operations, some level of contamination was noted with the DC-1 Nadir being the 
worst. The subsequent off-gassing of contaminated sensor surfaces and the surrounding PLB 
surfaces may be the principal damage mechanism. The concern of secondary emission from 
nearby surfaces was raised. The ISS Space Environments team discounted this potential, but the 
OBSS team still felt that there is potential for contamination and is requesting  to position SP1 so 
that any nearby objects in the LDRI field of view should be out of plume line of sight. Keeping 
the LDRI in Mode 2 will keep the internal components warm and will aide in protecting from 
internal contamination/condensation. Mode 1 will not activate the camera components and will 
not protect from condensation. The LDRI has heater power (equivalent to Mode 1) when in the 
OBSS stowed position, and the sensor is typically in Mode 2 when the OBSS is in a MPLM or 
Node viewing position. 
For SP-2, laser camera head (LCH), the predicted worst-case contamination rate at the DC-1 
location will be 1/3 of the rate experienced during the PIC experiment (6.4x10-8 gm/cm2 vs 
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19.3x10-8 gm/cm2). This level of contamination had no apparent performance impact on the 
SRMS wrist camera. Given the levels of contamination predicted, impact on performance due to 
contamination is unlikely. However, the effect of this contamination at 1500 nanometers (nm) 
(wavelength of the laser camera system (LCS) laser) on the coherence and/or geometry of the 
laser beam is unclear and cannot be assessed without testing. To address the risk contamination 
on the LCH window during a flight, the LCS developer has developed and validated an 
analytical assessment procedure to identify the presence of contamination that might impact its 
performance. This procedure is executed each flight during the analysis of the LCS checkout 
scans captured on flight day (FD) 2 and during the late inspection checkout. Should 
contamination be identified during the analysis of the scans, there exists a special 
“Contamination Risk Mitigation” database included as part of the flight load, which can provide 
a certain degree of compensation to offset the laser attenuation effects of contamination. 
Due to the results of the evaluation, it was recommended that the OBSS be placed out of the line 
of sight of plume. If the constraint is not met, then the mission impacts would include requiring 
cooling off phases during inspection and potential failure of LDRI. Placing the sensor in Modes 
3-6 may mitigate risk. The post-mission impacts to the hardware and to the ground operations 
would be to repair the silver tape and replace the laser diode. 
6.3.9.3 OBSS Sensors - Particle Impingement 
The OBSS sensors were evaluated, assuming the stowed position in the Orbiter PLB with the 
MPMs rolled out. In all port locations, SP-1 does receive particle impacts to some degree. The 
most impacted surface of SP-1 is the Orbiter zenith/ISS aft during DC-1 Nadir and SM Aft 
operations. This will result in damage to the thermal silver tape on the outside of the sensor 
requiring repair to maintain thermal properties. In the OBSS stowed position, the ITVC/LDRI 
lenses are pointing in the Orbiter aft/ISS nadir direction. This is the surface of the greatest 
concern to protect the optics. The ITVC/LDRI optics are not to be in the line of sight of the 
source of particle fluence. For the DC-1 Nadir and FGB Nadir operations, this sensor receives 
particle impacts on the lens, so moving the OBSS to a more protected location or not allowing 
RV operations at these ports is recommended. 
For SP-2, the lens surface of the LCH and Integrated sensor inspection system (ISIS) digital 
camera (IDC) is the Orbiter zenith/ISS aft surface, which in all vehicle operations is the most 
impacted surface. DC-1 Nadir and SM Aft operations are drastically worse than FGB Nadir and 
MRM2. Based on the DTO-829 test results of a fused silica lens, which LCH has, similar results 
are expected. The LCS performance may be impacted for the duration of the mission by window 
contamination or pitting. Assuming the LCS experiences a similar 2 percent pitting effect as the 
SRMS camera during the PIC test, the effect of pitting on performance of the LCS should be 
negligible (i.e., resulting in a ~2 percent drop in intensity due to scattering effects). 
Due to the results of the evaluation, it was recommended that the OBSS be placed out of the line 
of sight of plume. If the constraint is not met, then the mission impact would include requiring 
cooling off phases during inspection, and potential failure of LDRI. The post-mission impacts to 
the hardware and to the ground operations would be to repair the silver tape. 
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6.3.9.4 Trajectory Control Sensor - Particle Impingement and Contamination 
The trajectory control sensor shutter is constructed of an aluminum alloy (6061-T651) with a 
clear anodized coating. The shutter operates on a sliding track with a screw type mechanism and 
a gap of 0.41 mm during movement. The rest of the sensor area is protected by a thermal blanket. 
In the worst case, the projected contamination levels are not expected to cause concern for the 
shutter operations or the thermal blanket. The shutter is closed during times when the Orbiter is 
docked, thus preventing the buildup of contaminants on internal sensor optics or mechanical 
interfaces. Thermal degradation to the thermal blanket would have a minor impact to the thermal 
properties of the trajectory control sensor unit. 
Based on the evaluation, trajectory control sensor does not have any constraints to DDO. 
Therefore, there are no mission impacts. However, there would be a flow impact in that a 
cleaning of the trajectory control sensor unit after the mission is recommended. This would 
eliminate the possibility of cumulative contamination buildup. The cleaning of the sensor 
surfaces could be performed still mounted in the vehicle. 
6.3.10 SRMS/OBSS  
Both the SRMS and OBSS were assessed for contamination issues, and there were no issues 
identified. The thermal effect due to the thruster firings was negligible, and the concern for the 
multi-layer insulation (MLI) blanket was not an issue. Therefore, no constraints were placed on 
DDO with any mission or flow impacts identified. 
The SRMS was evaluated at pre-cradle, SRMS/OBSS at undock, and SRMS/OBSS contingency 
DDO positions. The data used was the forcing functions provided by RSC-E, and only docked 
loads were evaluated since undock loads are bounded by the docked loads. No issues were 
found, so no constraints were levied upon DDO. No mission or flow impacts were identified. 
The pressure summary provided by the LDT, reference Section 4.2, was used for the evaluation. 
Due to the low forces from the data, it was deemed that the plume forces would have no effect on 
RMS loads. 
6.3.11 WLE Subsystem/TPS 
6.3.11.1 WLE Subsystem - Particle Impingement  
Particle impingement generated from any of the various RVs approaching the ISS has the 
potential of ejecting droplets of uncombusted or partially combusted fuels along with 
noncombustible impurities in the form of particles in the discharge of thruster firings. Given the 
velocity imparted to these uncombusted particles, an assessment for potential effects to exposed 
Orbiter components is required. The WLE RCC is one such external structural component that 
would be exposed to potential impact from thruster firings.  
The areas of the Orbiter WLE RCC exposed to the thruster firings presented concern over what 
type of damage to the SiC coating would occur, if any, due to a single particle impingement, and 
the type of erosion that would occur to the SiC coating due to multiple particle impacts. 
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Analytical work was performed to determine the effects of particle impingement [19, 9] on the 
RCC. The location of the docked Orbiter and its view factor to thruster particle impingement 
from RVs is centered on four docking locations of the ISS. These locations are 
a. FGB Nadir 
b. DC-1 Nadir 
c. MRM2 
d. SM Aft 
 
Figure 6-5.  ISS and docked Orbiter with visiting RVs. 
The ISS Space Environments team’s analytical assessment developed a plot of the particle 
impingement for space operations of the different docking port locations with the expected 
particle fluence to the Orbiter docked position. Results show up to “4.64 million particles per 
cm2 are possible on some parts of the Orbiter RCC per event” [19]. The expected particle 
distribution and diameter for three of the docking ports are shown graphically in Figure 6-6 [19]. 
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Figure 6-6.  Particle fluence scatter on the Orbiter for three docking  
locations and particle diameters. 
Figure 6-7 through Figure 6-10 show the Orbiter only with examples of particle fluence results 
for all four docking ports [9]. 
Soyuz/Pro
gress 
proximity 
ops to  
DC1 Nadir 
Soyuz/Pro
gress 
proximity 
ops to SM 
AFT. 
Soyuz/Pro
gress 
proximity 
ops to 
FGB 
Nadir. 
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Figure 6-7.  Orbiter only shown with example of particle fluence for  
FGB Nadir approach. 
 
Figure 6-8.  Orbiter only shown with example of particle fluence for  
DC-1 Nadir approach. 
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Figure 6-9.  Orbiter only shown with example of particle fluence for  
SM Aft approach. 
 
Figure 6-10.  Orbiter only shown with example of particle fluence for  
MRM2 Zenith approach. 
Various other analytical studies and testing contributed to an understanding and bounding of the 
DDO study. Numerous RCC impact testing conditions and scenarios were accomplished as a 
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post STS-107 Columbia accident effort to further understand material characteristics and 
capabilities under adverse conditions. While two primary tests conducted were SSP external tank 
ice and foam impacts, additional tests focused more on smaller MMOD type impact damages. 
The MMOD type of impacts are more in-line with the type of impingement that thruster particles 
would impose on exposed components of the Orbiter. The data obtained from MMOD type 
impact studies set a basis for comparison for the thruster particle impingement concerns.  
SSP management directed resources to study the level of MMOD impact damage tolerated for 
reentry environments. Different sizes of hypervelocity impact damages generated by a range of 
spherical projectiles, ranging from 0.4 to 1.0 mm in diameter, on numerous RCC specimens have 
been characterized [25]. The hypervelocity impact damage and corresponding projectile sizes are 
given in Table 6-1. A photo of one test specimen to convey the type of coating damage incurred 
prior to Arc Jet Testing is shown in Figure 6-11 [25].  
Table 6-2.  Hypervelocity impact results to WLE RCC specimens prior to  
Arc jet testing [25]. 
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Front side (left photo)-projectile impact 
Backside (right photo) – resultant damage to back surface from projectile impact 
Figure 6-11.  Representative WLE RCC surface damage from hypervelocity impact [25]. 
The various specimens were then subjected to conditions that represent the temperature and 
pressure of the WLE RCC during reentry. The duration of the test was designed to extend 
through the peak heating cycle critical for a successful reentry. The results of the Arc Jet test for 
each of the impact damaged specimens exposed to flight environment testing are listed in Table 
6-3 [25]. 
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Table 6-3.  Arc jet test results summary of hypervelocity  
impacted WLE RCC specimens [25]. 
 
The resultant Arc Jet testing defined various levels of survivability with respect to the 
hypervelocity impact damage. Table 6-4 provides a summary of the Arc Jet test results for the 
MMOD impact test. With respect to the data in Table 6-3 and Table 6-4, specimen no. 2236 was 
identified as the test that defined the largest damage size for the “worse case” heating 
zone/location for all the WLE panels that did not result in a visible breach through the inner 
mold line (IML) (i.e., no through hole). This “worse case” heating location aligns with RCC 
panel 9 zone 3. The pre-Arc Jet test damage size for that test case, 0.084 x 0.091 x 0.041 in 
depth, was adopted as the largest acceptable RCC damage from a single particle impact [19, 25].  
Table 6-4.  WLE RCC Arc jet test summary for MMOD impacts. 
TEST # 
Facility 
# 
Customer # 
Projectile 
Dia. (mm) 
OML 
Damage 
(in.) 
Crater Depth 
(OML/IML)* 
Test 
Condition 
Results 
1 2233 A307-1 0.4 
0.028 x 
0.019 
0.027 in./NA 2960F/141psf Pass 
2 2234 A307-4 0.6 
0.089 x 
0.099 
0.036 in./NA 2800F/104psf Pass 
3 2235 A307-5 0.6 0.100 0.040 in./NA 2800F/104psf Pass 
4 2236 A307-6 0.6 
0.084 x 
0.091 
0.041 in./NA 2960F/141psf Pass 
5 2237 A307-7 0.6 0.140 x 0.046in./0.030 in. 2800F/104psf Pass 
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0.130 
6 2238 A308-9 0.8 
0.250 x 
0.255 
0.070 in./0.034 in. 2700F/98psf Fail @ 830 sec. 
7 2239 A308-11 1.0 
0.335 x 
0.268 
0.090 in./0.073 in. 2500F/104psf Fail @ 420 sec. 
8 2305 A306-1 0.7 
0.185 x 
0.161 
0.061 in./0.040 in. 2800F/100psf Fail 
9 2306 A306-4 0.9 
0.295 x 
0.335 
0.092 in./0.062 in. 2700F/100psf Fail 
10 2307 A306-3 0.8 
0.217 x 
0.228 
0.068 in./0.038 in. 2200F/81psf Pass 
11 2308 A306-2 0.7 
0.185 x 
0.161 
0.056 in./0.021 in. 2700F/100psf Pass 
12 2314 A307-10 0.8 
0.236 x 
0.220 
0.072 in./0.030 in. 2600F/100psf Fail @ 759 sec. 
13 2315 A307-11 0.8 0.197x 0.307 0.068 in./0.027 in. 2500F/100psf Fail @ 717 sec. 
14 2316 A307-13 0.9 
0.362 x 
0.362 
0.069 in./0.050 in. 2200F/88psf Fail @ 600 sec. 
*Crater depth measured from outer silicon carbide surface 
The Arc Jet test results were correlated with the temperature zones of the WLE RCC panels 
(reference Figure 6-8) to establish a maximum allowable surface damage/defect size acceptable 
for each zone. Table 6-5, generated based on the Arc Jet testing results, is the basis for 
acceptability criteria that is used for on-orbit imagery inspections for ascent (e.g., external tank 
ice and foam, solid rocket booster TPS, and Orbiter tile gap fillers) and MMOD impact damage 
[25, 26].  
The follow-on work related to the DDO study identified the potential thruster plume particle 
sizes to be in the range of 1 to 100 µm. Testing of particle impacts using projectiles that would 
mimic the expected thruster plume particle of 1 to 100 µm range was conducted at Rice 
University on RCC samples. The velocities for those particle impact tests were determined to be 
between 1 to 3 km/s [19].  
Comparison of projectile sizes and velocities used for the MMOD tests versus the Thruster 
Particle test indicate a difference in the amount of impact energy that the two types present. The 
largest thruster particle projectile size of 100 µm (0.0001 m) [19] with velocities 1 to 3 km/s 
tested at Rice University, versus the smallest size projectile size tested for MMOD 400 mm (0.4 
m) at 4.54 to 7.07 km/s [25], indicates that potential damage from thruster plume impingement is 
significantly less than representative test for MMOD.  
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Figure 6-12.  WLE surface inspection zones (reference April 6, 2006 PRCB S063202BR2, RCC 
Damage Criteria for Inspection and MMOD Risk Assessment [16]) (Don Curry and Alvaro 
Rodriguez), (RCC Critical Impact Damage  
Map [26]) (Don Curry) [16] and [26]. 
Table 6-5.  WLE coating loss criteria [16] and [26]. 
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Hypervelocity Impact Test and SPHINX analysis were conducted to characterize thruster plume 
particle impact damage to WLE RCC. The objective of the hypervelocity test was to characterize 
RCC SiC coating damage due to a single particle impact. SPHINX analysis was performed using 
data from the hypervelocity test to characterize surface erosion of SiC due to multiple particle 
impacts [19]. 
The hypervelocity impact test for single particle impact involved the use of 5 to 100 µm diameter 
glass beads accelerated to 1 to 3 km/s then impacting WLE RCC samples at normal impingement 
angles. The glass beads, 2.44 g/cm3, were chosen because of the similarity in density with 
thruster plume conditions, 2.33 g/cm3, (MMH density of 0.88 g/cm3and NTO density of 1.45 
g/cm3). Five 1.5 x 1.0 in RCC sample plates, labeled 1-A through 1-E, were subjected to glass 
beads varying in size from 5 to 100 µm accelerated to varying speeds of 1 to 3 km/s.  
The SPHINX analysis was performed using results from the hypervelocity impact test. SPHINX 
analysis’ success in the duplication of measurements from the impact test allowed for the 
characterization of other damages resulting from thruster plume particle impacts. The following 
identifies the range of particle characterizations: 
a. 5 µm diameter particle, normal impact of NTO to SiC at 2.9 km/s 
b. 20 µm diameter particle, normal impact of NTO to SiC at 2.2 km/s 
c. 100 µm diameter particle, normal impact of NTO to SiC at 1.0 km/s 
The particle fluence of the RV docking was calculated for proximity to Orbiter WLE RCC. A 
conservative representation of available RV thruster firing data were used to simulate only 
proximity operations. This conservatism was due to the limited number of post-flight thruster 
firing histories available, and the available data does not account for attitude variations or lateral 
transitions.  
The SPHINX characterizations with the calculated particle fluence of thruster plumes during RV 
proximity operations were used to linearly scale RCC impact damage. To correlate SPHINX 
results with ground test measurements, a SiC yield strength of 90,000 psi was used. These results 
were then assessed using the following two methods [19]: 
a. Method 1:  Average erosion depth estimate based on crater damage volume for single 
particles scaled linearly by particle fluence for a single event. 
b. Method 2:  Maximum erosion depth estimate based on total damage surface area and 
individual crater depths. 
Damage characterization for impact testing was conservative. All impacts were assumed to have 
normal impingement due to the fact that normal impingement would lead to greater impact 
damage results. All thruster plume particles were assumed to be traveling at the limiting velocity 
for RV RCS thrusters. Damage modeled was taken for the largest particle in each size class and 
damage estimate was taken for the highest fluence point on the RCC for worst docking port. 
In addition to particle impact damage, unreacted propellant contamination of RCC due to Soyuz 
thruster plume impingement was identified. Material compatibility assessment for this effort was 
based on the similarity of the RV propellants to those used on the Orbiter. A RCC material 
compatibility test was performed by Vought Corporation during the development of the LESS 
RCC hardware [27]. The purpose of the test was to determine the effects of various contaminants 
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on the flexural strength and plasma performance of coated RCC material. SSP procurement 
specification MC621-0007 requires “the outer surface of the leading edge shall be unaffected by 
intermittent exposure or spillage of hydrazine, MMH, and NTO.”  
All specimens used for the RCC material compatibility test were prepared in accordance with 
Vought Specification 208-7-42. Nineteen ply thick material was used in the flexure and plasma 
specimens, and were exposed, via full immersion, to the fluids in question.  
After contamination, flexure specimens were point loaded, at a speed of 0.05 in/minute until 
failure. Plasma specimens were tested in Vought’s 180 kilowatt (KW) plasma arc in a stagnation 
holder. Two half-hour cycles at a 2500° F surface temperature were applied.  
The results of the hypervelocity impact test for single particle impact revealed no through 
penetration of the SiC coating would occur. Sample 1-D (100 µm particle at 3.04 km/s) was the 
only test sample that produced distinguishable impact features. It is important to note that while 
impact features were present, Sample 1-D represents 15 times the maximum kinetic energy 
possible in thruster plume particles. Additionally, the deepest impact crater measured in Sample 
1-D was 100 µm with a minimum depth for SiC penetration of 500 µm. 
From the hypervelocity impact test, the average damage center diameter was calculated at 129.6 
µm, average flake diameter 251.3 µm and crater depth 43.1 µm. The largest acceptable diameter 
from a single particle impact is 2100 x 2300 x 1000 µm.  
The results of the SPHINX modeling indicate that a plume of up to 4.64x106 particles/cm² is 
possible. However, multiple impacts revealed less than a 5 percent SiC loss per thruster event. 
Results of the flexural strength and plasma performance of RCC samples contaminated, via full 
immersion, in hydrazine, MMH, and NTO revealed no degradation to strength or difference in 
mass loss rates between contaminated and uncontaminated specimens. 
a. The impact assessment results indicated that no through damage of the RCC SiC was 
anticipated.  
b. Hypervelocity impact testing did not penetrate SiC for any single event. 
c. SPHINX analytical modeling for multiple impacts showed less than 5 percent SiC loss per 
thruster event (5, 20, and 100 μm particles). 
d. A significant margin exists between the kinetic energy allowables for RCC damage and that 
which is predicted from the RV RCS thrusters. 
e. No issues with unreacted propellant contamination based on material compatibility testing 
during RCC development. 
f. The threat posed to the RCC hardware is taken seriously, and inspections for surface damage 
will be included as appropriate with the “Late Mission” MMOD inspection performed in 
accordance with operational flight rules. 
6.3.11.2 TPS (Tile/Reusable Surface Insulation) - Particle Impingement  
The Orbiter TPS was assessed for a plume impingement environment for DDO at the docking 
ports (i.e., DC Nadir, FGB Nadir, SM Aft, and MRM2). The TPS assessment was performed 
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using the original impingement environment provided for the RCC panels [19] and the 
guidelines used for the RCC. 
A comparison was made to previous tests/results and performance of TPS in the plume 
impingement area of the Orbiter upper body flap. The distance from RV to Orbiter is several 
times greater than Orbiter OMS to body flap distance. The down firing Orbiter OMS thruster 
impingement on the tiles results in minor coating/substrate erosion with negligible effect on 
overall effectiveness of the tiles and no discernable deposits. By similarity, any coating damage 
or deposits from RV thrusters would be expected to be less severe and not a flight issue. Any 
degradation would be addressed following post-flight inspections. 
Post-flight MMOD inspections demonstrate that damage to tiles/blankets/FRSI from light fast 
particles is generally less severe than the damage of light fast particles to RCC. Since the 
detailed Soyuz docking evaluation has determined there is no issue for RCC, no issue would be 
expected for tiles/blankets/FRSI. 
6.3.12 Contamination 
The Orbiter as a whole was assessed for contamination, but the focus was on PLB as the most 
likely area of concern for exposure to the propellant contamination environment imparted from a 
RV. The DC-1 Nadir docking approach was assessed projecting the largest debris field on the 
Orbiter. 
The RV maneuvering thrusters use UDMH and N2O4 for propulsion. Combustion products are 
mostly gasses, N2, H2, and NH3. However, droplets of uncombusted or partially combusted 
UDMH can be ejected [28] with associated noncombustible impurities and reaction products, 
including dimethyl-ammonium nitrate and other nitrite salts [29].  
The purpose of the PIC flight experiment [1] was to measure the initial and permanent plume 
induced molecular contamination produced by the Orbiter PRCS and Russian 130 N thrusters. 
The SPIFEX flight experiment provided relevant, although not continuous, data. The PIC data 
were taken throughout the thruster firing cycle while the SPIFEX was analyzed post flight, 
looking at only the results of being in the plume. Both the PIC and SPIFEX experiments were 
performed using a test package mounted on a boom at the end of the SRMS that was maneuvered 
into the plume of a thruster firing. Hence, plume effects are representative of the plume at that 
location. Plume modeling could be performed to represent plume effects at other locations [9].  
To analyze the potential contamination concern, the referenced documents were reviewed. The 
thruster product species, form, and mass were identified. References [28] and [29] provide the 
product species, and reference [9] provides the mass and distribution. Reference [1] provides a 
verification of references [28] and [29] and serves as the basis for the development of reference 
[9]. 
Ignoring the gaseous combustion products, which are not a contamination concern, the remaining 
constituents are primarily the result of incomplete or partial combustion and preexisting 
noncombustible contaminants [1, 2]. These consist of uncombusted UDMH and various organic 
compounds produced through partial combustion and nonvolatile dimethylammonium nitrate and 
other metal nitrite salts.  
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The amount of contaminant can be determined [9] by limiting the analysis to the PLB. From a 
contamination standpoint, the PLB becomes the only area of interest as the species of 
contamination, if deposited on the Orbiter external surfaces, would be dispersed on reentry.  
6.3.12.1 Nonvolatile Particulate Contamination 
The dimethylammonium nitrate and nitrite salts are dispersed throughout the PLB in the form of 
a powder/particulate. Dimethylammonium nitrate and nitrite salts are, per their Material Safety 
Data Sheets, an irritant to eyes, respiratory system, and skin. Protective clothing is recommended 
for handling. However, the amount of material introduced into the PLB is very small. Estimates, 
per reference [9], place the total mass of these salts at less than 3 milligrams (mg) (worst case, 
one approach, test and separation operation combined) dispersed throughout the PLB and do not 
take into account material removal via post-landing purges.  
6.3.12.2 Particulate Contamination Acceptance Rationale 
From a material compatibility and corrosion aspect, these minor amounts of salts are not 
expected to be of concern over and above the normal atmospheric salt deposits experienced in 
the coastal environment. From a particulate contamination aspect, the SN-C-0005 [32] document 
places the cleanliness requirements on the PLB as “Visibly Clean,” which does not measure or 
count the particulate, but places pass/fail based on the appearance of being free of all particulate 
or nonparticulate matter visible to the unaided eye. 
6.3.12.3 Volatile Constituent Contamination 
The volatile products, UDMH and other organics, are of concern (i.e., flammable, explosive, 
toxic, and carcinogenic). Analyses shows that concerns about residual UDMH in the PLB are 
absolved by the environment and material properties (i.e., none of the UDMH or other organics 
survive the environment because they are volatile). 
6.3.12.4 Volatile Constituent Contamination Acceptance rationale 
Reference [29] notes that the residual UDMH and organic compounds are volatile and are 
removed via exposure to a vacuum environment. This fits with the results of reference [1] 
wherein the PIC experiment noted roughly 94 percent of the initial thruster deposit evaporated 
within 1 minute of deposition, and the SPIFEX experiment, which did not detect any organic 
contamination in post-flight analysis.  
However, it must be noted that these experiments were conducted at relatively warm 
temperatures, the PIC experiment from 53 to 94°F, and reference [29] at room temperature. 
Impacted areas of the Orbiter could be at temperatures significantly less, and volatility is a 
function of temperature and pressure. Materials and Processes Engineering assumes that UDMH 
deposited on a surface at a temperature greater than the triple point (i.e., -71°F and 0.01 psia) 
will volatilize, but if deposited on a surface lower than the triple point, sublimation becomes the 
mode of evaporation requiring energy from solar or other radiative inputs. Note that the low 
pressure environment depresses the sublimation temperature below the triple point. Using -71°F 
is conservative for this assessment. 
The Orbiter Thermal Analysis group was requested to assess the on-orbit mission attitude 
timelines and provide typical docked attitude thermal data for the Orbiter PLB and MPLM [31]. 
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Numerous locations were investigated, but the only location where the local surface temperature 
dipped below the triple point of UDMH was the MLI blankets on the aft bulkhead at low solar 
beta angles (±10°). Mitigating this is that in this location the temperature cycles from 
approximately -110 to +20°F (worst case) every 45 minutes. Higher beta angles have warmer 
minimum temperatures since the ISS shading of the PLB decreases. In addition, after undocking, 
the nominal PLB to Earth attitudes will result in temperatures above -20°F for all surfaces. This 
assessment did not include any payloads, except MPLM post undocking, but the payload 
temperatures would be no lower than the aft bulkhead minimum. So, while it is possible that 
uncombusted UDMH could survive initial deposition on the aft bulkhead, it would be exposed to 
an environment that would cause it to volatilize.  
6.3.12.5 Addressing the Improbable Concern that the UDMH Deposits do not 
Volatilize 
It is not expected that any uncombusted UDMH or FORP would survive the environmental 
conditions, but, even if it did, a simple calculation [9] yields 9 mg of total material on the aft 
bulkhead. 
The concern is whether 9 mg of UDMH could produce an explosive atmosphere. The lower 
explosive limit for UDMH in air is 2 volume percent. This mass of UDMH converted to vapor 
produces approximately 3.6 cm3 by volume at standard temperature and pressure. The volume of 
the PLB is roughly 432,000,000 cm3 yielding 8x10-9 volume percent UDMH. 
There was a concern [28] that partial combustion of UDMH and/or exposure of certain organic 
constituents of the partially combusted UDMH and water could form a toxic carcinogen NDMA. 
A toxicological assessment was performed [30], to address toxicity concerns. Toxicity concerns 
for ground processing primarily center on the NDMA residue from the UFORP. A secondary 
consideration is the nonvolatile salts that may accumulate in the PLB since these do no liberate 
in a vacuum environment. The UFORP components evaporate within 45 minutes from a surface 
at 25° C. The nonvolatile particulate salts are eye and skin irritants per the MSDS, but use of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) will mitigate these concerns. Therefore, there are no 
constraints pertaining to toxicity. Forward work will involve sampling after the first DDO to 
include destructive testing of the TCS blanket cover to determine worst-case contamination 
quantity and composition. The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) industrial hygiene group has been 
engaged in this study and no issues are foreseen. As an additional precaution, EVA is not 
allowed as per ground rules during a DDO, and the only exposure risk to the UFORP is in the 
area immediately around the SM engine bells. 
6.3.12.6 Contamination Conclusion 
Using data for one complete RV proximity operation, worst-case docking location and worst-
case plume impingement, no concerns regarding thruster effluent contamination of the Orbiter 
remain. Potential residual contamination from DDO is considered minor with minimal 
degradation of any hardware due to RV plume propellant environment, thus not a constraint to 
DDO. Contamination sampling of the PLB should be conducted if more than two DDOs are 
performed on the same Orbiter visit to ISS due to potential buildup of particulate contamination. 
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6.3.13 Ground Operations 
The TCS hardware PRT and United Space Alliance (USA) Safety and Industrial Hygiene 
recommended sampling after the first DDO to gather empirical data on contaminant quantity and 
chemical composition. All the current data are based on test plates and model predictions. 
Sampling would provide valuable information for extrapolation of cumulative deposition of all 
nonvolatile contaminants. The sampling protocol would be under the direction of KSC Safety 
and Industrial Hygiene, and PPE would be required until hazard is cleared. Samples using a 
solvent wipe would be taken on the Orbiter PLB frames and hard surfaces for contamination. 
This could have a possible impact to beginning-of-flow Orbiter processing if personnel hazards 
are found to exist. Other possible Orbiter processing impact would be the offline sampling of the 
TCS blanket. This would consist of destructive testing of TCS blanket beta cloth cover, in area of 
highest particle fluence, to determine worst-case contaminant quantity and contaminant chemical 
composition and to determine if optical properties were affected. No impact to processing unless 
optical properties are significantly degraded. 
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7.0 S&MA Assessments   
The integrated S&MA team members (i.e., ISSP, JSC, and SSP) met numerous times over the 
course of the DDO analysis period. Joint S&MA discussions and efforts included reviewing the 
affected integrated hazard and risk baseline for docked operations and detailed background of the 
content development and rationale for the hazard reports, exchange of corporate knowledge, and 
identification of potential areas where engineering analysis might be needed to obtain a thorough 
review of the risk baseline. Some areas of open work and additional risk were identified. 
ISS Risk Management approach requires two-fault tolerance protection against catastrophic 
effect. Noncompliance situations require a NCR to be brought forward to the ISSP Manager to 
be considered as an acceptable risk. For such cases, risk has been accepted by the ISSP Manager 
but, per the process, was never presented to the SSP management for acceptance because DDO 
was ground ruled out. It is recommended that all NCRs be reviewed by the joint SSP and ISSP 
prior to a DDO mission. 
Integrated Hazard Reports (HRs), which were identified to be affected by DDO, are listed as 
follows. The Safety Review Panel (SRP) will support any effort to ensure that DDO is analyzed 
and any additional controls are captured appropriately in mission-specific integrated HRs. These 
analyses will be completed no earlier than (NET) launch (L) minus 4 weeks for the applicable 
flight. 
a. COL-1003 - This HR would potentially address the controls for preventing Orbiter pluming 
from a RV docking or undocking. Cause 1 addresses pluming effects caused by visiting 
vehicles. Cause 2 addresses clearances for approaching vehicles, while Cause 7 addresses 
clearances for departing vehicles. Although the arrival and departure corridors remain the 
same, there could be unique integrated controls required due to the nature of having an 
Orbiter present. Additionally, Cause 1 will require updates to account for arriving/departing 
RS vehicle pluming to the Orbiter while mated to the ISS. 
b. C&T-1101 - This HR includes references to Russian HRs and analyses concerning the 
transmission of RF from RV sources onto the ISS, Orbiter, and EMU. Updates for RF onto 
the Orbiter while mated to ISS at 19A have been included in this HR.  
c. GNC-0701 - This HR would address any impacts to the mated stack attitude control 
philosophy (i.e., how attitude control is normally maintained during RV dockings or 
undockings and during periods of Orbiter presence, and if these two existing plans mesh). 
No changes are required because operational controls, flight rules, and the real-time 
operational procedures exist to maintain attitude control for nominal and off-nominal 
operations. 
d. STR-0108 - Cause 1 of this HR addresses dock/undock loads. If loads are within margin, 
based upon “On-Orbit Transient Loads Analysis,” then no HR updates are needed. If there is 
a loads violation, then HR controls, and verification updates will be required. There will be a 
possible NCR, and there is a pending Orbiter and ISS loads analysis. 
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7.1 SSP  
The probability of an off-nominal scenario involving a RV dynamic operation remains high, 
although there is not a consensus in the Safety Community or an agreed-to methodology for 
computing the probability. However, because the joint ISS/Shuttle/US/Russian operational 
response to an off-nominal scenario is undeveloped, an off-nominal scenario may increase risk to 
the Orbiter. All integrated hazard analyses are described in the JSC S&MA section, Section 7.4. 
SSP Safety Panel chairs have reviewed the approach to DDO Safety assessment and have no 
additional concerns.  
Recommendations from the SSP S&MA office include: (1) concurrence with the hazard analyses 
and risk characterization contained in the JSC S&MA analysis, (2) no show stoppers have been 
identified that preclude DDO, although there is a high level of uncertainty concerning the hazard 
analyses, (3) if the ISSP requirements mandate DDO, that these risks be considered against the 
requirements mandating DDO and, if possible, reconsider scheduling and other constraints to 
avoid DDO, (4) any risk mitigation such as development of operational responses. However, 
extensive or further engineering analysis, including Russian-generated engineering analysis, be 
pursued to reduce the potential risk that the current limited and high-level assessment presents. 
7.2 ISS 
The ISS S&MA Office working in collaboration with the SSP Office is in agreement that no 
show stoppers have been identified that preclude DDO and if the ISSP requirements mandate 
DDO, that these risks be carefully considered against the requirements mandating DDO. ISS 
S&MA has evaluated hazards associated with visiting vehicles and has incorporated their 
findings into their HRs and controls. For any risk mitigation on a specific mission where DDO is 
required, mission-specific development of operational responses. However, extensive, or further 
engineering analysis, including Russian-generated engineering analysis, will be pursued to 
further reduce the potential risks. 
7.2.1 ISS Visiting Vehicle Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) 
The ISS PRA team completed an assessment of the “demonstrated reliability” of RV dockings. 
Specifically, ISS PRA evaluated historical RV Aborts and Manual Dockings. A RV abort is a 
hazard for a docked Orbiter because of the unknown consequences that may arise from an 
increase in propulsive maneuvers. A RV manually controlled docking may increase their 
respective propulsive maneuvers, potentially increasing the hazard to a docked Orbiter. 
The ISS PRA team completed probabilistic risk assessments on RV collision with the Orbiter 
docked to the ISS. Non-collision risks that can potentially affect the Orbiter were calculated, 
including RV probabilistic risk assessments to calculate the risk of hard mate failure, partially 
docked stuck vehicle, and docking failure, RV probabilistic risk assessment of their MCS digital 
system, and RV specific component failures rates for hook motors and springs. 
7.2.1.1 Russian Demonstrated Reliability 
As of August 10, 2010, the RVs have a combined 146 docking attempts (see Table 7-1), using 
the Kurs radar system. The MOD DM/AR&D team have documented records on previous 
docking attempts through November 5, 2006. ISS PRA updated DM/AR&D data through August 
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10, 2010, and did not include any planned manual dockings. The first Soyuz vehicle to use Kurs 
was TM-1 in 1986. The first Progress vehicle to use Kurs was M-1 in 1989. 
Table 7-1.  RV Docking Data. 
 Docking Attempts 
Successful 
Automated 
Dockings 
Aborts Manual Dockings 
Progress 94 81 7 8 
Soyuz 52 43 2 9 
Total 146 124 9 17 
Seven of the nine documented aborts are assumed to have had the potential to impact a docked 
Orbiter. Two RV aborts have occurred outside of station keeping (~200 m), and the PRA team 
assumed these do not impact a docked Orbiter. Two aborts occurred at an unknown distance and 
are assumed to have impact potential to a docked Orbiter. The seven distances where an abort 
was initiated are 8, 10, 12, 47, and 150 m, and two unknown distances. Progress 38P is the most 
recent aborted docking. 
Eleven of the seventeen documented manual dockings are assumed to have had the potential to 
impact a docked Orbiter. The PRA team assumed that a manual takeover inside of 20 m would 
not be an increased hazard to a docked Orbiter. Three of the last eight Progress vehicles have 
docked manually (i.e., 37P, 34P, and 31P). Soyuz 18S is the most recent Soyuz to manually 
dock. 
7.2.1.2 PRA of Docking and Undocking Scenarios 
The PRA models are based on Soyuz PRA v1.2 and Progress PRA v1.2 baseline models. It is 
assumed that RV pyrotechnics will not be used while the Orbiter is docked to the ISS. Therefore, 
pyrotechnics are not included in the PRA models. All Russian component failure rates are based 
on similar US component failure rates because of insufficient Russian component reliability data.  
The PRA model of Soyuz calculates a probability of a hard mate failure after a successful soft 
mate to a mean value of 5.08x10-5 (1 in 19,700) with uncertainty as shown in Figure 7-1. A 
successful soft mate is achieved when the Soyuz probe latches have successfully latched to the 
ISS. A failure of hard mate is when the Soyuz or ISS hooks cannot be closed due to hook system 
failure or failure of probe retraction. Failure to undock after the hard mate failure (without 
attempting to use pyrotechnics) is calculated to have a mean value of 1.10x10-8 (1 in 90,900,000) 
with uncertainty (see Figure 7-1). These two combined failures, mean probability of 1.10x10-8, 
would result in a partially docked stuck Soyuz vehicle. The model of the Progress vehicle has 
similar failure modes and failure probabilities. A Progress hard mate failure has a mean 
probability value of 5.09x10-5 (1 in 19,600), and a Progress partially docked stuck vehicle has a 
mean probability of 1.10x10-8 (1 in 90,900,000), both with uncertainty; see Figure 7-2. 
The PRA model of Soyuz calculates a probability of Soyuz docking failure after initial probe 
contact with the ISS cone to have a mean value of 1.10x10-4 (1 in 9,100) with uncertainty; see 
Figure 7-1. A Progress docking failure has a mean failure probability of 8.02x10-5 (1 in 12,500) 
with uncertainty; see Figure 7-2. 
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A Soyuz or Progress hook motor failure is calculated to have a mean probability of 3.40X10-5 
(1 in 29,400) with uncertainty; see Figure 7-3. 
A Soyuz MCS failure during undocking is calculated to have a mean probability of 3.61x10-5 
(1 in 27,700) with uncertainty; see Figure 7-4. A Progress MCS failure during undocking is 
calculated to have a mean probability of 3.62x10-5 (1 in 27,600) with uncertainty; see Figure 7-4.  
A single Soyuz or Progress spring failure is calculated to have a mean probability of 2.14x10-6 
(1 in 467,000) with uncertainty; see Figure 7-5. A dual Soyuz or Progress spring failure is 
calculated to have a mean probability of 1.07x10-7 (1 in 9,350,000) with uncertainty; see Figure 
7-5. 
7.2.1.3 PRA of Russian Docking Collision 
The PRA models are based on Soyuz PRA v1.2 and Progress PRA v1.2 baseline models. Only 
the final approach (~200 m) to contact is modeled. Earlier vehicle failure leading to collision is 
not considered credible due to the offset Targeting approach used by RVs. All RV component 
failure rates are based on similar US component failure rates because of insufficient Russian 
component reliability data. Ideally a demand failure rate would be used for the short duration 
mission of a RV final approach (i.e., final approach concludes in approximately eight minutes). 
However, a 24-hour mission time is used as a conservative approach to modeling component 
failure data that is based on an hourly failure rate. A combination of expert elicitation and 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) based analyses determined the 
percentage of manual dockings and human error probabilities.  
The RV PRA models calculate collision probabilities with mean values of 2.40x10-5 (1 in 
41,700) and 2.71x10-5 (1 in 36,900) with uncertainty (see Figure 7-6). The collision probability 
does not differentiate between a collision with ISS or with Orbiter; either collision scenario is 
assumed to be catastrophic to the ISS and Orbiter. 
7.2.1.4 PRA of Russian Undocking Collision 
The PRA models are based on Soyuz PRA v1.2 and Progress PRA v1.2 baseline models. For a 
Russian collision during undocking to occur, a combination of failures must transpire, which 
include one hook motor failure, MCS digital loop failure, 100 percent worst-case ISS drift rate, 
and worst-case docking mechanism performance. Worst case docking mechanism performance is 
varied between 100 and 25 percent to observe the sensitivity. All Russian component failure 
rates are based on similar US component failure rates because of insufficient Russian component 
reliability data. 
The PRA model of Soyuz calculates undocking collision probabilities assuming 100 percent 
worst-case docking mechanism performance to have a mean value of 1.23x10-9 (1 in 
815 million) with uncertainty; see Figure 7-7. If the probability of worst-case docking 
mechanism performance is 25 percent, then a mean value of 1.99x10-10 (1 in 5 billion) with 
uncertainty is calculated for Soyuz; see Figure 7-7. The PRA model of Progress calculates 
undocking collision probabilities assuming 100 percent worst-case docking mechanism 
performance to have a mean value of 1.24x10-9 (1 in 808 million) with uncertainty; see Figure 
7-8. If the probability of worst-case docking mechanism performance is 25 percent, then a mean 
value of 1.94x10-10 (1 in 5 billion) with uncertainty is calculated for Progress; see Figure 7-8.  
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Figure 7-1.  Soyuz docking scenarios PRA results. 
 
Figure 7-2.  Progress docking scenarios PRA results. 
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Figure 7-3.  RV hook motor failure PRA results. 
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Figure 7-4.  RV MCS failure (undocking) PRA results. 
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Figure 7-5.  RV spring failures PRA results. 
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Figure 7-6.  RV collision with ISS PRA results. 
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Figure 7-7.  Soyuz undocking collision PRA results. 
1.00E-12 1.00E-11 1.00E-10 1.00E-09 1.00E-08
100% Worst Drift Rate
100% Worst Hook Release Tolerance
100% Worst Drift Rate
25% Worst Hook Release Tolerance
Progress Undocking Collision
1.24E-09 (1 in 808 Million)
1.94E-10 (1 in 5 Billion)
 
Figure 7-8.  Progress undocking collision PRA results. 
7.3 KSC S&MA Summary 
In the event of DDO, there is a potential for the Orbiter PLB to become contaminated with 
NDMA, which is a by-product from firing the RV thrusters. The National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) lists this material as an occupational carcinogen. It is 
expected that this by-product could remain on the PLB liner thermal blankets at the time the 
Orbiter PLBDs are opened in the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF), potentially exposing 
workers at that time.  
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To be prepared to eliminate the exposure hazard and provide processes for cleaning up the 
contamination, if required, KSC S&MA, Ground Operations, and Occupational Hygiene 
specialists have completed assessments and have identified the following processing changes: (1) 
define the level for which the labs will be able to detect the NDMA by-products; (2) define the 
level for which the labs will be able to detect the NDMA by-products on the swabs and thermal 
blanket; (3) define the template for completing sample processing in the labs, considering 
schedule impacts to routine work; and (4) provide a draft plan, with a final plan to be completed 
in the event of a DDO flight, for how to clean the PLB should the sampling reveal a positive 
reading.  
These swab sampling and analysis procedures were performed to baseline the NDMA levels on a 
non-DDO flight. The STS-131/19A PLB post-flight swab test were performed on March 23 and 
26, 2010. These test samples were sent to the NASA labs at KSC where they were tested 
simultaneously for NDMA, MMH, N2H4, and UDMH. As expected, no hypergolic residues nor 
NDMA were found on the samples. As a result of executing these processes and analyses, future 
test samples can be processed in a timely manner. 
7.4 JSC S&MA Summary 
This section presents an integrated hazard and risk assessment performed by JSC S&MA. The 
objectives of this assessment for DDO are to characterize the increase in risk to the SSP; identify 
and characterize hazards, causes, uncertainties, and mitigations; define and frame the risk 
acceptance posture using past flight history and results of DDO analyses; and ensure that SSP 
management recognizes that there is significant effort required, nor any means, to analyze many 
hazard causes and develop risk mitigations. 
7.4.1 Assessment Findings 
It is the opinion of JSC S&MA that DDO represents an increase in risk to the SSP. From this 
organization’s perspective, qualitatively, the risk level may be equivalent to the program top 10 
infrequent risks, although as previously asserted, there exists no means to numerically quantify 
the increase in risk. Aborts present a higher level of risk than nominal. Quantifying the risk with 
an acceptable measure of uncertainty is difficult given lack of data, open causes, and 
undeveloped operational impacts. 
Primary hazards for DDO are collision, ISS structural overload, and Orbiter structural overload. 
Secondary hazards are in-flight readiness assessment limitations and operations impacts. Given 
engineering assessments for nominal proximity operations (Prox Ops), collision and structural 
overload hazards have been defined to be improbable. However, limitations, uncertainties, and 
lack of formal certification engender some unknown level of risk for these hazards. Additionally, 
although limited analysis has cleared the loads, plume loads on the Orbiter PLBD may exceed 
the certification limit, given certain off-nominal, yet unanalyzed trajectories and resulting jet 
firings. 
Figure 7-9 provides a risk scorecard for the DDO primary hazards. Figure 7-10,  
Figure 7-11, and Figure 7-12 elaborate on the 10 specific hazards and explain each risk cause, 
description, severity, likelihood, and classification, as ascertained in the risk assessment 
performed. 
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Figure 7-9.  Primary hazard risk scorecard. 
ID Cause Description Severity Likelihood Classification
1A Approach Abort RV collision with ISS or Orbiter during automated 
or manual abort after terminated approach
Catastrophic Infrequent (abort 
likelihood ~5%)
ISS Accepted Risk
1B Failed Capture  
Bounce
RV collision with ISS or Orbiter after approach 
(AUTO or MIL)  ends with contact conditions 
outside of docking mechanism envelope or FOD 
present resulting in failure to capture
RV “rebound” and initial recovery trajectory to 
prevent collision are unknown
Catastrophic Remote (“low” 
probability per RS 
HRs)
ISS Accepted Risk –
2 FT and DFMR
1C Failed Docking 
Release after  
mechanism retract 
failure
After successful capture, zero fault tolerant 
docking mechanism fails to or FOD prevents 
retraction & structural hooks from being driven
FOD event examples include trash bags on Mir, 
Progress 8P seal and Progress 23 P antenna  
failed deployed
RV collision with ISS or Orbiter after capture latch 
release and contingency separation during mated 
stack LOAC
RV trajectory to prevent collision (with Orbiter or 
ISS) are unknown
Catastrophic Remote (“low” 
probability per RS 
NCR)
ISS Accepted Risk –
RS NCR
 
Figure 7-10.  DDO hazard assessment - collision. 
CONSEQUENCE 
L 
I 
K 
E 
L 
I 
H 
O 
O 
D 
* 
Hazard # Title 
1 Collision (3 causes) 
2 ISS Structural  Overload (5 causes) 
3 Orbiter  Structural  Overload (2 causes) 
Probable 
Infrequent 1A, 2A, 3A 
Remote 
1BC 
2BCDE 
3B  
Improbable 
Marginal Critical Catastrophic 
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ID Cause Description Severity Likelihood Classification
2A* Abort ISS Plume 
Loads
Automated or manual abort after terminated approach
Jet histories are unavailable to assess USPVA or TCS loads
Catastrophic Infrequent (abort 
likelihood ~5%)
Unknown
2B* Failed Capture
Bounce ISS
Plume Loads
Approach contact conditions outside of docking mechanism 
envelope or FOD present resulting in failure to capture
RV “rebound” and subsequent recovery trajectory jet firings are 
unknown to assess USPVA or TCS loads
Catastrophic Remote (“low” 
probability per 
RS HRs)
ISS Accepted Risk –
2 FT and DFMR
2C* Failed Capture
Docking Loads
Approach contact conditions outside of docking mechanism 
envelope or FOD present resulting in failure to capture
Docking contact loads & IGN&C response are unknown
Catastrophic Remote (“low” 
probability per 
RS HRs)
ISS Accepted Risk –
2 FT and DFMR
2D* Failed Docking
Mechanism
Release ISS 
Plume Loads
After successful capture, 0 FT docking mechanism fails to or 
FOD prevents retraction & structural hooks from being driven
RV collision with ISS or Orbiter after capture latch release and 
contingency separation during mated stack LOAC
Subsequent recovery trajectory jet firings are unknown to 
assess USPVA or TCS loads
Shuttle undock with ISS LOAC has not been assessed
Catastrophic Remote (“low” 
probability per 
RS HR & NCR)
ISS Accepted Risk -
DFMR
2E Failed Docking
Mechanism 
IGN&C Loads
After successful capture, 0 FT docking mechanism fails to or 
FOD prevents retraction & structural hooks from being driven
Subsequent IGN&C recovery loads using Orbiter or ISS assets 
are unknown
Catastrophic Remote (“low” 
probability per 
RS HR & NCR)
ISS Accepted Risk -
DFMR
*Causes 2ABCD are routinely certified as part of Shuttle/ISS mission CoFR Verification Analysis Cycle (VAC); Cause 2A for ATV (BCDE are accepted risk) 
and HTV (BCDE are N/A) have equivalent certifications as hazard controls; ISS stage VAC does not include these potential RV contingencies  
Figure 7-11.  DDO hazard assessment - ISS structure overload. 
ID Cause Description Severity Likelihood Classification
3A* Abort Orbiter 
Window Erosion
Automated or manual abort after terminated 
approach
Worst case relative position/attitude and 
duration assumed to estimate maximum 
thruster effluence
Eroded thermal pane fails after entry peak 
heating during descent; failure effects may 
include loss of visibility and debris release 
Eroded thermal pane is etched/hazed resulting 
in degraded visibility
Catastrophic Remote (abort 
likelihood ~5%) Pending
3B* Abort Orbiter PLB 
Door Plume Loads
Automated or manual abort after terminated 
approach
Worst case relative position/attitude assumed 
to estimate maximum pressure
Inability to close doors after hinge overload
Catastrophic Remote (abort 
likelihood ~5%)
Pending
*RV plume impingement  environments for  failed capture bounce and failed docking release (see causes 2BCD)  have not been 
defined  for or assessed by Orbiter - these causes present additional unknown risk  
Figure 7-12.  DDO hazard assessment - Orbiter structural overload. 
7.4.2 Recommended Additional Characterization of Primary Hazard Risk Level 
In an effort to better characterize the primary hazard risk level, data generation and analysis must 
first be performed. These efforts include forward work for the Russian engineering disciplines, 
which would provide data for analysis. Specific analyses requested include: 
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a. RSC-E conduct automated and man-in-the-loop RV trajectory and docking system 
simulations. As reported by the VIPER team’s bilateral discussions with their Russian 
counterparts, a limited abort data development is in work, with completion expected on or 
around November 2010. For this analysis set space to be complete, it should consist of 
Monte Carlo run sets focusing on credible dispersions and concurrent failure/anomaly 
events. Simulators should have adequate capabilities and fidelity to model RS MCS, contact 
dynamics, etc. The Russians should develop ISS relative motion and RV firing histories, 
which include approach abort, failed capture, and docking mechanism release scenarios. 
Additionally, they should use simulation docking contact conditions to verify capture 
performance and synthesize failed capture docking forcing functions. 
b. Several key ISS analyses should then be performed, using the Russian simulation products 
as inputs. As was conducted to certify Orbiter dockings to ISS, the ISS analysts could then 
verify adequate vehicle clearance for failed capture and the docking mechanism release 
scenarios. Also from the Russian data, the ISS engineers could develop updated fluence and 
plume pressure estimates, which could then be used to assess integrated vehicle loads for 
failed capture, docking mechanism retraction failure and release, including mechanism 
contact forces and applicable Integrated ISS GN&C system thruster firings, assess integrated 
ISS GN&C systems controllability and stability margins for Orbiter VRCS and ISS RS MCS 
for failed docking mechanism retraction. These data would be used by engineers to assess 
Orbiter contingency separation, assuming ISS loss of attitude control (which is a 
catastrophic hazard for ISS) after docking mechanism retraction failure. As stated, all of 
these analyses were performed during certification of Orbiter to ISS docking. Failure to 
perform these analyses results in increased analysis uncertainty.  
c. Orbiter analyses to be performed, given ISS environments, include conducting additional 
window erosion testing and reassessing PLBD plume loads analysis with a more 
representative and comprehensive database than has been performed to date. 
d. Pending simulation and analyses, Russian procedures and training (and perhaps United 
States On-orbit Segment (USOS) and SSP operations products and training) could then be 
updated, and additional operational mitigations could be developed to further reduce risk. 
Figure 7-13 provides a more detailed and methodical depiction of this analysis process and 
provides background rationale and examples. 
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Risk Description Impacts Classification Examples
Certification 
Rigor
Non-certification and limited 
assessment of induced 
environments.  Despite best 
efforts, program assessments 
completed to date have 
significant limitations
Collision, structural 
overload, mission
success
ISS Accepted Risk given Stage 
VAC / SSP Accept assessment 
limitations for Orbiter (and ISS 
USPVA overload?)
Shuttle/ISS VAC uses 400+ 
Monte Carlo simulations 
(dispersed nominal & abort 
cases) for PROX OPS versus 
only 8 RV nominal flight cases
Operational 
Anomaly 
Potential
Potential for unanticipated 
anomalies, late changes to or 
unplanned OPS, and human 
errors – separate from failures
Collision, structural 
overload, mission 
success
ISS Accepted Risk  / 
Constrained by agency directive 
& International Partner 
agreements
The last six RV events 
(dock/undock/relocate)
MIL Soyuz 
Inertial 
Approach & 
Docking
No analysis has been conducted 
for this contingency where 
failures or OPS anomalies result 
in transition from automated to 
MIL approach and mated stack is 
required to hold solar inertial 
attitude
Unknown thermal 
effects, collision, 
structural overload, 
mission success
ISS Accepted Risk given FT, 
crew training, FRs, Chits / SSP 
Accepted risk for no 
environment assessment given 
lack of trajectory histories and 
ATL
Soyuz 9S abort and subsequent 
inertial approach (after ISS solar 
inertial snap & hold)
Orbiter Out-of-
Configuration
Failures leave Orbiter systems or 
payloads “unprotected” from RV-
induced environments
Degraded TPS 
inspection/increased 
entry risk, mission 
success, ground T/A
Shuttle accepted risk given FT 
on critical systems, flight rules
SRMS (0 FT) failure leaves 
OBSS sensors exposed
Joint OPS 
Complexity
Concurrent visiting vehicle 
resource management challenges
Mission success Joint Accepted Risk Orbiter debris damage 
assessment may be delayed 
given RV contingencies
 
Figure 7-13.  Secondary integrated risks. 
7.4.3 DDO Integrated Safety Assessment Possible Mitigations for Secondary Integrated 
Risks 
Additional mitigations, which would include extensive coordination effort between the SSP, 
ISSP, and RSC-E, would help mitigate secondary risk. These include, but are not limited to: 
a. Using joint flight history (Space Shuttle, ISS, RS, and RV), catalog credible failures 
and contingencies, review them for DDO impacts, and trade contingency planning costs 
versus risk level. 
b. Conduct VVO/AR&D team technical interchange meetings to review contingency 
procedures and plans for Orbiter situational awareness. 
c. Verify RV on-orbit safety critical systems tests are tested or verified prior to vehicle final 
rendezvous or undock and separation. 
d. Require the use of video assets to monitor the active RV, and have the ability to process and 
assess trajectory and jet firing performance. 
e. Preplan and position engineering and operations personnel to react to RV contingencies, 
including the authority to stop an operation, should the need arise. 
f. Consider conducting at least one bilateral multi-Program Mission Management Team 
simulation to establish effective lines of communication. 
g. Conduct trades for Orbiter contingency undock and re-rendezvous in the event of RV 
contingencies.  
h. Generate considerations to preclude DDO altogether or limit “overlap.”  Negotiate the RV 
launch schedule to mitigate mission impacts. After a SSP launch delay with RV launch dates 
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regarded as inflexible, evaluate a “slip” into DDO after scrubbing the mission objectives and 
timeline. 
i. Consider mission-specific risk acceptance given dock or undock, RS port utilization, 
integrated timeline complexity, etc.  
7.4.4 JSC S&MA Integrated Safety Assessment Summary and Conclusion 
No safety concerns have been identified with DDO for nominal RV rendezvous, proximity 
operations, docking, and undocking scenarios. Identified risk for Orbiter PLBD limit load 
exceedances may be avoided with a more detailed analysis, which could be based on reduced 
conservatism of key input parameters, if the appropriate input dataset were generated and shared 
by the Russian engineers. DDO catastrophic hazards are collision and structural overload due to 
aborts and docking failures. However, some hazard controls have significant limitations due to 
lack of data and analysis. Operational recovery from off-nominal docking and undocking has an 
indeterminate increase  in complexity and will not be fully developed, given the level of effort 
currently scoped to prepare for a DDO flight. Follow-on actions to potentially reduce the DDO 
risk have been identified in this section. It is noted that additional risk mitigation is not possible 
in some cases due to limited resources and time constraints. 
It is the opinion of JSC S&MA that DDO Hazards can be eliminated with schedule management. 
Therefore, the JSC S&MA directorate does not support implementation of DDO unless required 
for mitigation of potentially catastrophic hazards to the ISS. 
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8.0 PVR Summary 
Two PVRs were conducted to ensure that the DDO mission objectives and technical 
requirements for the development and implementation effort were fully understood. The purpose 
of both reviews was to evaluate program technical requirements and to evaluate the analysis, 
techniques, results, procedures, agreements, etc., used by all participants in determining the 
viability of DDO for all flights. Both reviews encompassed all major SSP participants and 
included the ISS VIPER and S&MA communities. 
The following sections provide a synopsis from these reviews.  
8.1 PVR 
The DDO PVR was held February 23, 2010, and the main purpose of the review was to evaluate 
the analysis techniques and results against program technical requirements used by SSP technical 
areas in determining the viability of DDO for STS-132/ULF4 and subsequent missions.  
There were four stated goals for the meeting:  (1) evaluate the data against the requirements for 
generic DDO; (2) identify constraints; (3) identify forward work; and  
(4) identify risks and mitigation methods for the SSP. A thorough review of analysis completed 
to date was conducted. The Orbiter window analysis and discussion of test results were not 
discussed at this meeting as testing was in process. Discussion of this subject was deferred to the 
delta DDO PVR. From this review a formal action was assigned:  ISSP is to develop jet-firing 
data for the worst-case scenario and provide the environments data to the SSP. Once received, 
the OPO and PRTs will evaluate the data against SSP requirements for the new environment. 
The ISSP and SSP are to continue working through the joint verification process. Results are to 
be presented at the delta DDO PVR. 
The general consensus from the PVR was that significant work had been completed and that all 
the teams are waiting for the updated environments data. Any future DDO flights will be 
analyzed on a mission-specific basis. It was recognized that a delta PVR would be required to 
address the additional environments and the results of the Orbiter windows testing. Further 
details on the meeting results can be found in reference [41]. 
8.2 Delta PVR 
The DDO Delta PVR was held August 13, 2010. The meeting’s purpose was to follow up on the 
PVR held February 23, 2010, and review Orbiter window test results, additional environments, 
and FO&I and Orbiter assessments of those environments and to provide an integrated S&MA 
assessment of risk.  
The intent of the review is to provide SSP managers with flexibility to schedule flights for times 
currently blocked out for DDO. This discussion concerns RV docking and undocking. It does not 
concern HTV, ATV, or any commercial vehicles. There is less “wiggle room” in the manifest as 
the end of the SSP approaches, and more flexibility is desired. This review included a response 
to actions assigned at the February 23, 2010, PVR. The generic case will be examined, and 
recommendations for DDO will be provided. 
From the review, the following summarizes the recommendations and opinions from the 
functional disciplines and program offices involved in this multilateral effort. It is important to 
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note that the DDO decision process is in two parts: (1) determine whether DDO can be 
performed, and (2) determine whether DDO should be performed. The second part would be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, including operational, clearance and other considerations, 
and schedule.  
All the PVR board members agreed with the exception of JSC S&MA that DDO could be 
performed, if necessary, but should be avoided if possible by pursuing slips to Space Shuttle 
manifest, RV docking/undocking, stage EVAs, or other scheduling adjustments.  
a. Current DDO analysis lacks knowledge of RV abort or off-nominal trajectories and 
environments, which resulted in the inability to quantify SSP operational risks. Using Mir 
space station and ISS historical data, probability of close-in RV abort is 5 percent (i.e., 7 in 
146 dockings); ISS-only abort probability is 3 percent (i.e., 2 aborts in 62 dockings).  
b. JSC S&MA expressed the strongest opposition to DDO, stating, “JSC S&MA directorate 
does not support implementation of DDO unless required for mitigation of potentially 
catastrophic hazards to the ISS.”  However, all risks identified by JSC S&MA were Yellow 
(infrequent-catastrophic); none were in the Red (probable-catastrophic).  
Operational impacts not considered, the PVR board agreed on the following: 
a. RV undocking is feasible, because the thruster firings are believed to be enveloped by the 
“bounded nominal” cases assessed for docking aborts (10° approach cone, 4° max pitch 
angle). The trajectories should be safe since orbital mechanics will create a separation after 
undocking. 
b. All ISSP ports are acceptable for undocking except the FGB/MRM 1 nadir port, which 
needs further analysis because of close proximity to the Orbiter tail. Previously, this port had 
been ground-ruled out. However: 
1. FGB/MRM1 nadir port is planned for Soyuz 23S undock for the November DDO cutout 
and 25S docking for the December DDO cutout. Both cutouts could be used by STS-
133/ULF5 for launch attempts, but time is limited for necessary coordination and 
planning. 
2. FGB/MRM1 nadir port is planned for 25S undock for the May DDO cutout, which 
could be used by STS-134/ULF4 if STS-133 slips to February 2011. 
3. Nominally, Progress docks to SM aft and DC-1 nadir ports, and Soyuz docks to 
FGB/MRM1 nadir and MRM2 zenith ports. 
c. For RV dockings, no issues were identified for nominal (down the centerline) or bounded 
nominal (10° approach cone, 4° pitch angle). The only unresolved issue was risk of Orbiter 
window damage from thruster particles for a docking abort to MRM2 Zenith. Worst-case 
consequences are window(s) shattering and subsequent debris during high-Q, after entry 
thermal phase, or hazing/cracking, which prevents crew from seeing through forward 
windows for landing. 
1. Since the ISSP has received no abort data from the Russians, data was synthesized 
based on nominal thruster firings and RV abort specifications. For worst-on-worst abort 
case assumptions for MRM2 zenith port (15° backout cone, 15° maximum pitch angle 
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with mid thrusters always pointed at windows), the thruster particle fluence 
(particles/cm2) exceeded the maximum fluence tested on windows by 7.5 times.  
2. Although windows passed the nominal and bounded nominal cases, the Windows PRT 
was unable to extrapolate their test data to the fluence level for the worst-case abort 
because the fluence necessary to cause windows to fail is unknown. Board members 
recommended additional window testing to clear MRM2 port, estimated at $50,000 SSP 
funding and an approximate 3 to 4 month duration. MRM2 is worst docking port for 
windows and is planned for 26S docking in April 2011. This DDO cutout could 
potentially be used by STS-134/ULF6.  
The overriding consensus is that DDO can be performed, but it should not be done unless 
absolutely required because of Program or Agency priorities. In addition, mission-specific risks 
and operational complexities will need to be assessed as part of the risk trade if a decision is 
made to protect DDO for a particular flight. 
Further details on the meeting results can be found in reference [42]. 
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